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Overview of the essence of the problem discussed. My dissertation deals with 
implicit and explicit normativity of ordering or finding order in the world. 
Order, lawfulness and regularity associate with epistemic security, that is, the 
possibility of knowing (the future) and of making plans. Hence the paper is 
about normativity of secure knowledge, or of feeling security as driving regu-
lating and ordering. With ‘scientific laws’ in a narrow sense, often called ‘laws 
of nature’, I mean first of all mathematically expressed laws in contemporary 
empirical exact sciences. However, this is just the peak of what can be viewed 
and has been viewed as expressing order and regularity in nature (in portions of 
the surrounding world): their mathematical formulation rests on the attributes of 
corresponding phenomena or entities that have been quantified, rendered into 
numerical form or measurable; but (exact, rigorous, numerical) comparability – 
measurability – is not an all-or-nothing but rather a more-or-less potentiality of 
“attributes” (see Appendix 4). By contemplating their normativity or imperati-
veness, understanding laws of nature and evolution of this understanding (to be 
discussed in Chapter 2) are relevant, hence also other senses of those laws not 
(mathematically) expressed. So it is not merely about whether “nature” is 
inexorably compelling or not, or whether man needs epistemic security or not; 
rather it is also about what is regarded as nature and where the security is sought 
after. 
When nature is the immediately surrounding world and wilderness, her parti-
cular (material) being is understood to constitute or belong to her “laws”, then 
the knowledge and epistemic security – if such is to be achieved – stem from 
the man setting himself, his actions, according to or into accordance with the 
material natural environment. Striving towards epistemic economy – towards 
generality and concomitant abstractness – parallels neglecting individuality and 
material particularities in nature, forming nature to conform the general abstract 
knowledge, thus enforcing abstractifying both the notions of ‘nature’ and of 
‘laws of nature’. This is the inescapable approach of science, and being (made 
into) the epitome of correct, sometimes of true, knowledge of nature, this 
approach has expanded both to other cognitive practices aiming at scientificity, 
and to the everyday thinking and cognition. Acting in the world – including in 
the natural environment – man needs to employ the things and beings in the 
world, thus he changes the world according to his needs. When what is called 
laws of nature is taken as guidelines for this acting, the way of acting and of 
changing the world strongly depends on how the nature and laws of nature are 
understood. In the contemporary understanding, given by the (exact) sciences of 
nature, the world is thought to be acted upon in accordance with laws of 
nature – the laws formulated in those sciences; it is often neglected that it is, in 
fact or first of all, acted upon into accordance with those laws, particularly 
acting with the mediation of technology. In other words: laws of nature are 
usually taken to be purely descriptive – in contrast to legal laws which are 
explicitly normative by prescribing certain ways of conduct and action – 
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whereas their deep-rootedness in contemporary world picture and cognition 
guides human action on a deeper level, remaining unnoticed in their normative-
ness. 
The technological mediation comes to determine ever more of human 
understanding of the nature and the world. It enables man to achieve his goals, 
thus setting nature into the role of providing resources to be arranged according 
to human discretion and control, used and exploited, thereby neglecting the 
nature’s own being and dignity – as if what is were merely for and through man. 
It also broadens the possibilities of human action upon the nature, hence in a 
sense it seems to enhance human agency. However, the ever more techno-
logically determined world also restricts naturalness of the life-world by 
intruding ever deeper and farther into the wilderness and narrowing its extent 
and perceivability; the nature (wilderness) recedes from the immediate cogni-
tion of everyday life. As mathematical-technical accountability and controllabi-
lity of the world is strengthened, it comes to be taken for granted, forming a 
normal basic cognition of man and nature. By concentrating on the planned 
aspects and effects of his actions and neglecting multifariousness of beings and 
their relations, man thus claims ever more precise knowledge of the world and 
an ever more cunning skill to steer it. The unforeseen effects that arise out of 
this steering sooner prompt further technological means than revising the 
imperative of the ubiquitous (mathematical-technological) control and its 
generated world picture. 
Formulation of the research question. I propose that laws of nature are not 
neutral with respect to human activity and thinking in the way as they are often 
thought to be so – namely as being purely descriptive, representing in human 
knowledge the way nature is and goes. This claim is not new (see references in 
footnote 1 and part 1.3.2); I think human agency, human understanding of 
nature, and the (human understanding of) laws of nature are mutually related 
and variously normative to one another, where the guiding aim is order enabling 
certainty in thinking and action. Thus I will consider laws expressing natural 
order (scientific laws) and laws expressing social order (legal laws). These 
two – nature and society – are the relevant fields for me to consider as: 1) they 
are the fields of laws, that is, the epitomes of law are mostly laws of nature and 
laws of society (legal norms); 2) nature and society are often regarded as 
contrasts, opposing counters, for 2a) nature is taken to be passive, as subject to 
human action, society as active, acting upon nature and other surrounding 
world, 2b) (due to 2a) laws of nature are taken to be descriptive, laws of society 
(legal norms) as prescriptive; the explicit normativity of legal laws offers a 
preliminary enframing for normativity of scientific laws; 3) as has been 
emphasized in several recent philosophical accounts of science1, nature-related 
aspects and human-(and/or society-)related aspects should be accounted for 
together, if one looks for an adequate understanding of science; I assume this is 
                                                 
1  Constructive realism: Vihalemm 1979, 1989, 1995, 2001, 2011, Rouse 1996, 2002, 
Stepin 1999a,b, 2005, Giere 1988, 2006, 2008, 2010. 
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necessary also for understanding law. (2b) is the immediate target of my study 
as I aim to show the normativity of laws of nature. Thus I will develop a 
comparative analysis of laws of nature or of sciences with legal laws, which 
depend on, or are ordered by, human decisions, and influence or order them. 
Such an analysis may comprise the following aspects: 
A purely theoretical (formal-logical, linguistic – including semantic, or 
other) analysis may compare what are called ‘laws’, and the language of laws, 
in each of them2, or the theoretical assumptions underlying such laws3, or the 
relation of those laws to the (objective) reality (either on the side of their origin, 
or on the side of their purpose and function)4. A cognitive or phenomenological 
study is to show how scientific and legal systems, and the world imbued with 
and determined by them, is revealed subjectively, to individual consciousness 
(to the “self”), and how they affect the perception of self and its relation to the 
world5. A practical or historical approach would try to construe developments of 
scientific and legal systems in concrete historical, social-cultural and environ-
mental circumstances as human and social actions and activities responding to 
those circumstances and their changes6. The levels of comparison may be the 
said laws7, or the part (broadly construed) of the world they are to apply to8, or 
the theories encompassing the laws9, or meta-theories which study the scientific 
or legal theories (e.g. philosophies of science and of law)10, or practices of law 
construction or formulation11. Finally, one can either compare these two areas as 
to their similarities and differences, for example in order to give an account for 
understanding one or another of their aspects with the help of the other (which 
seems to be most often the case); or one can consider relatedness, that is, 
                                                 
2  Dretske 1977, Dalla Chiara and Giuntini 2002, Haack 2008, Holmes 1899, 1897, 
Alchourrón and Bulygin 1971, Ross 1998, von Wright 1951, 1963, 1972, Kelsen 1976/1960, 
Dorato 2005, Hage and Verheij 1999 
3 Hart and Honoré 1973, Lunstroth 2009, Haack 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, Holmes 1897, 
1899, 1915, Alchourrón and Bulygin 1971, van Fraassen 1989, Laudan 2006 
4  Rundle 2004, Mumford 2000, 2004, Flanagan 2010, Beebee 2000, Landers 1990, Haack 
1999, 2004, 2009, Holmes 1897, 1915, van Fraassen 1989, Dretske 1977, Ross 1998, Agassi 
1966, 1973, Kelsen 1976/1960, Dalla Chiara and Giuntini 2002, von Wright 1951, Laudan 
2006, Finnis 1980, Hage and Verheij 1999 
5  Finnis 1980, Mumford 2004, Haack 2004, Holmes 1915, Agassi 1995/96, Kelsen 
1939/1940 
6  Ruby 1986, Lemons et al 1997, Haack 1999, 2008, Holmes 1899, Agassi 1982, Dorato 
2005, Kelsen 1939/1940 
7  Austin 2001, Ruby 1986, Mumford 2000, Flanagan 2010, Dalla Chiara and Giuntini 
2002, von Wright 1951, Alchourrón and Bulygin 1971, Dretske 1977, Dorato 2005 
8  Rundle 2004, Mumford 2000, 2004, Finnis 1980, Ruby 1986, Landers 1990, Holmes 
1915, Dretske 1977, Ross 1998, von Wright 1963 
9  Hart and Honoré 1973, Finnis 1980, Haack 2004, 2007, 2008, Holmes 1899, Alchour-
rhón and Bulygin 1971, Kelsen 1976/1960, von Wright 1972 
10  Haack 2005, 2007, Holmes 1899 
11  Lemons et al 1997, Beebee 2000, Laudan 2006, Ruby 1986, Haack 1999, 2004, 2005, 
2009, Holmes 1897, van Fraassen 1989, Agassi 1966, 1973, 1982, 1995/96 
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(mutual) influences or interdependence of legal or moral norms and scientific 
laws12. 
I see these aspects and levels to be interrelated and affecting each other, and 
I see also science and law affect each other in these various aspects, on various 
levels in several ways. The reputation of exact science stems from an image of 
it as of the true theory of the physical world; mathematics is thought to be the 
language of the nature. It is an image that all other sciences, including legal 
science, have tried to imitate, to strive towards. This presupposes well-defined 
concepts (mathematically defined, if possible), which correspond to determinate 
entities in objective reality (measurable, if possible). This image contributes to 
the perception that the world, its contents and their properties, are objectively 
clearly determinable, comparable, measurable, calculable. Well-formulated laws 
and norms are to enable interactions with the respective parts of the world and 
manipulation of them. Historically, as the notion of ‘natural law’ indicates, 
certain laws, moral or legal norms were perceived as being non-contingent, 
rather like laws of nature – laws of morals, of human reason or God (Austin 
2001; Alchourrón and Bulygin (1971: 50–51): natural law postulates as the 
basic axioms of law as a deductive system on the example of Euclidian 
geometry, seen as the ideal science with a deductive system). Legal positivism 
opposed to treating human laws as naturally given, and treated them instead as 
arbitrary, as purely conventional. However, I would contend that although laws 
are not given objectively and independently of human mind, neither are they as 
arbitrary as it may appear according to positivism: 
Both science and law are social practices. That is, they are carried out in 
human societies, have developed in social and natural circumstances, learning 
from them and shaping them. Neither is a mere theory, but rather a theory 
according to which certain activities are carried out and which is adjusted to the 
results of those activities. Thereby it is not that law applies to one part of the 
society and of the environment, and science to another part not overlapping with 
the first. Rather they apply to the same society and to the same environment, 
shaping them in different ways and aspects, but thereby changing the world 
from which either of them learns for its theory. Scientific research and develop-
ment of theories change the understanding of the world, as the new knowledge 
created in those cognitive processes imbues common sense knowledge and 
becomes a basis for designing the world, including technical development. This 
changes social relations, natural and social environment, perception and under-
standing of the ways how human power can change the world, thus creating 
new possibilities and problems that must be (legally) regulated. Legal regula-
tion, in order to be applicable and relevant to the new cognitive and techno-
logical situation, must use this very same scientific-technical language, thereby 
on the one hand crystallising it as a valid conceptual network, hence socially 
normative, on the other hand creating social-institutional science-making 
                                                 
12  Lemons et al 1997, Haack 2005, Holmes 1899, 1915, Laudan 2006, Agassi 1966, 1973, 
1982, 1995/96, von Wright 1963 
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structures, which on their part are based on the legal-political understanding of 
social relations [technocracy]. A third dimension, but related with the two 
previous ones, is the interdependence and mutual inspiration in universalisation 
or colonisation process for either frameworks: by claiming universal validity or 
truth, they pretend to be applicable independently of time and place; thereby 
legal-political power has enabled concrete manipulations of the world to prove 
scientific theories, and those on their part have empowered and credited the 
universal applicability and superiority of certain legal-political regimes (see 
Anghie 1999, Harding 2003, Lunstroth 2009). In Appendix 3 I consider the 
universality of laws – of laws of nature and of international law – arguing for 
fragmentation of laws (both natural and legal) and for corresponding locality-
conditioned customised practice. 
 
Arguments set forth for defence.  
1. Scientific laws, or laws of nature as they are often called, are normative in a 
similar sense as legal laws are normative: they prescribe ways of acting and 
sanctions in case of non-conformity. 
2. The aim of laws (scientific and legal) is achieving epistemic and practical 
certainty – simplicity and foreseeability (predictability) in actions upon the 
world. 
3. Mathematicalness and mathematical laws are pragmatic in the sense that 
they provide the repose of mind due to the (illusory) simplicity in the 
complex, often irregular world. 
4. The way the mathematical laws of nature gain validity operates through 
active human agency in restructuring the world according to those laws, or 
forcing the world to display regularities expressed with the laws. The aim of 
doing so lies, as said in argument 2. This is how scientific laws are norma-
tive, as said in argument 1. 
5. The concept of nature depends on the concept of laws of nature; hence the 
more technical or abstract the concept of laws of nature, the more technical 
or abstract the concept of nature. 
6. The world view is dependent on the concepts of nature and of laws of 
nature, and it is normative to human agency. 
 
Description of methods. To a considerable extent, I work in the conceptual 
framework of constructive realism in various contexts, either applying it to 
concrete scientific attempts as case studies (Appendices 1 and 2); to law as one 
of my main issues, either as case study (Appendix 3) or in service of the com-
parison between scientific and legal laws, with the clarification of normativity 
of the former as one aim (Paragraph 1.3.2, Chapter 2, Appendix 3); or to serve 
more directly my main aim – explicating normativity of the basis of science and 
of its laws (Chapter 2, Appendix 4). Phenomenological approach to science and 
technology (by Martin Heidegger), and somewhat to law, will have a funda-
mentally important role, as I will compare and unite it with constructive realism 
in order to explicate cognitive aspects of natural and social order and trace their 
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generation and normativities (Chapter 2, Appendix 3). To the latter end also 
historical accounts of aspects of science and technology will be engaged and 
used to explicate and clarify the phenomenological concepts (Chapter 2). To 
keep clear the meaning of ‘normativity’, a logical account of explicitly norma-
tive systems will be provided and expounded for comparison with not explicitly 
normative systems, together with some of its implications (abstractness or 
generality, causality, implicit normativity) (Chapter 1). 
My attitude towards science, its theories and law-establishing practice as 
normative owes much to Joseph Rouse’s (1987, 1996, 2002) account of science 
as variously normative and his emphasis on practice in contrast to language, 
which he considers a substructure of practice, immersed in and interacting with 
it. Rouse’s naturalist account of normativity aims to take into equal account 
both (natural) science and its practice as well as the nature that the science is 
about, and to follow the principles of metaphysical naturalism that philosophy 
should impose no arbitrary constraints upon science nor invoke supernatural 
explanations about (the success of) scientific knowledge, and “that human 
beings and any other beings to whom (putative) norms might intelligibly apply 
are natural beings, embodied, causally intra-active, and historically and bio-
logically evolved” (Rouse 2002: 2–4). For me the especially important aspects 
here are particularity and historicity of scientific practices and their carriers, 
their situatedness in particular cultural-technological-natural circumstances that 
make up their world. I see a parallel with Edgar Schein’s conception of the three 
levels of culture (the visible artefacts, the conscious espoused beliefs and 
values, and the unconscious basic underlying assumptions; see footnote 74) 
where Rouse’s normative networks are mainly on the underlying unconscious 
level (Rouse (1987: 62): “This field [of possibilities] remains hidden from us … 
as something so close to us and so obvious that we see right through it. We are 
unable to envisage concretely what an alternative to this field would be, and we 
are likewise unable to envisage the field itself as such.”). Their unconsciousness 
lies in the state of affairs that their normativity is usually not noticed, it is 
implicit in the practices, whereby the practices themselves and scientific lan-
guage are usually not perceived as explicitly prescriptive (hence science and 
technology are usually considered (value-)neutral). This basic underlying level 
of culture and hence of (world-)cognition I perceive to be strongly shaped in the 
way as Martin Heidegger describes the essence of contemporary technology and 
science, and my main interest lies in articulating this way of cognition in a more 
detailed manner (Chapter 2). Thus my other major inspirations, particularly 
concerning what exactly science prescribes, how it shapes the being-together of 
man and the world, emanate from Heidegger’s philosophy of technology and 
Carolyn Merchant’s eco-philosophy, plus various other authors who either more 
or less explicitly state or implicitly follow the normativity or norms of science. 
My contribution to solving the problem lies in 1) bringing the logic of 
explicitly normative systems to bear upon scientific regimes with the aim to 
clarify the normativity hidden in them; 2) the attempt to set legal regimes into 
the frameworks of practice-based philosophy of science and phenomenology of 
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technology to uncover their analogous practical-technical approach to their 
object and the connectedness of techno-scientific and legal regimes in handling 
the world; 3) the tentative categorisation of aspects of implicit normativity of 
science; 3a) with critical analysis of classical physics (measurement theory), 
social science and the so-called post-non-classical science (by Ilya Prigogine) as 
illustrations of the aspects of normativity; 4) the historically based feminist-
ecophilosophical interpretation of Heidegger’s phenomenology of technology. 
Course of answering the research question and its evidence. In Chapter 1 
(like in Appendix 3) a comparative analysis of science and law is elaborated. I 
propose a logical reconstruction, a conceptual framework (from Alchourrón and 
Bulygin 1971) of explicitly normative systems, to try applying it on scientific 
theory in order to identify possible analogous elements characteristic of norma-
tive systems (paragraph 1.1). The two kinds of systems (science and law) will 
be compared as to the legitimacy of the logical analogue: the roles of abstract-
ness and concreteness (1.2) and the kind of implication presumed in the laws 
(between the elements of the laws), or the logical modality of the laws (1.3). 
Subparagraph 1.3.1 then scrutinises causality as an aspect of necessity usually 
implicated as the modality of natural laws, and its role in legal law will be 
regarded; subparagraph 1.3.2 broadens the notion of normativity from explicit 
to implicit kinds of prescriptiveness better suitable for scientific laws and 
scientific world picture. In my view the talk of law, lawfulness, regularity, or 
order, is driven by the human need or longing for certainty and the will to bring 
this certainty into the world, to have the world under control.13 Thus Chapter 2, 
elaborating on the kinds of implicit normativity and hence of normativity of the 
basis of science (as does Appendix 4), analyses and criticises the meaning of 
regularity or order as to what it is that offers this certainty; additionally, human 
order-seeking and -bringing interaction with the world, with the nature, and 
some historical aspects of this interaction and of corresponding world picture or 
cognition will be undertaken. Paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 give a historical-pheno-
menological account of the emergence of contemporary scientific-technological 
world cognition, 2.3 of scientific theory and scientific law. Subparagraphs 2.3.1 
and 2.3.2 peer more deeply into the concept of law of nature, its historical 
variants and the concept of the nature or the world (and wilderness) in relation 
to the understandings of laws of nature. Paragraph 2.4 provides some examples 
to illustrate the approaches of the theoretical frameworks of Chapters 1 and 2. 
The four articles underlying the current work (Appendices 1…4) contribute 
to the aim of the dissertation as follows: 
Appendices 1 and 2 constitute case studies that paved the way for my argu-
ment (mathematical laws of nature as normative for the micro level of matter 
and fundamental human cognition, and for social sciences, correspondingly). 
                                                 
13  Although Laudan (1984: 83–84) claims that science abandoned the ideal aim of episte-
mic security, this aim still seems to persist at least in the popular understanding of science 
and its role in society. Also Cartwright (2008, 1) finds that despite quantum indeterminacy 
and chaos the world is seen as governed by laws of which the success of science is evidence. 
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Appendix 1 “The constructive realist account of science and its application to 
Ilya Prigogine’s conception of laws of nature” (Mets, Kuusk 2009)14 illustrates 
the perception that mathematics is a (or the) true language in which to describe 
and make sense of the world. Prigogine is a renowned scientist who has created 
considerable well mathematised theories of self-organising systems in chemistry 
and physics. In this paper we criticise his attempt to expand this mathematical 
approach to what he calls ‘the fundamental level of reality’, to the micro-level 
that he considers to be inherently fundamentally irreversible, self-organising, 
unstable, complex, and to the ‘fundamental level of human perception’, parti-
cularly time as a kind of basic “dimension” of human experience of life and the 
world. Our criticism mainly rests on the nature of exact scientific theories as 
idealised, abstract theories with particular aims and purposes, where the aims 
and purposes determine the required or allowed level of abstractness and close-
ness to empiria. Mathematics, “the language of science”, does not describe 
immediately the reality that a scientific theory is about, but rather defines 
models that can be used to manipulate the reality, as we argue on the basis of 
accounts of science by Nancy Cartwright, Rein Vihalemm and Ronald Giere. 
Hence it does not make much sense to try to describe the whole intricate 
material world with mathematical formulae, which are in any case too abstract 
and would become unmanageable and hence unusable if it should be adapted to 
describe the intricate elaboration of the world as Prigogine seems to have in 
mind. In addition, in the light of the discussion of measurement theory and 
practice in Appendix 4, a deficit of concrete references from mathematical for-
mulae to empirically identifiable properties of material situations diminishes the 
applicability of Prigogine’s approach. 
There is another aspect to Prigogine’s approach which deserves criticism in 
the perceptual and historical accounts of order to be developed in the following 
analysis: the will to mathematise the most intimate “dimension” of human being 
(Dasein) – time. He criticises the usual parametrisation of time, that is – that 
time is usually inserted into physical formulae as a parameter in the same way 
like parameters of space, as if time had the same characteristics, and most 
weirdly – as if one could move forwards and backwards in time like one can 
move in space. Thus he attempts to develop what he calls a ‘time operator’, 
which is to take into account the irreversibility of time. However, if this 
operator as a mathematical formula is to apply on concrete situations, it must be 
specified in relation to material settings of the world, which has not been done, 
so it can rather be viewed as pure mathematics than as physics (in Appendix 4 I 
consider the relation of mathematics to matter through measurement; Stepin 
1999a,b, 2005 exposes conditions for mathematical formula to count as part of 
physical theory – material interpretability). The parametrising approach to time 
in classical physics takes time as something uniform, whereas this uniformity 
                                                 
14  In this article the author suggested the problem investigated and performed the philo-
sophical analysis, while the co-author complemented it taking into account the actual work 
in theoretical physics. 
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has been achieved through corresponding technologies resting on processes 
considered as regular, that is, as generating periodic physical (material) signs 
counting as time units which can be used in physical operations in science, 
technology and everyday life. On the other hand, looking at time not as the 
materially-spatially generated sequence of ticks, as axes of units, but rather as a 
flow of moments, as the fundamental sense of human experience of life, in the 
eco-feminist and Heidegger-inspired critique of science and technology to be 
considered later in this paper, such a formalisation of the most intimate 
perception may count as offensive, as a misrepresentational mathematical en-
framing superimposed on an inarticulable reality, thus setting it wrongly or 
blocking it. However, time operator could also be a concept applying to any 
dynamic system, purporting to describe its inherent time flow, not just the 
inexorable transience in human cognition. But what would this mean – what 
information would it give about this system, if related only to its inner self? A 
mathematical formula must be interpretable, it must make reference to some 
humanly reachable and intersubjective system, its variables and parameters to 
some measurement and unit systems and dimensions. This means their refe-
rence cannot be limited to just one operating unity, but must take reference to 
other material systems, including some etalon units and processes for ascribing 
numbers, if mathematics is to make any sense at all, if it is to help calculate (see 
Appendix 4 about the meaning of measurement for physical theory, and Tal 
2011(2012) about measurement units and their materialisations). 
Appendix 2 “On scientificity of social sciences. Rein Taagepera Making 
Social Sciences More Scientific” (Mets 2009) relates to normativity of scientific, 
mathematical approach in the field of social phenomena. Taagepera argues 
against the misuse of mathematics, or rather – of statistics, numerical methods – 
in social sciences, and for exact scientific, mathematical, quantifying and 
purpose-oriented methods. My analysis brings forth some specificities of social 
phenomena, like complexity, conscious “self-organisation” or self-determi-
nation, due to which the idealised approach fostered by Taagepera should be 
applied with due care. I also pose the question about scientificity and the 
meaning of mathematicalness in sciences: What is the core of scientificity, to be 
found in exact sciences, that other disciplines with the pretension of being 
scientific are to feature? This core seems often to be taken to be a numerical 
precision, whereas Taagepera takes it to be simple meaningful (that is, empi-
rically interpretable) mathematics; precision in itself gives no understanding if 
the numbers cannot be interpreted, but understanding is the aim of science. He 
takes quantification of relations between variables to underlie a good scientific 
method. Normativity in his attitude towards primacy of theory- and 
mathematics-driven research is clearly manifested by his explication of the basis 
on science, namely in the second of the two motivating questions of scientific 
research: “What is?” and “How should it be on logical grounds?” (Taagepera 
2008: 5). Implicitly, Taagepera’s approach manifests normativity of exact 
scientific rationality – that exact quantification gives understanding and is thus 
to be sought if a human endeavour is to be useful in its aim. 
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Appendix 3 “Some limitations of universal international law from a philo-
sophical point of view” (Mets 2012a), together with Chapter 1, constitutes the 
comparative analysis of science and law. Whereas Chapter 1 concentrates on the 
logical and linguistic aspects of laws in either practices, Appendix 3 draws 
parallels between scientific and legal regimes on theoretical and practical-social 
levels. It emphasises the primacy of practice, of the material actuality with 
respect to theory or conceptual understanding. The latter, however, is often 
regarded as clear and well defined, and as such providing a true understanding 
of the reality, and assumedly applicable universally independently of “local 
material idiosyncrasies” which are regarded as deviance from correctness and 
hence count for being rectified. I argue (among others with the help of histo-
rically founded criticisms of political and scientific colonialisms) against uni-
versality of laws and correspondingly of orders, both legal and scientific, and 
for locally customised theoretical and practical treatments of the world. I also 
question the notion of regularity which seems to be fundamental to a practice-
based account of laws, namely regularity of operations or actions: for scientific 
laws, experimentation grounds the regular application or applicability of mathe-
matical formulae in matter, thus laboratory operations are to build up a kind of 
system of regular processes; in law, it is the behaviour of politicians, lawyers, 
justices etc. that makes up a regularly functioning system that law can be based 
upon, like customary international law, for example (Tunkin 1961). The regula-
rities in legal matters, that is in political and social processes or events, are 
questionable, as I contend there, for having too many “dimensions” to be inter-
preted in concrete situations which the particular legal enframing is applied to, 
and for the interpretations being too subjective. Here I must add another rather 
trivial source of the irregularity of social processes: their historicity. As I will 
discern, based on Mackie, broader, middle and narrower notions of causality, 
similar enframing should be taken into account here: talking about regularity, 
Tunkin seems to consider only the narrower notion of processes, which with a 
great deal of simplification could be taken to reiterate themselves. However, 
each time they appear in a new historical situation, the middle and broader 
contexts of those processes are always new, and the three levels being inter-
dependent with each other, thus determine new meanings for the narrower sense 
of lawfulness or regularity. Peeter Müürsepp (2012) considers historicity a 
confounding regularity also in laboratory experiments in physical sciences. This 
accords with Joseph Rouse’s understanding of continuous recreation (re-
establishment, redefinition) of research foci and stakes, or what matters in 
research, as practice and knowledge evolve and mutually determine each other. 
Appendix 4 “Measurement theory, nomological machine and measurement 
uncertainties (in classical physics)” (Mets 2012b) together with Chapter 2 
explore the basis of science and its conditioned world picture. Whereas Chapter 
2 explores rather the meta-metalevel of science – the history of scientific 
practice and law, and of concomitant world cognition and its changing that 
underlie and have brought forth normative exact scientific world picture at all, 
Appendix 4 explores rather the metalevel of science – measurement as the basis 
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of scientific practice and physical theory. It concerns the relation between 
mathematical laws of physics and the “noisy” material laboratory reality that 
they are to account for. I aim to show that neither fundamental nor phenomeno-
logical (numerical) laws describe the material actuality, as both simple mathe-
matics as well as ascription of numbers are too idealised with respect to the 
fuzziness and intricateness of material world. I argue that using mathematics to 
account for matter is pragmatic, or goal- and activity-driven, and so are the 
notions of noise and (measurement) errors, and modelling or mathematisation of 
the latter, serving simple calculable conceptual and practical treatment of the 
world. This paper contributes to the understanding of the notion of regularity 
and its pragmaticalness: as the material world under study in physics labora-
tories, however isolated from external influences and best approximating the 
ideal of ceteris paribus conditions, still displays real deviances from the ideal 
mathematical formula that refers to or denotes it, that is from ideal regularities, 
the question of tolerance of such deviance and its meaning for the fundamental 
physical theory arises. Utterances from practicians to the effect that the simplest 
possible mathematics should guide the physicist in interpreting and processing 
empirical results testify of the normativity of mathematicalness and simplicity, 
or of what is understood as scientific rationality. This in its part contributes to 
the contemplation of world picture to be undertaken in the dissertation: scienti-
fic rationality means analyticity, quantifiability, simplicity, calculability. The 
imperative basing of scientific results on these principles is just a manifestation 





1. WHAT ARE CALLED ‘LAWS’?  
THE LANGUAGE AND LOGIC OF LAWS 
 
There have been attempts to reduce legal system to a set of logically analysable 
sentences, similarly to logical positivist attempts of reducing scientific theories 
to propositions, linguistic entities (e.g. Haack 2007 refers to Langdell; Mor-
genthau 1940, Alchourrón and Bulygin 1971). At the dawn of contemporary 
science, legal science was regarded as a purely rational or formal science 
(Alchourrón and Bulygin 1971: 2) like mathematics and logic, with the diffe-
rence of having import on material reality by guiding decision making (Oppen-
heim 1944; Haack 2007). In the positivist understanding, (legal or scientific) 
theory consists of well-defined concepts or terms with well defined relations 
between them (see also Holmes 1899), and such a system is allegedly, or in an 
ideal case, coherent, self-contained and sufficient through deduction for all 
possible (legal or scientific) cases (Morgenthau 1940). Theoretical sentences are 
logically analysable, hence their correctness – like the rationality of science – is 
a matter of logic (Haack 2007), and deducible from each other (in case of exact 
sciences – mathematically deducible). Felix Oppenheim and Susan Haack 
analyse the legal language logically. Both emphasise that logic is not the whole 
of law, practice being a necessary determining part of it; however, Oppenheim 
(1944: 143) regards the “law in action” or the empirical science of law to be just 
a ‘particular branch of the study of “law in books”’. 
 
1.1. Logical elements and properties  
of normative systems 
 
Carlos E. Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin (1971) seek a purely logical reconst-
ruction of a normative system, which has the following elements: Universe of 
Discourse (UD): which real world events – misdeeds – are aimed at by a law 
(elements of UD are actual, individual cases, happening in concrete space and 
time); Universe of Properties (UP): which legally relevant properties constitute 
the treatment of a certain kind of misdeed in written law; e.g. a certain kind of 
harm or good faith of a party in an event; Universe of Cases (UC): defined by 
the presence or absence of said properties (UC is a set of generic cases, which, 
together with UP, is used to determine appropriate UD or elements thereof); 
Universe of Actions (UA): which are the possible actions to be taken in case of 
said type of misdeed (actions are logically independent of each other (logical 
atomism) and from properties; they are equated with their effects/results, that is, 
with states of affairs to be reached through the actions); Universe of Solutions 
(US): provides Universes of Actions with deontic operators (‘permitted’, 
‘obligatory’, ‘prohibited’, ‘facultative’). Any normative system, including 
written law, is a system that correlates Universes of Cases with Universes of 
Solutions. It thus has elements of the form (F→G), where F is an element of a 
Universe of Cases and G an element of a Universe of Solutions. Alchourrón and 
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Bulygin discern logical and empirical implications of a normative system: the 
properties in the Universe of Properties are required to be logically independent, 
but they may still be empirically dependent (e.g. causally); (hence, but also 
independently from the previous) even if a normative system has a logical or 
normative gap (i.e. some cases are not related to any solutions), it may be 
empirically complete if those cases do not occur in reality. A normative system 
is logically or normatively complete if it has no normative gaps, that is, it gives 
solutions to all possible cases (to all elements of a Universe of Cases). As to 
problems of application, they discern between gaps of knowledge (due to lack 
of empirical information about an individual case) and gaps of recognition (due 
to fuzziness of legal concepts), but they regard them as strictly independent of 
each other and independent of logical gaps. Axiological gaps – that prescripti-
vely relevant properties are descriptively not relevant (that is, are not taken into 
account in the system) – are due to value decisions and can occur only if there 
are no normative gaps in the system (that is, if the system gives solutions to all 
cases, but in an undesirable way). Ideally, a normative system, like a deductive 
system in general, is complete (i.e. has no normative gaps), consistent (does not 
correlate any case with two or more contradictory solutions) and independent 
(there are no redundant solutions) (ibid: 5). 
Let us notice some similarities between a normative system and a scientific 
theory: The Universe of Discourse for a scientific law is the cases which it can 
be applied to (e.g. the law of gravitation to massive bodies); the Universe of 
Properties are the quantities defined in a physical theory and used to define 
“laws of nature” (e.g. mass m, gravitational force g, time t, etc.); the Universe of 
Cases is the set of laws of physics (or of nature, as sometimes called) where the 
relations and (thereby) intensities of said properties (quantities) are defined. The 
Universe of Cases for laws of science are determined through experiments and 
measurements15 of involved “independent” quantities, which at least theore-
tically have a numerically determinate, often continuous, scale – in contrast to 
the purely qualitative discrimination between presence and absence of a pro-
perty in legal cases.16 But regarding measurement as a process of comparison 
that always presupposes some contrasting background or different intensities of 
properties, legal and scientific cases look more similar on a certain level: they 
both select or define17 a restricted number of properties or attributes from the 
                                                 
15  Experiments are one of the testing methods of laws of sciences – perhaps the most secure 
ones for determining applicability of mathematical laws (of physics for example). Hence 
they serve to determine the material settings which count as the Universe of Discourse and 
make up the basis for the Universe of Cases for sciences. Experiments are “constructed out 
of measurements” (Baird 1964: 89); in Appendix 4 I consider the relation between measure-
ment and experiment and theory of physics. 
16  Alchourrón and Bulygin mention that there are relevant properties in law which can have 
a continuous scale, e.g tax rates. 
17  Whether it is selection or definition is not a trivial matter and will be focused on later in 
this paper: ‘selection’ refers to the representational understanding of laws, ‘definition’ to the 
conventionalist understanding, either of which alone is insufficient. 
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complex entangled reality, which are regarded as relevant, and assign a value to 
them on some scale (either discrete, like the binary regarded by Alchourrón and 
Bulygin, or continuous or some other). Like in law, so also in science the 
theoretical (here importantly – mathematical) account of cases and properties 
depends on the empirical knowledge about the Universe of Discourse, but also 
determines what is regarded as such: For one thing, namely, the Universe of 
(scientific) Discourse is equated with the real world “events” in which the 
defined properties and their relations as formulated in laws of sciences are 
identified as essential18; for another – the mathematical formulation and the 
scale assigned to an attribute depend on the empirical basis, on the Universe of 
Discourse (empirical relational system) available for the abstraction (numerical 
relational system).19 In this respect, the simple values ‘present’ and ‘absent’ of 
properties occur also in scientific cases: the “purer” the phenomenon20 to be 
studied or modelled, the more properties are absent; the closer the model is to 
come to the real material situation, the more properties are to be included (like 
magnetic force to gravitational phenomena, or friction and resistance of the 
medium of oscillation).21  Alchourrón and Bulygin (1971: 170) draw a parallel 
between the logical functioning of scientific and normative systems that I here 
present in tabular form (ibid: 170; logical denotations added): 
 
 Explaining (science) Justifying (normative) [logical 
denotation] 
Description of: Phenomenon solution [G] 
deduced from: scientific system normative system  
-consisting of: general laws general norms [(F→G)] 
and from: antecedent conditions a case [F] 
Uses predicting future phenomena guiding future actions [(x)(Fx→Gx)] 
 explaining past facts justifying past actions [(x)(Fx→Gx)] 
 
At first sight, there seem to be no clear correspondent to the Universe of 
Actions, and hence also to Universe of Solutions, in science, in the way as there 
is in law. This corresponds to what Oppenheim, Haack and several other authors 
allege: science is said to be normatively neutral, that is, making no prescriptions 
as to treating the concrete real world systems. However, looking back in the 
history of science, or of some disciplines that now are considered as scientific – 
medicine and mathematics, for example, at their dawn (Ritter 1997a,b) in 
                                                 
18  That is, the phenomena studied in exact sciences are precisely those that can be mathe-
matised, that is, dissected into measurable attributes, those (re)combined in mathematical 
formulae; see e.g. Vihalemm 1995, 2001. 
19  The first hints to natural-historical (natural scientific) approach, the latter to phi-
scientific approach (see Vihalemm 1989, 1995; those are also discussed in Appendix 1, and 
will be considered later in this paper). 
20  I write ‘pure’ in quotation marks because I consider phenomena and hence their purity  
dependent on theory, not as something inherent in nature and directly read out of her. See 
also Rouse (2002). 
21  These matters are discussed in more detail in Appendix 4. 
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Babylonia and Egypt, Universes of Actions and of Solutions seem to have their 
counterparts.22 Some examples to illustrate: “If a man is covered with a rash 
[element of the Universe of Cases]: gradually mix malt flour into oil, apply, and 
he will recover; if he has not yet recovered, apply warm simtum and he will 
recover [elements of the Universe of Actions]” (Ritter 1997a: 52, quotation 
from a Paleo-Babylonian text)23; for the mathematical exercise “I added the 
surface and my side of the square: 45” the solution goes: “You pose 1, the 
wasitum. You divide the half of 1 (: 30). You multiply 30 and 30 (: 15). You add 
15 to 45: 1. 1 is the square root (of) it. You subtract the 30, that you multiplied, 
from 1 (: 30). 30 is the side of the square (ibid: 54, quotation from a Paleo-
Babylonian text)”;24 and a mathematical exercise from Egypt (Ritter 1997b: 68): 
“An example for making a round granary of 9 (and of) 10.” “You subtract 1/9 of 
9: 1. Remains: 8. Multiply 8 by 8; it will be 64. You multiply 64 by 10; it will be 
640. Add to it its half; it will be 960. Its quantity in khar.” “You take 1/20 of 
960: 48. Enclosing it in 100-quadruple-heqat; wheat: 48 heqat.” There are 
clearly cases (elements of Universes of Cases) in the mathematical texts, 
although as aims of actions and not as their incentives, and actions prescribed in 
given cases; that is, cases and actions are correlated with each other, thus the 
examples above can be regarded as elements of Universes of Solutions. 
(Already in the Egyptian texts of mathematics, the explicit descriptions of 
actions to be taken were left out, so that only tables of numbers, standing for the 
series of mathematical operations to be performed, were left (Ritter 1997b gives 
several examples), thus grounding the later abstracting-theorising approach by 
Greek mathematicians. See also Stepin (1999a: 28–31) about Egyptian and 
Greek mathematics.) The Greek pre-runners of some contemporary sciences 
hint to Universe of Actions as well: economics (oikonomia) and astronomy 
(astronomia) referred to sets of rules for treating or observing corresponding 
parts of the world (household, celestial bodies) (Ruby 1986). This accords with 
Rein Vihalemm’s understanding of laws of exact sciences that he calls laws of 
nature: according to his conception of phi-science (1995, 2011 etc.), laws in 
those sciences do not tell us what the world itself is like, but rather what can be 
done with it and what cannot and in this sense guide the material ordering of the 
world with the aim to achieve accordance with the mathematics. However, the 
case for the analogues of Universe of Actions is dubious: What I call elements 
of a Universe of Cases in the mathematical examples may in fact be elements of 
Universe of Actions – as actions are by Alchourrón and Bulygin equated with 
their consequences, and the exercises here which solutions are given to are 
exactly the consequences of those actions presented as elements of a Universe 
of Actions, or stages of solving the exercises. According to the Aristotle’s four 
causes conception, we are given causa finalis. The same is actions in Universe 
                                                 
22  Their social reputation resembled that of nowadays as well (Ritter 1997a). 
23  Translations from French by A.M. 
24  Babylonians used a sexagesimal system of arithmetic. 
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of Actions of explicitly normative systems like law if understood as the con-
sequences or effects of those acts, hence as wishful final states. 
As to the logical properties of both scientific and normative systems as 
allegedly deductive systems, Alchourrón and Bulygin (1971: 171–173) draw 
some explicit comparisons. Completeness and consistency are rational ideals for 
both empirical sciences as well as in normative systems: in the former, 
completeness means that the theory should be able to (causally) explain all 
phenomena in its scope (related to determinism), in the latter that it must be able 
to give a solution to each case.25 Consistency in science, particularly mathe-
matical science is also linked to determinism: mathematically possible different 
solutions mean indeterminacy in interpretation of the formula (an example of 
this are bifurcations in deterministic chaos). Alchourrón and Bulygin point out 
four main differences between scientific and normative systems: science 
explains empirical facts, normative systems explain or justify solutions; general 
laws of science are descriptive, those of normative systems prescriptive; in 
science, antecedent conditions “cause” the effect (regarding the formula 
(F→G) – F causes G, however “cause” is meant here), in normative sciences no 
case causes its solution; the “empirical conditions of adequacy” in science is 
truth, in normative systems it is validity, which can be and often is a matter of 
convention – that truth never is.26 
In this “purely” logical account, Universe of Discourse is in a sense out of 
the logic: as a linguistic account of law or norms (norms as linguistic entities) 
lend themselves more easily to logical analysis or reconstruction than a meta-
physical account would (norms as ideal entities, as thought-formations or 
meanings) (ibid: 5),27 the Universe of Discourse, whose elements are under-
stood as particular material states of affairs, is trivially non-linguistic on this 
level of reasoning (meta-level with respect to legal norms).28 As Alchourrón and 
Bulygin take into account what legal scientists really do – deal with actual 
concrete cases, determine their subsumption under appropriate legal acts – the 
Universe of Discourse in their account should probably be understood as these 
concrete cases. However, their approach – pure logic – is supposed to be – and 
they contend it to be – universal, applicable to more than just the current, actual 
world, rather to ‘the actual world plus its extrapolation’, ‘the actual world plus 
all similar cases’. In logic, Universe (or Domain) of Discourse is understood as 
the set of entities over which the variables of a formula may range, hence {x} 
such that (x)(Fx→Gx). The x here, an element of a Universe of Discourse, a 
                                                 
25  Alchourrón and Bulygin emphasise that actually no legal scientist is interested in 
completeness or other logical features of the whole normative system, e.g. the whole legal 
code of a state, but rather just a narrow field of law concerning particular field of cases. 
26  However, conventionality and changeability of basic conventions come in degrees. 
27  This seems to be trivial – as logic stems from logos, which is sometimes translated as 
‘word’. 
28  There are of course norms that have language or language use as their object or touch 
upon it, like those about free speech, that is, language (use) constitutes some Universe of 
Discourses. 
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possible extrapolation of cases dealt thus far, is possibly “not yet there”, hence it 
is something ideal. It is to be recognised according to – as it is defined 
through – Universes of Properties and Universes of Cases. But how are those 
reached? Alchourrón and Bulygin do not discuss this, they state the possible 
plurality of sources of basic sentences in law (natural law, sovereign or other; 
ibid: 59–60). This issue has to do with the notion of regularity to be discussed 
later: How regularly do or must actual, material x-s with exact properties F (and 
G) occur – so that it would make sense to talk about abstract properties F (and 
G) to be found in a Universe of Discourse or defining a Universe of Discourse? 
What roles do they play in theories (scientific and legal)? I will next consider 
the abstract and material planes of reasoning in law from the point of view of 
logic; particularly, relations between Universe of Discourse and Universe of 
Properties/Universe of Cases will be addressed. 
 
1.2. Levels of reasoning – referents of logical elements 
 
There are at least two aspects to the question of levels of referents of laws 
(abstractness or universality or generality and individuality or concreteness or 
particularity of laws) or the logical form of laws: 1) The “purely” logical aspect 
of whether laws refer to particulars or to universals, that is, whether the correct 
logical formulation is (x)(Fx→Gx) – there are presumed to exist particulars x 
that have properties F and G, or (F→G) – the existence of corresponding 
particulars is not presumed, only the possibility of their existence, that is, there 
are properties F and G and sometimes they get embodied by some particulars 
(the question of empiricism and realism of abstract or theoretical entities, e.g. 
properties);29 2) The import of concrete, particular actuality to theory: does the 
“logical” difference between (x)(Fx→Gx) and (F→G) make a difference in law-
making, in theory of law (or of science)? Does it make a difference in the 
specification of F and G, and in the relation of x to F and G? Dretske concerns 
the first aspect, Oppenheim the second.30 
Fred Dretske’s (1977) logical analysis of laws (of nature) touches upon the 
form of legal norms, or particular legal statutes or regulations, with reference to 
their way of regulating. Namely legal regulations, like scientific laws, set 
relations between abstract (Platonic31) features, not between concrete objects or 
                                                 
29  Is 'x' also an abstract entity? 'x' as a reference to an idealised, abstracted individual? This 
probably depends on the context: in applications, e.g. judicial or engineering reasoning, it is 
a concrete individual, on juridical or theoretical level it is a general abstract individual. 
30  Those aspects are not independent of each other. For example, if one considers the 
elements of Universe of Cases F as composed of elements of Universes of Properties fi: 
F=f1+f2+..., then if actual, particular x can affect F, then F can change in time as the practice 
of law or accordingly science advances: F1=f1+f2+... becomes F1.1=f1.1+f2.1+... Also 
Alchourrón and Bulygin point this out. 
31  Dretske says (1977: 267–268): if there are laws of nature, they are definite relationships 
between universal (Platonic) properties; and: it is nowadays too “expensive” to hold that 
there are no laws of nature. 
26 
individuals: hence, not the form “(x)(Fx→Gx)”, but rather “F-ness→G-ness”, 
where F and G are universal properties or quantities, and the meaning of ‘→’ 
(‘equals’ or ‘yields’ or other) depends on the particular law (also E.J. Lowe (see 
Mumford 2000) regards both legal and natural laws as pertaining to ‘sortal 
terms’).32 Although laws, “[i]n both the legal and the natural context”, do tell 
how an individual falling under them is to behave – as “the modality at level n 
is generated by the set of relationships existing between the entities at level n + 
1 (Dretske 1977: 265)” (a diamond is to have a certain refractive index, the 
President of the United States is to consult the Parliament on certain issues) – it 
is only in the aspect of the required property that an individual comes to be 
relevant for a theory. Any other of her properties, even if co-extensional with 
those included in the law-statement, is irrelevant to the law. Hence law is not a 
universal truth which would depend on statements about concrete particulars: 
“Laws eschew reference to the things that have length, charge, capacity, internal 
energy, momentum, spin, and velocity in order to talk about these quantities 
themselves and to describe their relationship to each other (ibid: 263; emphases 
added).” Similarly the laws that define relations between government branches 
are not about the particular individuals, but about those governmental offices, 
and set constraints upon individuals only as long as they occupy those offices. 
By deeming no references to concrete individuals and events to be a part of the 
language of laws, Dretske leaves the Universe of Discourse out of the scientific 
language (like Oppenheim, to be considered next), but also out of legal 
language.33 The relationships defined by the law are themselves not necessary 
or obligatory – they could as well be (redefined) differently just like laws of 
thermodynamics are formulated in many different ways34 – they are so only for 
the individuals and objects occupying the “offices”. 
Felix Oppenheim’s focus is more on the logic of functioning or application 
of law, hence he sees interpretation as the process of applying theoretical terms 
to empiria more important.35,36 He considers interpretation to be defining the 
                                                 
32  The first formulation (x)(Fx→Gx) enters as a supporter of counterfactuals, and in this 
role is the indirect linkage between law and concrete individuals or objects. 
33  There is Universe of Discourse in Dretske’s account in the sense that the account does 
have a possible reference to material reality – the institutions of President and Parliament – 
but Dretske deems the material reality rather irrelevant to the logical form and interpretation 
of legal statutes, and of ‘laws of nature’, respectively. 
34  However, Dretske here fails to take into account that different formulations of laws of 
physics arise from different “levels of reasoning”, or dividing the part of material world into 
different sets of discernible properties. However, when this is fixed, the relation between 
these properties is believed not to depend on human power; whereas designing government 
offices and their functions is humanly, or socially, determined. 
35  The most frequent form of deduction in law is syllogistic – deriving a prescriptive con-
sequence for a concrete crime from two basic sentences, one of which is a statement of fact, 
the other a prescriptive statement of legal consequence: person p has committed an act a 
which falls under the definition of crime c, hence p must be punished as settled for crimes of 
said type (Oppenheim 1944: 148). 
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extension of legal terms or of laws (or of terms that appear in laws) and thereby 
creating new basic sentences in the legal language – as in his account law has 
two kinds of basic sentences: theoretical, given in legal norms, and empirical, 
stating concrete particular facts. He claims scientific and legal languages to 
differ from each other in that the former contains no reference to concrete indi-
viduals and events in the world; the main form of deduction should accordingly 
differ in science, as being only between theoretical, not concrete, sentences and 
statements of laws. But there seems to be confusion about levels of reasoning 
here, or rather about the nature of the practice considered, which I will address 
more thoroughly later: law is seen as a plainly down-to-earth and solution-
driven domain of human activity, hence in mutual interaction with the part of 
the material world it is about; science is seen as mainly a theory, as a conceptual 
system with the aim of providing true reflection of the world in linguistic or 
mathematical signs. However, as I will argue, on-going interaction with the 
concrete material world, that is – practice, is essential in both of those domains 
(see also Stepin 1999a,b, 2005, Rouse 1996, 2002; in Appendix 3 I briefly dis-
cuss definitions’ relation to actuality pertaining generally to both science and 
law). 
Dretske’s understanding of legal language thus differs from that of Oppen-
heim, as in Oppenheim’s analysis, empirical terms referring to concrete persons 
and events – that is, Universe of Discourse – are a basic or primitive element of 
the legal language. Thereby Dretske’s understanding seems to illustrate Martin 
Heidegger’s (1959b) account of science: in contemporary mathematical science, 
it is not concrete objects but rather the abstract features that are important; 
object, objectness, is abstracted from scientific understanding and cognition, the 
object of cognition is the network or entanglement (Gewirk) of abstract pro-
perties (particularly quantities in exact sciences). Heidegger (1959a) contends 
that man comes to see himself in the same scientific enframing – he abstracts 
himself from concrete cognition, from concrete personness, and reduces himself 
to his abstract, enumerable and quantifiable properties. Dretske’s understanding 
of legal regulations corresponds to this contention of Heidegger. In Dretske’s 
conception, seeing the (social) world through the enframing of a legal theory, or 
the theoretical framework of legal terms or concepts, means that one sees just 
the abstract offices (like the governmental ones) and their abstracted relations 
that are defined through their functions, and concrete persons or collectives 
come forth only when, and as much as, they fall under the definition. 
Both Dretske and Oppenheim, and also Langdell and positivist theory of law 
presuppose well defined concepts, but Dretske’s account applies to explicitly 
                                                                                                                       
36  This difference from Dretske may also or primarily be due to the different fields of law 
they consider: Dretske’s field is designing law, one that determines and designs its object 
like engineering science (although he likens it with no engineering science but rather with 
“pure” “descriptive” science), Oppenheim’s field is the “objective”, “human-independent” 
world that happens itself, so the treatment of it must be based on an adequate description and 
understanding of it – like natural sciences are understood to provide adequate description of 
nature in the form of laws of nature. 
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purposefully man-made or designed world: to political order (public law), 
whereas Oppenheim and Alchourrón and Bulygin analyse law pertaining to 
(seemingly) emerging, in a sense self-organising world (like criminal law). 
What is common in both cases is that the defining function of law applies to the 
human activity to be regulated by the laws; what is different is that in Dretske’s 
case also the entities themselves are explicitly constructed (government institu-
tions) on the basis of definition, in Oppenheim’s case entities are to be found or 
to happen in the (social) world and to be interpreted in the judicial process on 
the basis of a legal theory.37 However, Oppenheim does not deem a definition to 
be once and for all settled (nor does Dretske) and unambiguously applicable to 
all cases; rather, he regards the interpretation of particular cases as basic 
sentences of the legal language, which thus create new definitions by modifying 
the extensions of legal concepts, or bringing new concepts into the legal 
language. By this he brings the factual, down-to-earth aspect of law to bear on 
the legal language in two ways: Explicitly as one of his main points he claims 
the validity of legal sentences to depend on actual, activity-driven conditions in 
a way that scientific sentences do not, as the latter only need to be syntactically 
and semantically correct, but not stated by official authorities, hence not valid 
but only true. Less explicitly, and perhaps unwillingly, he makes the “law in 
books” fundamentally dependent on the “law in action”, as he says the process 
of interpretation creates the basic sentences of legal language. Thereby Oppen-
heim (seemingly inconspicuously) confounds declarative and constructive fun-
ctions of basic sentences: a sentence referring to an individual, e.g. “Smith has 
committed a grand larceny”, is at once a statement of fact, hence it has a truth 
value, and at the same time it is an interpretation, hence a definition in Oppen-
heim’s account, and hence it has no truth value. I think this confusion hints to 
the practical confoundedness, or interdependence, of statements of fact and of 
interpretations, or rather the dependence of what is believed to be empirical on 
the theoretical and “pre- or quasi-theoretical” background beliefs (see also 
Agassi 1956 for this issue). Similarly in science, shifts of concepts take place, 
even if in popular and sometimes philosophical thinking (positivist, realist38 and 
Popperian accounts of science) notions seem to be fixed and ideas to have 
recurred, for example, when talking about the “come-back” of the corpuscular 
theory of light39 or the atomic view of matter40. Development of (scientific) 
apparatus opens up new cognitive possibilities, thus providing new views onto 
                                                 
37  Cases are implicitly constructed – certain happenings or constellations, states of art, are 
constructed as cases on the basis of legal understanding or theory, of effective legal codes. 
38  As pointed out by Rouse (1996: 16) and discussed and criticised by Laudan (1984: Ch. 
5), particularly what he calls ‘Convergent Epistemological Realism’. 
39  See for example Agassi 1956 on the non-identity of the earlier and later corpuscular 
theories of light. 
40  See for example van Melsen 1957 about the changing of the concept of atom. 
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natural and designed worlds, changing extensions of concepts and intercon-
ceptual relations, and opening prospects for novel theories.41 
What role do the logical elements – Universes – have in this matter? Is the 
reasoning carried out on the level of those Universes? Or concrete individuals 
and events? In legislation and theoretical science it is the general, abstract level 
(Universe of Properties, Universe of Cases, or F-ness and G-ness), in appli-
cation (judicial, engineering) the individual level of x, elements of a Universe of 
Discourse – it is for them that there is any theory at all – for treating the real 
world somehow, either in science or in law. What are the relations of all those 
Universes to the actual material reality – in law and in science? The on-going 
practice changes both of them, their “basic sentences” or “basic definitions”, 
hence the whole theory. Besides the question “is Universe of Discourse the 
actual material world?” we have the question “what is the relation between 
Universe of Discourse and Universe of Cases?” to solve. The latter guides 
identification of actual events as belonging to the Universe of Discourse of one 
or another law. At the same time, as Oppenheim asserts (and I agree), those 
actual events, having been identified as belonging to a Universe of Discourse, 
change this Universe of Discourse, its extension trivially and through this also 
its intension. How so? It brings in new situations: even if the narrower specif-
ication of a case fits the definition of the Universe of Discourse (Universe of 
Cases) exactly, its broader context brings in new specifications, new relations, 
new individual properties – and hence new ways for abstracting and idealising, 
but also possible new relevant properties which will have to be included in 
Universe of Properties and Universe of Cases. 
Abstraction and generalisation is necessary for the possibility to predict what 
happens in cases that have not (yet) been observed; without this ability, science 
would be useless and even impossible (Feynman 1965: 76–77, 164–166, Stepin 
1999a: 23, Taagepera 2008: 25, 63, Wallace 1997: 56–57). Similarly in law: the 
importance of logic and purely logical deductive clarity attributed to law serves 
to create the feeling of certainty: “The process of analogy, discrimination, and 
deduction are in which [lawyers] are most at home. […] And the logical method 
and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every 
human mind (Holmes 1897: 998).” Alchourrón and Bulygin (1971: 170) can be 
interpreted as saying to the same effect: “Both activities, causal explanation and 
normative justification, arise from one and the same need in man – his need, as 
a rational being, to give a rational account of things, whether it is an explanation 
of the phenomena of the world or a justification of his own actions.” Prediction 
has been regarded as an essential task of science that rests on the immutable 
regularities stated by the laws of nature that sciences carve out of apparently 
                                                 
41  Hanzel (2008: 280, 287, 294) explicates the conceptual difference between earlier and 
later (contemporary) versions of laws on the basis of idealisations that were available at the 
time of their formulation, that is, what kinds of (theoretical) conceptions (e.g. gravitational 
force) belonged to the kit of science of the time. Laudan (1984: 128–129) explicates why 
two succeeding theories about the same phenomenon cannot be equal (they normally have 
different ontologies). 
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chaotic reality. Holmes (1897, 1915) and Ross (1998) attribute this task also to 
legal regulations – bodies of dogma and terms used in them, and in the judicial 
process of courts.42 Like in scientific theories there are theoretical terms (like 
‘force’) whose main function is to connect the theory into a compact body of 
predictive use, so in legal doctrines there are theoretical terms (like ‘rights’ and 
‘duties’) that serve to predict the outcomes of certain deeds. Ross contends the 
meanings of such terms to be empty, as there is nothing in the material reality 
corresponding to them, so they cannot be applied isolated from their function, 
which is to guide practical decisions. Also Holmes takes the factual decision 
process of courts to constitute law – analogously to Oppenheim’s account of the 
continuous redefinition of basic legal sentences, which steadily shifts the Uni-
verses of Discourse and of Cases and their mutual relation. I contend that this 
longing for certainty and repose uttered by Holmes is present also in science, or 
is even the essence of mathematical treatment of the world, and prevails in the 
popular and political image of exact sciences. It looms behind the search for an 
all-unifying fundamental mathematical theory, or a finite set of fundamental 
(covering) laws which all others would be deducible from, and the ever-
expanding coverage with mathematical laws of worldly phenomena.43 At the 
same time, ever more areas of practical social life, and also of the non-human 
world (like territories, aquatories, outer space) are covered by legal laws. These 
tendencies relate to the above-mentioned claims to universality, on the one 
hand, and logical certainty and clarity of categorical boundaries like Alchourrón 
and Bulygin present them and Morgenthau criticises, on the other hand. 
 
1.3. Modality of laws 
 
As Dretske’s logical form of laws ‘F-ness→G-ness’ indicates, laws can be 
regarded as ‘linking two elements [F and G or F-ness and G-ness] with each 
other’ – as Hans Kelsen (1976) expresses it, likening legally defined order to 
causality in laws of nature in the sense that both kinds of laws say which effect 
(G) follows which conditions (F) (in law, both F and G are determined by the 
legal regime). Difference between them, according to Kelsen, is in the modality 
of this relationship: for laws of nature the relation (‘→’, ‘implies’) is (ne-
cessarily) so, independently of any act of will, for judicial order the relation 
must be so44, as settled through an act of will of a legal authority (hence a more 
accurate formulation, in Dretske’s terms, would be ‘(x) (Fx must imply Gx)’ – as 
                                                 
42  Also Haack (2009: 19) addresses the predictive function of law (“law-as-prediction”), 
and criticises it on the basis that each new legal case or situation is different from the past, so 
laws are not applied as a strict logical system of drawing conclusions, but rather adapted to 
each occasion. The changeability of (legal) states of affairs due to occurring events is 
included in the logical account of law as a dynamic system by Hage and Verheij (1999). 
43  See Appendices for different fields of this striving. 
44  Some reckon ‘ought to’ as more appropriate in legal vocabulary. Dretske uses ‘must’ for 
both legal and scientific laws. Kelsen uses the word ‘soll’, which is better translated as 
‘ought’. 
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the modality of the stated relation between abstract properties or offices applies 
only to the level of individuals (x)).45 This difference is emphasised by many 
writers on the topic (Beebee 2000, Haack 2007, Rundle 2004, Mumford 2000, 
2004) and in various formulations: laws of nature (or scientific laws) describe, 
whereas legal norms prescribe; legal norms can be obeyed or disobeyed, laws of 
nature cannot be disobeyed and in this sense they also cannot be obeyed or 
consciously followed; necessary A implies A, obligatory A does not imply A 
(von Wright 1951, Dalla Chiara and Giuntini 2002). This implies the different 
relations of legal norms and laws of nature (or laws of science; Universes of 
Cases) to the world that they are to apply to (Universe of Discourse), or of the 
theoretical part of law or science correspondingly, with the material reality: laws 
of nature are thought of as describing how the world is and behaves as a non-
conscious, non-sensible reality; legal norms and rules are regarded as pre-
scribing ways of behaviour, in this sense designing, or intending to design, the 
world that is consciously and sensibly to obey them. Hence statements of law 
‘F-ness→G-ness’ belong to different Universes depending on whether they are 
legal or scientific: in law, the F belongs to a Universe of Cases and G to a Uni-
verse of Solutions (law explicitly prescribes policies); in science, the whole 
formula belongs to a Universe of Cases, linking elements of a Universe of Pro-
perties (F, G) with each other (laws seem explicitly to describe the reality)46. 
Kelsen (1976) links the modal difference of legal norms and laws of nature 
(obligation vs necessity) also to the origin of laws: legal laws are an act of will 
by an authority, whereas there is no such authority nor act for laws of nature.47 
To many, the notion of law is intimately related to a law-giver (Beebee 2000, 
Austin 2001) and/or conscious following of or governing according to law 
(Finnis 1980, Beebee 2000, Mumford 2000, 2004, Flanagan 2010). So they say 
that using the word ‘law’ to denote regularities or necessities of nature, or 
formulations of (natural) regularities in sciences (‘laws of nature’ or ‘laws of 
science’ accordingly) is metaphorical, because there is no law-giver, no 
conscious following of those laws, and no purposeful governing of nature 
according to those laws. This conclusion rests on the representational under-
standing of laws of nature or of science, according to which laws of nature as 
natural and physical sciences formulate them are descriptive, describing es-
sential and inherent features of the world (also Haack 2007, Dretske 1977). The 
analogy draws from the written or potentially formulable rules that are followed 
by the subjects of the rules (human beings or objects in objective material 
reality correspondingly). This view implicitly lies on the assumption that 
                                                 
45  In Alchourrón’s and Bulygin’s formulation, modality equals deontic denominators, hence 
there can be ‘obliges’, ‘prohibits’ etc instead of ‘ought’; or should the G itself be read as an 
element of Universe of Solutions (as I did claim earlier)? But then the ‘→’ is already on the 
meta-level – the value-decision level – and (F→G) is a hypothesis of relevance if ‘→’ is 
‘ought’; it will be a thesis of relevance if ‘→’ is ‘is’ or ‘implies’. 
46  Or rather they construct mathematical images of reality in the form of phenomena, that 
is, they describe models of reality. 
47  The view of laws of nature as divine legislation will be addressed in the next chapter. 
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scientific laws and theories are objective in the sense of pertaining to human-
independent reality, free of normative and value-laden premises; as well as the 
assumption that legal norms and systems are only or primarily a matter of 
convention, hence contingent and changeable at any time, in contrast to laws of 
nature which because of their descriptive character are unchangeable (and to be 
expressed by scientific laws). 
For normative systems like law, Universes of Actions and of Solutions are 
what constitute the explicit normativity of legal norms: they explicitly state 
what is to be done or which end state is to be reached in certain circumstances. 
Besides the historical (seeming) normativity of this kind in science illustrated 
above (paragraph 1.1), there are contemporary accounts which state it more or 
less explicitly: for example Nancy Cartwright’s (1999) notion of nomological 
machine as a law-producing setting, and Rein Vihalemm’s notion of phi-science 
cited in paragraph 1.1 (also Appendices 1, 2 and 3). To use Dretske’s for-
mulation, a law ‘F-ness→G-ness’ generates “physical” or “nomic” necessity of 
relations between concrete individuals, laws “tell us what would happen if we 
did such-and-such and what could not happen whatever we did (Dretske 
1977: 264; italics in original, bold added).” These accounts construe laws of 
nature (scientific laws) as built upon human activities, upon the ways how 




Let us look closer at ‘causality’ as what the necessity in scientific laws is often 
taken to be, and which is often used in various different meanings. 
Collingwood (1937–1938) considers three understandings of causation: I. 
The original meaning as causa or aition consists of efficient cause (the current 
state of affairs) and final cause (the state of affairs to be brought about) and 
pertains to intended actions of conscious beings: those can be caused by another 
conscious being’s influence, or may be self-caused. According to this under-
standing, it is rather the legal norms, not laws of nature, which are causal, as 
motivating conscious human action. II. Natural scientific notion of causation, 
which is a contingent process, depending on conditiones sine quibus non and on 
(man) turning it on and off – cause itself in this sense (aition – blame, accu-
sation) is a condition that can be humanly manipulated.49 This causation is, to 
Collingwood’s mind, only metaphorically so: making things of “inorganic 
nature” behave in the way that man likes, thwarting them behaving as they 
                                                 
48  Dretske’s aberrance from the popular understanding of scientific laws manifests itself 
also in his explicit statement that on the abstract level, laws could be formulated differently 
than they are – supporting his view that necessity holds only on the level of particulars due 
to abstract level of laws, not on the abstract level. Also Ronald Giere (2006) advocates the 
pluralistic view of laws, but he grounds it concretely on sciences and the plurality of their 
research levels. 
49  Collingwood adopts a Baconian or Aristotelian notion of natural science as practical, 
manipulating science. 
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themselves like (ibid: 96). III. Mathematical or theoretical causality of theo-
retical science; that is, theory or a mathematical model states an allegedly causal 
relation which is necessary (apodictic), for being mathematical, and non-spatio-
temporal. Those called laws of nature in my context and considered as causal by 
Kelsen (and Taagepera), belong to this category. Collingwood regards this 
notion of causation as anthropomorphic – stemming from an animistic theory: 
the neo-Platonic theology. 
Heidegger (1959a, 2003), criticising the contemporary instrumental under-
standing of technology and correspondingly of causation, considers and 
explicates this word ‘aition’ (‘debt’) in its original Greek understanding as four-
fold (causa formalis, causa materialis, causa efficiens and causa finalis), where 
causing should rather be understood as occasioning (veranlassen), which 
pertains to both conscious action (bringing something forth, Collingwood’s II 
meaning and perhaps also I meaning) as well as to spontaneous happening in 
living nature, physis or “the arising of something out of itself” (coming forth) – 
which is even the highest form of bringing-forth as physis inherently has its own 
“irruption belonging to bringing forth” (Heidegger 2003: 254). I will consider 
some issues contiguous with the historical meanings of causality in Chapter 2. 
Let us next consider the notion and role of causality in law and in science as 
nowadays understood (which is what Heidegger and Collingwood criticise), and 
its relation to norms and laws and to the conditions mentioned by Kelsen. 
H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré (1973) concentrate on causality in law. Their 
notion of cause stems partly from that of J.S. Mill which has four main features 
(ibid: 20): 1) “invariable sequence of events in nature”, referring to empirical 
regularities [(x)(Fx→Gx)], 2) causal events and states (F) are complex, not 
simple [F=(F1F2F3...)], 3) distinction between scientific notion of causality 
(entire set of causal conditions is sufficient [F1…Fn…→G]) and legal notion of 
causality (one of the causal conditions is selected [Fi →G]), and 4) one and the 
same event may in different circumstances have different causes [in C1, F1 →G; 
in C2, F2 →G; …]. Hart and Honoré have three criticisms against Mill’s notion 
of cause (ibid: 20–23): 1) causation is usually not understood as invariable 
sequence, but also statements about singular sequences of events are legiti-
mately regarded as causal. Nancy Cartwright (1989) likewise emphasises the 
fundamentality of singular causations: there must be a (at least one) concrete 
causation in the material world in order to state a general causal relation (also 
Mackie (1980: 80, 122) mentions this). In addition, superfluity of the 
requirement of material regularity is supported by Cartwright’s claim that there 
are not enough regularities in the world [for exact sciences like physics] 
(Cartwright 1999: 71); all the less can there be real regularities in such complex 
domains that law, politics and applied sciences, like environmental and climate 
science, are engaged with.50 2) One must differentiate between causes and 
                                                 
50  However, whether something appears as regular, depends on the deviation tolerance 
established for the asserted regularity (measurement uncertainties in laboratory practice are 
an example; see e.g. Appendix 4 about this), similarity with the “standard” is conventional. 
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reasons (in Collingwood’s account – causes improperly or metaphorically called 
so, and real causes) – the latter is often the relevant notion in law (here 
particularly the requirement of regularity breaks down, as the same influence 
may incite different conscious effects on different individuals or on different 
occasions). 3) Mill considers mainly scientific causal inquiry, which is expla-
natory; in law, causal inquiries are rather attributive – searching for the strength 
of causal link between a defendant’s act and the effected harm. The last 
criticism pertains to two main differences that Hart and Honoré draw between 
law and science: Firstly, that science is interested in general causality, or 
regularity of general features, and concrete causal relations are merely a tool for 
finding those, whereas law seeks for concrete causal chains and applies general 
causal relations for this end. Secondly – which is analogous to Mill’s third 
feature – that in sciences there is no sharp distinction between causes and 
merely enabling circumstances – as in reality, things are more complex and 
there are no clearly separate elements of a set of conditions which cause an 
effect and other elements that do not cause it, it is rather the whole situation in 
which an effect occurs; in law (and in history and common sense thinking) such 
concrete causes as sequences of events are singled out of complex cir-
cumstances that are said to have caused an effect. I would add a fourth criticism 
that not only causal states and events F are complex, but also effect states and 
events G are complex [F1…Fn…→G1…Gm…].
51 Usually it remains unnoticed 
because it is just a particular state or event whose causes are of interest. But it is 
not some causal chain that is isolated from the rest of the world, rather it is 
related to many other things and processes not in immediate focus, but which 
may manifest themselves in other spatiotemporal or contextual circumstances. 
Hart and Honoré’s third criticism and Mill’s 3rd feature of causality point to the 
solution-driven purposes more immediately perceivable for common sense of 
either kind of investigations: in law, truth must be settled once and for all in a 
sensibly short time, in science, the pursuit of truth is an on-going process 
(Haack 1999, Laudan 2006). 
The causalities meant by Hart and Honoré in law and in science are of the 
same kind of occasioning: the kind happening in the “human-independent” 
world to be described in technical terms in order to bring it under a theory (a 
law or norm); it is not likening the formulae to each other as to their modalities 
‘necessity vs. obligation’, where F and G belonged to different Universes 
according to the formula’s belonging either to the field of law or that of science. 
To make it clearer, let me make substitutions in the formula [F1…Fn…→ 
G1…Gm…]: Fi (i=1,..., n, ...) -> F1.i (i=1,..., n, ...) and Gj (j=1,..., m, ...) -> F2.j 
(j=1,..., m, ...); then the logical formula for a legal norm will look like this: 
([F1.i→F2.j]→G), where the first ‘→’ stands for causing in the contemporary 
                                                                                                                       
Thus regularities for non-exact-scientific domains may be more loosely defined for allowing 
reasonably economic treatment of them in terms of corresponding theories or normative 
systems. 
51  Also Kelsen (1939/1940: 107) points out that both “causes” and “effects” are complex 
and not clearly separable from each other and from the general situation. 
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“scientific” sense and the second ‘→’ stands for the correlating of an element of 
a Universe of Cases (F2.j or [F1.i→F2.j]) with an element of a Universe of 
Solutions (G). 
Let me now clarify the misunderstanding about causality in contemporary 
science, or the interpretation of F, G and ‘→’ in Dretske’s formulation. Some 
reckon associational or covering-law relations in scientific laws as causal, for 
example f=ma and functions for different forces f, deducible from this (e.g. 
Taagepera 2008; Feynman 1965: 53);52 this is what Hart and Honoré seem to 
have in mind. However, on this mathematical-theoretical level – in mathe-
matically formulated laws of physics for example – there is no causality at all 
like already claimed by Collingwood, but rather an interrelation of singled-out 
attributes that are regarded as essential in a phenomenon.53,54,55 Such an inter-
relation holds in certain circumstances, called ceteris paribus or ceteris 
neglectis conditions. Causality may enter this game in material experiments, 
where the conditions for a phenomenon to occur are created with the help of a 
concrete apparatus – then the effects of the apparatus and of other circumstances 
that may be present in the situation materially cause the phenomenon to occur. 
This corresponds to Mill’s first feature of causality – that the notion entails 
invariant sequence of events – that involves three important aspects that also 
Hume had pointed to: materiality (empiricalness), succession (temporal order), 
and regularity, the first two of which are relevant here. Thus the “scientific” 
notion of causality resembles that of Hume and Mill in that there can be a causal 
relation only between material events or ‘objects’ which are clearly discernible 
from each other and appear in temporal order (Mackie 1980: 30, 32). As-
sociational laws considered by Taagepera, in contrast, hold between simulta-
neous attributes of one and the same ‘object’ or set of objects, and they 
characterise abstract (theoretical) properties and relations of a system.56 This 
mathematically expressed relation of measured attributes and their dependence 
on other possible circumstances is what matters to theory, not some concrete 
                                                 
52  The force function is even better to be interpreted as the definition of the concept of 
force, rather than an associational law, as Poincaré has argued (Ayer 1998: 813). 
53  This was pointed out to the author by Piret Kuusk in personal communication; causality, 
as she says, is in physical theories always related to time and enters only the heuristic or 
“narrative” part of physics, but not its abstract theory or mathematical laws associating 
quantities with each other. See also Gasking (1955). 
54  In field theory, and thus in modern fundamental physics, there are no causes at all 
(Rafaela Hillerbrand in personal communication). 
55  However, Hanzel (2008) considers those (associational) laws as causal (he calls them 
‘laws of manifestations' in comparison with what I would call, on Cartwright’s example, 
phenomenological laws (‘laws of appearance'), as the latter describe phenomena purely on 
the basis of their empirical appearance, the former on the basis of the causal forces or factors 
(capacities) behind the empirical phenomenon that bring it about. 
56  The confusion with succession and simultaneity is present already in Mackie’s 
formulation of causality (1980: 63): he claims for some purposes the form ‘[In circumstances 
C] each [F] is followed by [G]’ to be legitimately replaceable by ‘[In circumstances C] each 
[F] is [G]’. 
36 
causal chain that brings it about (also Stepin 1999a: Ch. 2; 2005: Ch. 2; 
Ladyman and Ross 2007: 121). In applied science and technology, where 
concrete material things and their evolution in time play an essential role, 
(concrete) causality is a more substantial element of reasoning. But on this level 
scientific reasoning resembles the level of concrete happenings that interest 
judicial reasoning. Examples can be taken from environmental and risk 
evaluation where effects of concrete (possible) activities and objects are of 
interest. In contrast, the theoretical part of law, like a scientific theory, deals 
with idealised categories and relations more similar to natural sciences.57 
Mill’s listed 2nd and 4th features of causality – complexity of causal events or 
states, and plurality of possible causes for an effect – yield what Mackie calls 
inus conditions58 (Mackie 1980: Ch. 2). This should be understood in the frames 
of his activity-driven distinction between causal field, conditions and cause: 
Causal field is the normal background conditions (ceteris paribus conditions) 
which are taken as a self-evident part of normal human activity and not 
considered a part of the cause (even though science may deem it an important 
cause or condition, like presence of oxygen for fire). Conditions are the various 
non-self-evident or non-everyday states or events, which are together necessary 
for the effect to occur. Cause is one of those necessary conditions that strike 
normal human experience as conspicuous, that occurs differently from normal 
state of affairs in the particular situation (ibid). Mill’s 3rd feature of causality, 
Hart and Honoré’s 3rd criticism to Mill, and the two differences between 
scientific and legal notions of causality that they draw (general vs concrete 
causality, and enabling circumstances vs concrete causal chains), pertain to this 
dissection of causation. That science deals with general “causality” has to do 
firstly with the plurality of scientific disciplines that study the world from 
different aspects and on different levels, thus bringing forth different ways in 
which things can behave and relate to each other. Secondly, (theoretical) science 
is not interested in contingent “idiosyncratic” circumstances, but universal 
properties and generalised, unhistorical relations, like Heidegger, Dretske and 
Holmes describe.59 In judicial and various applied scientific inquiries like 
environmental and climate science for policy making, it is the concrete idio-
syncratic circumstances and events that matter, and theoretical science is often 
of help for advising about (physically) possible processes and (causal) 
scenarios, or possible sets of inus conditions for a particular effect. 
As Hart and Honoré argue, causal relations are essential for determining 
which paragraph of a given legal code should be applied in a given case, hence 
                                                 
57  Hence the interpretation for bringing unclear concrete material occurrences under the 
clear concepts of theory by comparing “how like or unlike the standard clear case the present 
debatable case is (Hart and Honoré 1973: 87)”, is essential both in law and in science. 
58  insufficient but non-redundant parts of unnecessary but sufficient conditions 
59  Local, incidental or contingent circumstances may be seen as occurring in the form of 
initial and boundary conditions, but even as such they are generalised, not related to concrete 
circumstances but to generalised properties and their relations – as a quantity can be treated 
as variable in one research, as parameter in another. 
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real causal relations are a constituent element of Universes of Cases, hence they 
are to be considered as elements of Universe of Properties, or of the F-ness in 
legal norms, or the conditions determined by the legal regime that Kelsen 
mentions (1976: 80). This means that they must be formulated in terms con-
cordant with legal theory, or the latter must concord with the relevant perception 
and understanding of the world. For example, environmental and climate laws 
must use the conceptual frameworks of corresponding sciences, and those 
sciences, on their part, must carry their research out in a way that would be 
usable for legal policies aiming at those parts of the world. That is, their out-
comes must indicate humanly manageable properties. According to the mani-
pulational account of causality in practical science (Collingwood 1937–1938), 
and if causal relations are as fundamental in science as Cartwright contends60 
(1989), the outcome of scientific research being about humanly manageable is 
trivial: (exact) scientific practice itself is engaged with numerically exact 
manipulation of the “inanimate” world, bringing material settings, and proce-
dures on them, into accordance with mathematical laws of nature in controllable 
ways. But also scientific mathematical theories themselves purport to causal 
systems, like in Cartwright’s example from econometrics (Cartwright 1989: Ch. 
1) (or in environmental and climate models). Often the purported “systems” are 
not directly controllable in all their parts and details, particularly the Cases 
(mathematical laws) often cannot be tested in laboratory situations, or cannot be 
tested for all of the possible values of their constituent Properties (Colling-
wood’s theoretical causality, causal relation which has not been empirically 
confirmed, hence belief in it rests exclusively upon theory). For Cartwright, 
such causality makes sense because she regards capacities of things or their 
properties as the most fundamental measurable and calculable features under-
lying causes. In applied sciences, inferences about the material world are often 
drawn from the calculations of those mathematical ideal models, hence the 
models are taken as representing, or as functioning in the same way as, the real 
world properties and their (causal) relations, or the Universe of Discourse. This 
theoretical causality Collingwood recognises to be perceived as necessary be-
cause of its mathematicalness or apodicity, in contrast to the manipulational 
causality which is perceived as contingent because it is material. 
 
1.3.2. Implicit normativity 
 
The systems that Alchourrón and Bulygin call normative are that on logical 
grounds – due to containing explicit prescriptions for actions. As they advocate 
analyticity and clarity of concepts through clear and strict definitions of tech-
nical terms, their concept of ‘normative’ may also be regarded as technical, 
being limited to ‘explicitly prescriptive’ in this logical sense, to sentences telling 
                                                 
60  Cartwright regards causal laws in science more fundamental than associational laws, the 
latter being built upon the former; causal laws, on their part, rest upon (causal) capacities of 
things or their properties. 
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what is to be done. However, there are also less technical concepts of ‘norma-
tivity’ applied in the contexts of science and law. I will present some accounts of 
normativity of laws or in science, and thereafter my own classification of 
aspects of normativity in and of science. 
Ernest J. Lowe explicitly claims natural laws (nomological generalisations, 
or dispositional claims about sorts or kinds that he considers natural laws to be; 
Lowe 1989: 35 and 2009: 34) to be normative, whereas he seems to hold two 
different senses of normativity. The first is a similar sense in which judicial and 
moral laws are normative – prescribing how a normal individual of the type 
targeted by the law is to be (Lowe 1980; 1982; 1987a; 1989: 147–148). He 
exemplifies both natural sciences’ kinds of laws (and respective natural kinds) 
like “Ravens are black” (ravens) as well as exact sciences’ kinds of laws like 
“Electrons have the charge –1” (electron) (Lowe 1980, 1982). In (1987a: 273) 
he expresses the view thus: “According to the normative account of laws, a 
statement of natural law (a ‘nomological’ statement) characteristically implies 
that normal or typical individuals or exemplars of some recognizable natural 
kind possess a certain dispositional property, that is, are disposed to behave or 
appear in a certain way (usually in certain specifiable conditions).” He also 
considers the notions ‘permit’ and ‘obligate’, that usually pertain to moral and 
judicial laws, in the context of natural laws: if the latter are to be logically 
similar to the former – and that they must be if pretending to legitimately be 
called ‘laws’ – then ‘not permitted that p’ does not imply ‘obligatorily not-p’ 
and ‘obligatorily p’ does not imply ‘p’ (ibid), contrasting to the account of 
modal difference between natural and legal laws enunciated by the many 
philosophers, presented in 1.3.1;61 or again “an exception to a putative law is 
permissible provided that it does not constitute an instance of another, 
incompatible law (ibid: 275)”. These equalisations of natural law with legal and 
moral norms and laws leave it unclear what exactly Lowe means by ‘natural 
law’: if it is to be normative to its object x in the same sense as judicial law is to 
the subject of law, that is, obligatory, then it should be something that nature 
“prescribes” (in the metaphorical sense of the word) to itself, or just what nature 
is like62 – as nature cannot spontaneously, from out of itself, follow human 
prescriptions (in the literal sense of the word ‘prescription’); however, con-
ceding natural laws to be incompatible with each other rather refers to the 
concept of natural law as statements formulated in sciences that can be 
                                                 
61  This normative account of laws of nature resemble what Joseph Needham (1951b: 225) 
reports about medieval understanding of natural laws as laws prescribed by God, that in 
Europe, transgressing those laws was considered possible to the extent that anomalously 
behaving animals or things were litigated and punished for transgressing the laws that God 
had prescribed them; whereas, in contrast, in China, no transgressing of natural laws was 
considered possible – in whatever ways nature is (behaving), it is natural and according to its 
laws (one could say – man had no arrogance to pretend to know all and everything about the 
Universe, to be in a state to judge its ways). 
62  This view rests on the belief in lawfulness of nature, and specifically in the governing 
role of natural laws, which is not self-evident; this view is criticised by Mumford (2004). 
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inconsistent just as it is possible to formulate inconsistent statements63, for 
example when not sufficiently qualified (that is, if their conditions of appli-
cation or “validity” are not pronounced to the extent as to make explicit their 
compatibility)64. Stephen Mumford (2000) rebuts Lowe’s normative account of 
natural laws on the basis of two differences between legal and natural laws: 1) 
The origin and status of laws – who should be the prescriber of norms in case of 
natural laws? God as prescriber is subject to scepticism; empirically discovered 
laws are rather descriptions than prescriptions. 2) For legal norms, there is a gap 
between norm (the written law or norm) and normal (what is practiced normally 
or in most cases, considered normal in the society). There can be no such gap 
for natural laws. 
The second sense of normativity in Lowe’s account pertains to human 
conduct and attitude towards the objects that laws refer to. This sense can also 
be seen as a reinterpretation of Lowe’s first notion of normativity as restrictions 
to human attitude towards the world: men (e.g. scientists) applying the laws are 
to consider as objects of those laws, that is, as the Universe of Discourse of 
those laws, those sorts, and derivatively individuals, that accord with the speci-
fication of the law. For example, the law “Ravens are black” is to be applied to 
normal or typical ravens, whereas e.g. albino ravens are to be considered as 
non-typical with respect to this law (although they may be typical with respect 
to a law about the underlying causes of albinism; Lowe 1980; 1982; 1989: 198–
199). He more explicitly pronounces this interpretation in relation to laws of 
“advanced sciences” in (1989: 149 and 174–175): as there are not even perfectly 
normal individuals in the real world (that is, corresponding to all the normal 
traits of its specified sort or kind), still less perfectly ideal individuals that the 
advanced sciences deal with, laws and terms of those sciences are theoretical, 
ideal, and hence normative by excluding any abnormal individuals from the 
Universe of Discourse of the science (for example, there can be no proton with 
charge other than +1, or with any other attribute different from that of an “ideal 
proton”). This kind of normativity resembles that included in Rein Vihalemm’s 
concept of phi-science (physics-like science), which itself defines its object 
according to what in the world corresponds (can be made to correspond) to the 
mathematical descriptions of exact sciences, and it only “sees” that part of the 
world that lets itself be subsumed to mathematical description (Vihalemm 1995, 
2011 and others). Lowe explains the purpose of this setting of norms (Lowe 
1989: 175): “the idealizing tendency of scientific theory-construction is just a 
response to the perfectionist urge to refuse to allow abnormality to enter the 
most fundamental description of nature, but still involves an implicit 
                                                 
63  As Cartwright and Giere explicate the forming models in sciences, correspondingly 
models of engineering or applied sciences and representational models (Cartwright 1983: 
104–106; Giere 2010: 272). However, it may be questionable if this notion of inconsistency 
can apply to laws as generalisations that Lowe takes them to be.  
64  This criticism rests on the assumption that nature cannot be incompatible with itself; 
however, I’m not in the position to evaluate the credibility or even meaning(fulness) of this 
assumption. 
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recognition of the normative character of nomic generalizations.” This discords 
with Vihalemm’s understanding according to which there could not even be any 
of those theoretical entities involved in the “advanced science” unless as the 
constructed (not generalised!) idealisations. But it concords with my claim 
(parallel to that of Holmes) that the idealisation (be it generalisation or 
construction) aims to expunge abnormality – and with this, uncertainty – from 
our understandings and handlings of the world. 
Anthony M. Tinker, Barbara D. Merino and Merilyn Dale Neimark (1982) 
argue against the claimed objectivity and independence of positivist (realist) 
accounting theories (theories that presume the existence of a human- and 
theory-independent reality that is the same for all), intending to show value-
ladenness of supposedly descriptive, empirical theories, as contrasted with 
normative theories. On the basis of the historical development of the concept of 
‘value’ in economics, and in contrast with alternative value theories (classical 
value theory vs marginalist value theory) that have differing underlying as-
sumptions about the basic phenomena of the field65, they show the determining 
role of pre-analytic values in economic and accounting theories which are 
usually claimed to be value-free, historically descriptive and hence non-
normative. Due to the ban to formulate economic theories in normative form, 
and their claim to objectivity by restricting their scope of (causal) relations 
taken into account in the theory and factors claimed to make up the values of 
goods, those theories are believed to reflect objective facts. However, they do 
actually determine the description of the world by accountants, thus also 
handling of the world by corporations and politicians on the basis of financial 
statements, and are therefore prescriptive and create the very “facts” they 
“describe”, ignoring other facts of society that are related to and more or less 
directly dependent on the concept of value in economics.66 Thus, as Tinker et al 
note, marginalist value theory, by restricting its scope or the concept of value, 
does so at the cost of socially ideological idealisations; hence “this separation of 
theorizing into descriptive, positive and normative is designed to create an 
illusion of impartiality and independence to support normative policy type 
decisions (ibid: 172)”. 
The discussion by Tinker et al can be taken to exemplify Vyacheslav Stepin’s 
(1999b) and Joseph Agassi’s (1956) understanding of the prescriptive role of 
world picture. Stepin proposes the notions of scientific world picture and 
special scientific world pictures (linked to particular scientific disciplines) that, 
among their other functions, create a system of values that determines the 
character of world cognition and an active relation of man to the world, and 
                                                 
65  e.g. that markets are effective; wealth endowments can be ignored; informational effi-
ciency is an important indicator of economic well-being; utils can be added together; 
markets exhibit equilibrium-seeking properties (ibid: 170–171). 
66  “Since the ultimate object of economic activity is to reproduce the (real) means of sub-
sistence, with stock prices merely “paper” intermediaries in this process, the linkage between 
stock prices and the production of real goods and services is critical and cannot be taken for 
granted (ibid: 171).” 
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prescribes the legitimate hypotheses, problems and solutions for scientific 
theorising and research. That is, they restrict the theory’s underlying assump-
tions and hence the phenomena that make up the scope (Universe of Discourse) 
of the theory, but also its structure (Universe of Properties and Universe of 
Cases). In the case of economic theories, the Universe of Discourse is “re-
produc[ing] the real means of subsistence”, for value theories “the logic of 
exchange relations”, whereas “accounting has provided the system for mea-
suring and reporting reciprocity in exchange” (Tinker et al 1982: 174), or the 
“theory of measuring value”. The marginalist theory of value restricts the logic 
of exchange to purely pecuniary, to monetary transactions, thus preserving some 
phenomena of preceding value theories, but expunging some other aspects (“the 
underlying processes”) of those phenomena, that is, restricting the Universe of 
Properties and hence Universe of Cases. For example, in Marxist value theory, 
““value” is ultimately a social relation because it is concerned with the 
exchange of the life experiences of people whose labor is bound-up in the 
products (ibid: 179)”; that is, (socially necessary) labour, society-at-large, and 
income distribution and other differences between social classes, are some 
properties that marginalist value theory expunged from accounting. The 
assumptions listed in footnote 62 may be regarded as stemming from the special 
scientific world picture underlying marginalist value theory; some further such 
assumptions might be (ibid: 190): 
that the primary (and perhaps sole) rationale for and objective of contemporary 
financial reporting is to serve the capital market; that competitive market forces 
can be relied upon to protect all interest groups (and that all interest groups are 
represented in the process); that members of each interest group are equally 
capable of processing information and discerning management’s (homogeneous) 
utility function; that only government possesses coercive power; that all behavior 
is motivated by economic rationality; and that public interest arguments are 
always a sham to mask self-interest. 
Larry Laudan (1984) focuses on cognitive values and methodological norms 
and rules in science, seeking to answer the question of achieving consensus 
about scientific theories among scientists. He sets out from the hierarchical view 
of science according to which dissent in science can appear on three interrelated 
levels (ibid: 23–25): facts or what there is in the world, meaning both ob-
servable and also unobservable and theoretical entities; methodology of science 
or rules concerning attributes of scientific theories, “principles of empirical 
support and of comparative theory assessment”, from highly general to specific 
to particular scientific disciplines; and the basic cognitive aims (like truth or 
“conceptual economy” or “predictive accuracy” or “manipulative simplicity”; 
ibid: 48). Laudan argues on the basis of historical evidence that these three 
levels do not rigidly depend on each other, as there is no one-to-one relationship 
between them; or in other words: facts, methodologies and aims do not uniquely 
prescribe each other. Although aims and rules in science are often rather general 
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and not uniquely interpretable, they are nonetheless prescriptive, as theories not 
complying with them are excluded (ibid: 85). 
Vyacheslav Stepin (1999b) tackles similar issues about the complex forms 
and levels of norms and ideals in scientific inquiry. He discerns two types of 
norms and ideals in science (ibid: 31ff., 40ff.; translation by A.M.): a) the three 
basic forms of cognitive guidelines (for explanation and description, for 
demonstration and foundation (justification), for construction and organization) 
“that guide the process of reproducing the object and the varying shapes of 
scientific knowledge”, corresponding to science as cognitive process; and b) 
social standards that determine the role and value of science for the society in a 
particular era, corresponding to science as a social institution. He emphasizes 
that the various ideals or characteristics of scientific knowledge (accuracy, 
empiricalness, simplicity etc.) pertain to different forms of norms in science, 
and they can change within time more or less according to their generality. The 
last point will be particularly relevant to my study. Stepin discerns three levels 
of ideals of science (ibid: 41ff.): I. those that differentiate it from all other forms 
of knowledge and do not change since Antiquity (the era when the first 
scientific disciplines in the contemporary sense were born): its difference from 
opinion, justification and demonstration, the requirement to discover the 
essence of things, not restricting itself to the appearance of phenomena; II. 
ideals of style of thinking determined for a particular historical era, e.g. 
difference between Ancient Babylonia and Egypt, and Greece, in organizing 
(mathematical) knowledge (see also paragraph 1.1 of this paper), or the me-
dieval differentiation between correct knowledge (by observation) of practical 
import, and true knowledge, discovering the symbolic meaning of things; III. 
ideals, principles of particular scientific disciplines. 
John Lemons, Kristin Shrader-Frechette and Carl Cranor (1997) discuss 
cases of science-based policy making, particularly environmental policies where 
the underlying scientific models are complex and over-laden with various 
sources of uncertainty. On the one hand, they show politics- and ideology-
ladenness of applied research, where epistemological decisions must be met 
under economic pressure by restricting the number and values of variables 
(Universe of Properties) and time span taken into account in models. For 
example, in modelling Yucca Mountain as a possible nuclear waste repository, 
temperatures of air and soil, scenarios of climate change had to be limited and 
time span restricted inadequately relative to the expected lifetime of the 
repository, leaving out of consideration even the possibilities known to the 
sciences of that time. On the other hand, the resulting scenarios of nuclear waste 
evolution were considered as possible on the basis of epistemic standards of 
fundamental science – the standard of proof: 95 percent rule (that is, a scenario 
of causal links has a confidence level of, or is taken as true if its probability is, 
at least 0,95)67 – which is inadequate for cases of high environmental and health 
                                                 
67  Epistemic values of science, particularly the 95 percent rule, is also discussed by Laudan 
(2006) in legal context which resembles the policy decision context as both depending on 
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risks. Besides explicitly pointing at values influencing scientific research in 
application, Lemons’ et al own text implicitly manifests the normativity of 
epistemic values and standards in science like theoretical and analytical simpli-
city, scientific rationality and certainty, quantifiability and measurability that 
should be met by natural sciences, as illustrated by the quote (ibid: 217, em-
phases added): 
In fact, ecology has failed to develop predictive laws because ecological 
systems are so inherently complicated that all the small and assumed 
insignificant variables can easily overwhelm the ecological systems and 
confound the mathematical models, as well as because of the fact that we 
simply do not understand much about the structure and functioning of 
ecosystems. 
This considering the inability to provide certain predictions via mathematical 
models as failure hints to considering mathematicalness and certainty of 
numerical predictions as normative and as the ideal to be followed by sciences. 
In addition, their criticism of the modelling of Yucca Mountain only targets the 
restrictedness of geological-physical attributes, but not the restrictedness of the 
model merely on said attributes with no attention at all paid to, for example, 
biological or cultural contexts of the mountain68. 
Joseph Rouse (2002) argues for implicit normativity in scientific practices 
partly on similar grounds as Lowe argues for normativity of laws: as an 
alternative to the regularities-account; that is, scientific practices cannot be 
identified on the basis of regular procedures and activities (like natural laws 
cannot be identified on the basis of regular events and associations in nature), as 
there are no objective regularities, e.g. in following rules (Rouse 2002: 170). 
However, Rouse’s normativity-account of scientific practice has a rather 
complicated shape – it has various “constituents” and ‘intra-actions’ to which he 
applies the words ‘normative’ or ‘normativity’, but what exactly those 
normativities consist in is rather unclearly articulated (unclearly in contrast to 
Alcourrón’s and Bulygin’s and other logical expositions of normativity). Among 
the various normative elements of scientific practice in this account are: the 
surrounding world: by engaging in a practice, one is “implicitly committed to 
on-going engagement with a surrounding world (ibid: 256)”; understanding of 
the self in relation to this surrounding world: “Who “we” are depends upon how 
our surroundings are configured. That, in turn, is a normative question: what are 
the phenomena (as repeatable patterns) to which our activities belong? (ibid: 
332)”; other practices: scientific practice can only be identified “against a 
background of other practices (ibid: 170)”); inter- or intra-actions – particularly 
                                                                                                                       
finding out the ultimate truth about particular real world individuals (objects or “systems”, 
persons, events). 
68  Yucca Mountain has been a sacred site for local indigenous people since times imme-
morial; see Fowler et al 1991; http://www.umich.edu/~snre492/kendziuk.html 
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causal ones – with the world (people and things):69 “[C]ausal interactions with 
objects acquire normative authority over what people say and do (ibid: 186)”; 
interactions with scientific-experimental apparatus (ibid: 286–287); and also 
that which in other accounts might be called laws of nature, or phenomena: 
“The repeatable pattern of a physical phenomenon is ... normative rather than 
simply regular (ibid: 280)”. These elements cover several aspects, listed in the 
introduction, in which laws can be contemplated: the narrow notion of laws as 
expressing some kind of order or regularity in the world, their relation to the 
world, theories that encompass them, practices of formulating laws, (inter)-
relatedness of law-formulating practices. Rouse regards them as tightly 
interdependent, particularly he sees (scientific) (linguistic) discourse as strongly 
dependent on practice and perception. Above all, his notion of normativity 
seems to mean the implicit guiding role of “what is at issue and at stake” in 
(scientific) practices, what is being aimed at, and that something is being aimed 
at;70 this, on its part, is constantly changing as the world and perception of it is 
changed through material activities (practices).71 
To clarify Rouse’s notion of normativity, let us notice that in his account it is 
the practice or action (activity) that makes up the world and therefore also 
makes up science.72 But this is exactly the element of a (logical) system that 
underlies its normativity – actions; and those actions being provided with 
deontic operators. So in Rouse’s account, the fundamental constituent of life-
world and of science is the Universes of Actions, and “what is at issue and at 
stake” determines the Universes of Solutions. The latter logically includes Uni-
verses of Cases and hence those of Properties, which are the logical, linguistic 
or theoretical parts of normative systems, in Rouse’s account the discursive and 
hence in a sense secondary element of practices, as they rest on those. Universe 
of Discourse is on the one hand the perceived part of the world, on the other 
hand it must be regarded as the world acted upon. So Universes of Discourse 
and of Actions are the underlying elements of science as understood in Rouse’s 
framework. However, it is also clear that all the Universes are subsumed to 
constant reconceptualisation and reestablishment, as issues and stakes change 
due to the constant explorative and conceptualising reconfiguration of the world 
in scientific and other actions (practices). This of course implies historical 
changing of (implicit) norms which complicates detecting concrete norms and 
by this demonstrating the normativity of practices like science. Rouse’s 
normativity might be close to what Stepin and Agassi mean by the normativity 
                                                 
69  Similarly to Cartwright, Rouse argues for the priority of causality, or causal intra-actions, 
in practices, including scientific practice (ibid: e.g. 259–260, 318). 
70  “Intentionality is … an inherently normative concept, at two levels: its use by an inter-
preter is governed by norms, and in using it, the interpreter ascribes rational normativity to 
what she interprets (ibid: 188).” 
71  “What is authoritative over and constitutive of human agency and meaning ... is not the 
independent objective natures of things, but the emergent configuration of a situation as 
having something at stake in its outcome (ibid: 257).” 
72  Thanks to Endla Lõhkivi for pointing this out to me. 
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or guiding task of world view or world picture, and also as the deepest level of 
Schein’s partition of culture, which determines how the members of that culture 
perceive and think about their world (footnote 74). 
Let us notice that there have been both different sources of normativity, or 
what is setting norms (laws formulated in sciences, scientific practice – 
theoretical, experimental and applied, social and political considerations and 
practices, the underlying fundamental or scientific world picture or scientific 
theory), as well as different directions of normativity touched upon: 
 norms set upon science: underlying assumptions determining the scope and 
basic terms of a fundamental discipline (Stepin, Tinker et al, Agassi) or of 
models in applied research (Lemons et al); epistemic (Laudan, Stepin) and 
practical (Rouse, Stepin) ideals and norms guiding and shaping scientific 
inquiry;73 
 norms set by science: upon the way of seeing and handling the world (Tinker 
et al), upon policy decisions and their underlying knowledge standards 
                                                 
73  Particularly widespread is the topic of value normativity or value-ladenness of theories. 
Studies dedicated to the latter show how particular underlying implicit value judgements 
affect science making, first of all practical applied science and scientific modelling for 
science-based policies, but also scientific theories (e.g. Lemons et al.1997 about environ-
mental modelling for policy making; Tinker et al 1982 about ideologicalness of accounting 
theories; the joint article with Rafaela Hillerbrand to be based on the current work will deal 
with normativity and value-(and politics-)ladenness of particularly climate science). Agassi 
says to this end (1956 Part II: 381): “It is always possible to argue that a scientific theory 
which contradicts the metaphysical view which we now defend, is only tentative, an 
approximation to the truth, that a better scientific theory will supersede it which will 
conform with the metaphysics which we are defending.” Indeed the same seems to hold 
about environmental policies, contemporary politics and international legislation, as Lemons 
et al (1997: 214) recognise on the basis of their study: “This historical analysis of 
environmental change … demonstrates the evolution of scientific paradigms over time and 
how humans have constructed knowledge to satisfy their needs and wants within certain 
political economic systems.” Peter Newell states explicitly (2003: 60, 61, referring to 
Scoones 2002) that global economic and political powers, the capitalist market system, 
shape science, prescribe scientific rationality and soundness, and presumption of 
universality. In Alchourrón’s and Bulygin’s (1971: 103–107) logical account, values are 
external to the normative system as a purely logical system, but an important issue in legal 
theory related to axiological gaps, as they determine which properties ought to be relevant 
(prescriptive relevance) and hence to be included in a Universe of Properties (to be 
descriptively relevant). An axiological gap therefore occurs between a normative system, e.g. 
a legal act, and value judgements if the former does not take into account some properties 
that ought to be taken into account in a decision according to a hypothesis of relevance. To 
this effect, they say (ibid: 103): “To say that a property is relevant in the prescriptive 
meaning is to say that a certain state of affairs ought to be or should be the case, i.e. that a 
case and its complementary ought to have different normative status.” In those inquiries into 
the value-ladenness of science it is often the tension between descriptive and prescriptive 
relevance of properties that is addressed: on ideological, economic, political grounds, 
scientists are prescribed by policy makers which entities to take into account in modelling 
the real world phenomena, which variables to include in their models of research, which 
domains of those variables, etc. 
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(Lemons et al), upon scientific practice itself – science reproducing its own 
practices (Stepin, Rouse). 
 
These are certainly not independent from each other: as science can be said to 
be world picture-, value-, politics- and ideology-laden, so are politics, epistemic 
and moral values and law world-picture laden, which on its part is strongly 
related to science. I present in the following some aspects of how science itself 
(implicitly) exhibits normativity upon (other) portions of the life-world. Those 
aspects pretend neither to completeness nor exclusiveness, but are to clarify and 
illustrate what I mean by implicit normativity of science. Thereafter I will 
briefly consider them in case of law (explicitly normative systems) and relations 
between explicit and implicit normativities. 
1) Conceptual normativity hints to linguistic treatment of the world, or how 
something is expressed in language. I discern two modes: general and particular. 
a) The general analytic way of seeing the world, which is both superimposed 
and presumed by the scientific thinking, means dividing the world into some 
kinds of well defined elementary particles or attributes, which, when composed, 
like in conglomerates of atoms, mathematical formula, or generally systems, 
make up the world (the concepts of Universe of Properties, Universe of Cases, 
Universe of Actions as atomic, independent, exclusive and comprehensive 
exemplify this general fundamental scientific-analytical attitude). Arie Rip 
(2009: 408, 416) links such a (conceptual) treatment with engineering thinking, 
where atomic, elementary parts, into which the world is divided, can be mani-
pulated in controlled ways as building blocks. b) The particular way of correct 
thinking or talking or writing about the world (concrete elements of Universes 
of Properties and Universes of Cases), or perceiving it (concrete elements of 
Universes of Discourses): with which words, which conceptual networks, or 
which is the true description of the (human-independent) world; the examples of 
complex functional scientific concepts, shaping common sense understanding, 
might be: gene, species, climate, greenhouse gases, electricity, gravitational 
force; (from Tinker et al 1982: 176) capital, rent, profit, wage. The general 
meaning of conceptual normativity is enwombed in Vyacheslav Stepin’s (1999b, 
2005) conception of world picture or world view and philosophical foundations 
of science, in Edgar Schein’s (2010) analysis of culture as the deepest of the 
three levels of culture74, and possibly in Martin Heidegger’s (1959a) notion of 
Gestell (see also Seubold 1986); the particular conceptual normativity is 
enwombed in Stepin’s conception of (special) scientific world pictures (Heideg-
                                                 
74  Schein (2010: 23–33 and Part Two) discerns three levels of culture: the upper level of 
artefacts and observable behaviour which are manifest but difficult to interpret, the middle 
level of ‘espoused beliefs and values’ which are relatively conscious, and the deepest level of 
‘basic underlying assumptions’ which are unconscious and taken for granted, only become 
aware of in contact with different cultures, where the underlying deepest levels come to 
conflict. Schein specifies as some features of ‘culture’ that it creates stability and certainty, it 
is a “coercive [hence normative!] background structure that influences us in multiple ways” 
(ibid: 3), including how we perceive and think and feel about things (ibid: 28). 
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ger 1959b brings those forth as well), and possibly (partly) in Lowe’s kind of 
normativity (normal sorts) as I reinterpret it. I will inspect world picture as a 
guideline, hence as normative, in more detail in chapter 2. 
2) Epistemic normativity again has two modes: theoretical or mathematical 
and practical. a) Mathematical accountability, closely related to the requirement 
of conceptual clarity; the norm here is accountability and measurability, or 
mathematical clarity where ever possible (conceptual clarity in non-phi-
sciences), which implies in principle, if not in practice, determinism – as mathe-
matics is a priori unique and universal, independent of particular material idio-
syncrasies.75 Cognitive aims and values in science, shared goals constraining 
permissible rules, analysed by Laudan (1984: e.g. 36, 48) and by Stepin 
(1999b), and Lowe’s notion of normal sorts illustrate and expound this kind of 
normativity. Also the notions of (measurement) errors and noise evidence of the 
normativity of mathematical theories (or models or laws) of science: a datum, a 
measurement result can only be said to exhibit an error or noise if there is a 
norm that says what an error- or noise-free datum should look like. b) 
Laboratory experimentation to this end. What should be done with the world, or 
how should the world be arranged and ordered in laboratory, so that the laws 
formulated in the sciences would apply to it. I call this aspect ‘epistemic’ 
because the aim of laboratory experiment is to ensure knowledge about how a 
mathematical model and the material situation relate to each other, and namely 
that they display a required resemblance. Nomological machines (Cartwright 
1999, discussed in Appendix 4) are material settings displaying the regularities 
expressed in mathematical laws, so they approximate the epistemic certainty 
closest. This aspect pertains to the method how “laws of nature” are reached: 
they are not read out of nature but constructed mathematically and experi-
mentally. Martin Heidegger’s view of science as working or manipulating and 
refining the real to secure it for pursued aims expresses this active role of theory 
and observation in securing knowledge (Heidegger 1977: 166–168; 1959b: 55–
56). This view contravenes, in principle, both the inductivist and the represen-
tational understandings of law formation in science (or the naïver versions of 
them); particularly – mathematical laws build upon, and abstract from, the 
formal properties of experimentation and measurement procedures (Vihalemm 
1979, Suppes and Zinnes 1962). In laboratories, causal chains of events are 
enacted which lead to constellations or settings of matter which enable 
measurement of theoretically prescribed attributes of interest. The Universe of 
Discourse is determined in laboratories: if a part of the world can be treated as a 
composition of measurable and calculable Properties, or of simpler Cases which 
can be treated in this way, it belongs to the Universe of Discourse. For example, 
climate models have as their components simpler models of phenomena studied 
                                                 
75  Probabilistic laws can be understood as deterministic in the sense that a particular pro-
bability is necessary; however, laws so called (in physics) are based on particular frequencies 
in statistical collectives, hence they are statistical not probabilistic, that is, based on 
idiosyncratic empirical data not on apodictically true (mathematical) theory. (Probabilistic 
models are abducted/inducted versions of empirical frequencies?) 
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in laboratories, like convection or properties of atmospheric gases. Scientific 
practice is collective and historical or developmental (evolutionary).76 Mathe-
matical theory guides laboratory activities – design of experiments, inter-
pretation of results (Agassi 1956). Historical or developmental means: Due to 
the historically long practice and in a sense accumulative process, some of the 
theoretical knowledge becomes basic knowledge, often implicit and tacit, in the 
(laboratory) practice of physics, and is not questioned anymore (tests for a 
putative mathematical law are designed and run only until the mathematical 
formulation and test results are made to coincide, or the final shape and limits of 
the law settled, or the “phenomenon is stabilised”). Collective means: The 
normativity of laboratory physics is implicit in the ‘paradigm’; one learns 
already at the university what a ‘correct’ problem looks like, how to treat it, 
what a solution ought to look like (one talks about ‘well defined’ problems, 
variables and solutions). The correct formulation namely corresponds to the 
conceptual clarity of a scientific theory. Experimental practice serves to render 
unclear material settings to networks of well-defined quantities with sufficiently 
well determinable scales and magnitudes. Mathematical-experimental clarity 
and accountability of matter, reached by exact sciences, has been the ideal and 
norm of scientificity, the epistemic Leitbild to be followed by other sciences and 
by practical designing of the world,77 thus underlying the next kind of 
normativity: 
3) Practical normativity has a narrower mode and a broader mode. a) The 
narrower mode is engineering: applying exact scientific knowledge to design 
appliances – technology in narrower sense – used in everyday life or (industrial) 
production. It is in a sense somewhere between epistemic and practical norma-
tivity: it goes on in laboratories, being developed and tested there, but is applied 
outside laboratory and gets its task also from outside. b) The broader mode 
means social and technical practices and policies, including science teaching: 
How it is correct to treat the world (for example, technical requirements for 
buildings, conservation of species, climate regulation).78 The narrower, 
scientific-institutional ordering habits are expanded similarly outside laboratory, 
when science is applied to real world problems, in policy making, rule creation 
for practical handling (also Rouse 1987: Ch. 1 and 101). In order to be com-
patible with engineering approach, the real world is divided into problems of 
different disciplinary bearing,79 which consist of interconnected, practically 
identifiable and measurable attributes, relevant for the aim, some of which are 
                                                 
76  Rouse (2002) proposes implicit normativity in laboratory practices. See also Laudan 
1984, Stepin 1999a,b, 2005. 
77  as illustrated by the Appendices here 
78  Appendix 3 touches upon this aspect of normativity with an example from climate 
science. 
79  Also Heidegger (e.g. 1959b) emphasises and expounds this. An example of this division 
into disciplinary competencies is the case of value and accountancy theory by Tinker et al 
(1982), where all other aspects (like societal) but monetary are delegated to other scientific 
disciplines. 
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considered humanly manipulable, others as dependent on those. The ways how 
to scientifically treat the world depend on how the world is scientifically under-
stood, and also the other way around – understanding and hence conceptualising 
the world depend on how it is perceived, which on its part depends on the 
techniques of discrimination and manipulation of the world, that is – on 
technology. So all these aspects of normativity are related to each other. 
A brief contemplation might suggest that there really are just two kinds of 
normativity: theoretical (conceptual, mathematical, epistemic) and practical 
(laboratory, engineering, policy making). I point out epistemic normativity, 
keeping in mind my general target in this work: mathematicalness, analyticity, 
calculability or predictability – that hint to regularities, order or simplicity of 
some kind – in the sense that something lets itself be known in advance, be 
calculated, and thus provides certain peace of mind or repose, as e.g. Holmes 
expresses it (see 1.2). 
The general and particular conceptual normativities of legal systems have 
been briefly hinted to above and are manifested in legal statutes, acts etc.; the 
broader practical normativity of law is straightforward in judicial, and some-
times in political, actions and activities: it is the explicit normativity instantiated 
in normative systems, their Universes of Solutions. What about epistemic and 
narrower practical normativities? Some epistemic goals directing law or judicial 
practice come from science, particularly where science is to advice legislation 
or courts about possible real world happenings, connections etc., like Laudan 
(2006) or Haack (2004) consider, or like in science-based policies (climate, 
environmental and other). But this is epistemic normativity of science. Partly it 
pertains to law itself: as law is to enable orderly, accountable, secure life in the 
society, applying it must be accountable and predictable. Hence scientific 
certainty is sometimes normative to the broader practice of law. But the 
education and insider-practice and scholarship of law, similarly to scientific 
education and laboratories-institutes, that Rouse has described as exercising 
implicitly normative practices, can be regarded analogously as securing 





2. THE ORDERED WORLD AND  
ORIGINS OF NORMATIVITY 
 
The last paragraphs of the first chapter already considerably diverted from the 
narrow conception of laws as linguistic formulations or formal entities. In this 
chapter I turn to the broader context of laws – to world picture as a guideline 
driving ordering the world theoretically and practically, and to historical con-
texts of laws, normativity and world picture (or world cognition). My particular 
interest lies in the fundamental level of world cognition (or Schein’s basic 
assumptions of culture) that guide more generally the experience or cognition of 
the world and treating it in social practices.80 The aspects of normativity listed 
in the previous chapter will bear on the disquisition as follows: 1a general 
conceptual normativity means the normativity of world picture or world view or 
cognition and will particularly be addressed in paragraphs 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, and 
its relation to broader practical normativity (3b) in 2.1 and 2.2; 1b particular 
conceptual normativity specifies and illustrates with some examples the general 
conceptual normativity; broader practical normativity (3b) is the supporter and 
reproducer of the world view as it designs and creates the world immediately 
surrounding human life and perception; this will be in focus in parts 2.1 and 2.2; 
theoretical and practical epistemic normativities (2a and 2b) represent the ideal 
manifestation or peak and standard or reference model of the world-picture-
driven treatments of the world. Particularly the latter, 2a,b, and their 
corresponding world cognition will be historico-phenomenologically traced and 
grounded (especially in paragraph 2.3). 
I will start by introducing my interpretations of Heidegger’s core notions of 
the essence of contemporary technology (Heidegger 1959a).81 According to his 
words (Heidegger 2003: 259) contemporary technology applies contemporary 
science and is based on it, but its essence holds sway within science. Hence this 
basing (of technology by science) must be understood more broadly than 
applying theory – rather as general conditions for the arising of such practices 
like contemporary science and technology. Reflecting world views as strongly 
dependent on human relations with the surrounding world, including techno-
logy, will thus be essential for understanding normativity in contemporary 
mathematical-empirical science: the anthropological view of technology 
(technology as human activity) emphasises and specifies the activity-related 
side of science and its laws (Universes of Actions); technology as the (or a) 
                                                 
80  Stepin (1999b, 2005) discusses something like this under the name of ‘philosophical 
foundations of science’. 
81  Thanks to Prof. Ülo Matjus for many patient explications on Heidegger’s philosophy. 
However, I have not fully taken over his interpretation (as little as I understood it), but keep 
to large extent to my own (mis)understandings and (mis)interpretations that were 
disapproved by him – as it is not specifically Heidegger’s philosophy in my focus but my 
own understanding of contemporary world view and its normativity, and how reading 
Heidegger has helped me understand and conceptualise these on a certain plane. 
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practical side of science and as human everyday coping with the world essen-
tially determines human cognition and conception of the world (as mediated by 
technology); and technology broadly understood as a means for an end (the 
instrumental view of technology), a corollary to the manipulational account of 
causation (as a basis of scientific experiment and thereby of empiricalness of 
science), is changing, creating or designing the world (or trying to do so) 
according to human needs and visions of it.82 On the basis of historical moments 
in the evolution of the concept of law and its place in society and science, I will 
track the essence of science, or scientific world cognition, that Heidegger’s 
conceptions have suggested to me. 
As for Heidegger (1959a) one of the foci is the difference between ancient 
and contemporary technology, understanding this will be relevant for the histo-
rical approach taken here. The main characteristics of contemporary technology 
that discerns it from the ancient one is said to be Gestell83 – enframing – which 
is the ontological (not ontic) structure of the contemporary world (Seubold 
1986: 111), challenging man to regard the world or nature as a Bestand84 – 
standing-reserve, hence constitutes the basis of the normativity 1a. What exactly 
this nature of technology as Gestell and world as Bestand might mean, I will 
discuss in this chapter. The word ‘Bestand’ has three important aspects: firstly 
as ‘standing’, it means something stable, brought to (still)stand and thus secured 
in its state; secondly as ‘reserve’ or ‘inventory’, it is something that can be 
expressed in quantitative terms – something measurable and calculable, and, 
thirdly, as such staying at human disposal and discretion.85 Which of those 
meanings is the core of contemporary world cognition, discerning it from the 
earlier world cognitions, and thus corresponding to the essence of contemporary 
technology, will be addressed in the following contemplations. 
Cognition – world cognition and human self-cognition – is to a considerable 
extent constituted through human (material) relation to the immediate sur-
roundings, including nature and the Earth. Thus for understanding Heidegger’s 
distinction between ancient and contemporary technology, and thereby the 
fundamental world view related conditions of contemporary science, I will trace 
the evolvement of this relation in some historical moments of material practices, 
particularly mining as an intimately Earth-bound practice86 and as an almost 
iconic figurative illustration to Heidegger’s understanding of truth as uncon-
cealment – Unverborgenheit. Also scientists of the age draw parallels between 
                                                 
82  Heidegger regards the anthropological and instrumental views of technology as correct 
but not getting at the essence of it, thus incomplete. For me they are important as expressing 
the active, activity-related, and normative roles of technology and science. 
83  Gestell – base frame; frame; framework; mount; rack; shelf; stage; stand; support 
84  Bestand – inventory; population; stock; asset; book of business; constancy; continuance; 
crop; stability; supplies 
85  Glazebrook’s interpretation of Gestell also hints at this aspect: “a way of revealing things 
that sets them up as a standing reserve of resources available for human disposal” 
(Glazebrook 2000: 113). 
86  Heidegger’s own example of agriculture (e.g. in 1959a) is of course equally Earth-bound. 
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scientific inquiry and mining: William Gilbert imagines scientific experiment as 
“penetrat[ing] the inner parts of the earth”, whereas he regards Earth as “our 
common mother” (Henry 2001: 115; quoting Gilbert’s De Magnete); Robert 
Boyle likens experimental learning to “dig[ging] in the quarries for materials 
towards so useful a structure, as a solid body of natural philosophy” (Agassi 
1956 Part II: 99 and 181, quoting Boyle’s Proemial Essay). In a sense, ‘world’ – 
Welt, wer-alds – is itself to be understood as unconcealment, as what has come 
to light, to be known: it is something for man and through him, his (life)time 
and being together with other humans, times and places filled with people that 
offer maintenance and stand and thereby security – in contrast to wilderness 
(Wildnis) that is perceived as dangerous (Grimm and Grimm 1966, referring to 
the possible Christian origin of the word ‘world’). Wilderness or desert is 
dangerous because it is unknown, it is concealed from man and his 
comprehension and insubordinate to his administration.87 Being and truth or 
unconcealment (aletheia) are the same (Heidegger 1999: 135–136). Being is 
limiting the brought-to-the-fore or the brought-to-still-stand88, that happens in 
coming out of concealment (Verborgenheit), in quarrel that weighs up the 
counters (Heidegger 1999: 151, and 1966: 87).89 Mining could on this ground 
be seen as an activity that opens up the Earth as dark, opaque and concealed, 
bringing it to light and making it thus a part of the world, of human cognition. 
Man broadens the world, his understanding, by pushing the limits of world ever 
further into wilderness – bringing ever more of the wilderness forth into light 
and to still-stand, subsuming it thus under his understanding and administration. 
Understanding what and how ‘world’ is in human cognition is to inform 
about the possibility of ‘laws’ in the world and in nature, and the particular 
meaning and change of ‘laws of nature’. The narrow exact scientific concept 
might be seen as the peak and perfection of this notion, like the exact sciences 
themselves can be seen as the peak and perfection of epistemic certainty. So 
after contemplations on the man-Earth (or man-nature) relations I go on 
                                                 
87  Also in Baltic languages the word ‘world’ – ‘pasaule’ (lv) and ‘pasaulis’ (lt), literally 
‘under-sun’ – refers to something lighted; the Estonian ‘maailm’, literally ‘Earth-heaven’, 
refers to the being-together of the dark and opaque Earth and the light and transparent 
heaven (or sky or atmosphere or weather). Hear http://heli.er.ee/helid/970321.mp3 (in 
Estonian); Metsmägi et al. 2012: 91. 
88  “Ergrenzung des zum Stand Gebrachten” 
89  Pelseneer (1949: 23) reports about “primitive” peoples that the appearance of things was 
essential, notional for them, so that changing it could turn everything upside down; due to 
this they did everything exactly as their ancestors had done. This reminds of Heidegger’s 
notion of truth as what is in the fore and hence unconcealed from the sight, and that this 
brings stand or certainty. Also Archimedes’ physics conforms to Heidegger’s truth concept 
by having “directly evident and evidently logical” basic notions (weight, density, geo-
metrical form), differently from that of Galilei, although being just as mathematical (Gorelik 
2012a; it is, however, questionable to what extent those properties really are “directly 
evident and evidently logical”). One could see (remains of) this attitude still in the require-
ment in classical physics (Stepin 1999a: 321) that mathematical models reflect a pre-existing 
pictorial idea that was based on the world picture. 
53 
considering particularly the nature of contemporary science as Gewirk (fabric), 
on the basis of Heidegger 1959b, and technology as Gestell (enframing), and 
interpret them in various historical and cultural contexts or mind-sets in which 
some concept of ‘laws of nature’ has appeared. Thus I will try to bring forth 
some issues about the abstractness and concreteness of the notion. 
 
2.1. The relation of (technical) cognition to mining:  
an eco-philosophical analysis 
 
In this and the next section I consider some changes in the mental-spiritual side 
of world cognition arising from human practical treatment of nature, which 
underlie contemporary science. For this I gather together Carolyn Merchant’s 
account of the beginnings of contemporary industry and science in eco-feminist 
terms (Merchant 2003), and Martin Heidegger’s original (German) pheno-
menology of technology in his “Die Frage nach der Technik” (Heidegger 
1959a).90 I especially dare emphasise Heidegger’s expressions in relation to 
mountains and mining for two reasons: Firstly, there is a remarkably important 
role – important with relation to the content and meaning – for words whose 
stem – berg – would be translated as ‘mountain’, and to words relating to 
mining, at that sometimes in meanings in which they are usually not understood 
anymore, even though they could be so understood some centuries ago; there 
are other possibilities to express the same meanings in German (nowadays), 
thence why I opine that his choice is not “random”. Secondly – and why I think 
this expression is purposeful – the historical link between science and techno-
logy that Heidegger refers to, as it seems to me and as I will show on the basis 
of Merchant’s eco-feminist account of technical development, is influenced by 
the relation of humans to nature, or man to Earth, evolvement of this relation 
and its reflection in mental-spiritual and activity-related world. Also Seubold 
(1986: 35–36) finds the essence of technology to be inherently related to the 
relation of man and Earth: as technology mediates man and Earth, helping man 
to make the Earth usable and to process her for himself, then more technical 
methods engender a father-from-Earth disposition in man. Hence I try to bring 
forth one break point that introduced such a difference between contemporary 
and ancient technology. 
In order to better understand the words related to the stem ‘berg’ (e.g. 
‘bergen’, ‘verbergen’, ‘entbergen’, ‘Gebirge’), let us look into their history. 
‘Berg’ and ‘bergen’ stem from the hypothetical indogermanic parent language 
and can be related to each other, whereas Grimm and Grimm (1966) claim 
‘berg’ to stem from ‘bergen’. ‘Bergen’ means etymologically ‘keep, maintain, 
preserve’ (e.g. grain, foodstuff) (Kluge 1989) and ‘bring into a firm place (e.g. 
into a tower), bring to a mountain, to rescue’ (Grimm and Grimm 1966, Auberle 
2001, Paul 1992); ‘berg’ means ‘high, rising higher of the plane, raised’, and 
                                                 
90  As will be clear, the German original is decisive for my account. 
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also ‘sublime, exalted’. Mountains were seen as firm, secure places, as rescue – 
from which ‘Burg’ with the same meaning stems, also ‘rescue for the truth from 
appearing’91 (Grimm and Grimm 1966: 1503, 1505), that originates from 
warfare – from hiding troops behind mountains to conceal one’s military might 
from the enemy, to face him unexpectedly, to bring him into (still)stand 
(Auberle 2001). Here one can notice associations that appear between these two 
meanings – ‘mountain’ and ‘maintain’ – as relevant in current context. Firstly, 
as will come forth in Merchant’s explications about understanding Earth as the 
nourishing mother, the Earth keeps or maintains her fruits (e.g. metals and ores), 
keeps them firmly ripening and ripened in her womb – in mountains, as the first 
mining activities took place in mountains (Kluge 1989: 75, entry word 
‘Bergbau’ – ‘mining’). Secondly, when gathering and maintaining crops and 
other reserves, those were gathered into heaps, that liken mountains according 
to their shape, and that were also called like this – ‘berg’ (Grimm and Grimm 
1966), and conceal and keep that what is in and behind them. And thirdly, 
keeping the truth in concealment, in secrecy, behind the mountain, harmonises 
with Heidegger’s understanding of truth as aletheia, and facing the enemy to 
bring him to still-stand from behind a mountain with his understanding of being 
as quarrel, as mutual bringing into limits with the brought-to-the-fore, bringing 
to still-stand and to appearance.92 
Heidegger describes technology as bringing forth the truth, bringing it out of 
concealment – or appearing from behind a mountain93 (Heidegger 1959a: 19). 
Together with episteme, it is a way of cognition (Erkennen): understanding, 
capturing something; “cognition gives explanation [or opening or making 
available or outcrop] (Aufschluss) (ibid: 21).” Technology (techne) brings being 
forth through a work – it is knowledge or skill to set being into a work, to bring 
it to (still)stand through a work (Heidegger 1999: 204; 1966: 122), or make it 
understandable, cognisable and available. As unconcealment is always accom-
panied by concealment (Verborgenheit), the truth or unconcealed always tends 
to conceal itself again, to hide itself behind the mountain or maintain itself 
heaped in a repository (store room), thus bringing man to the way of 
unconcealing it again and again, to set himself according to the concealed to 
bring it to light. Thus man and truth mutually bound and limit each other.94 
Taking into account Heidegger’s understanding of thinking as a way that 
discloses different views before “getting there” and gathers95 the views together, 
                                                 
91  ‘hinter dem berge halten’ 
92  This conception of truth as quarrel probably has its roots in Ancient Greek conception of 
the ground (arche) of being as lying in the mutual countering and balancing between love 
and strife (Kelsen 1939/1940: 90). 
93  Entbergen, “aus Verborgenheit her in die Unverborgenheit vor”. 
94  This sounds similar to Anaximenes’ saying: come to know the starry sky, and you will 
come to know yourself (De Crescenzo 2007 Part 1: Ch. 5), if starry sky is a part of φύσις, 
that meant being for Greeks (Glazebrook 2000: 99), which means, as I have gathered from 
Heidegger, truth as aletheia. 
95  legein, lesen 
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and of what is traditionally called causa efficiens, that it is what gathers the 
other three “causes” (debts or occasionings – causa materialis, causa formalis, 
causa finalis) together in thinking, sets them into the fore in imagination, to 
bring them into sight in reality as a complete (technical) thing, I see here the 
following association. This causa efficiens, for example the silversmith, is on a 
way of technical thinking which takes him forth between mountains and 
discloses different views to him of what he intends to bring forth. This way can 
also already be that of producing, where the initially imagined thing changes, 
for example due to contingent factors, or because this way (the material, form, 
or other) discloses (entbirgt) itself differently than initially thought: the thing 
can appear once this way, once another way (Heidegger 1959a: 21). The silver-
smith must adapt to the situation, for example change the direction on the way 
(switch to another raw material if this turns out to be poor, or other). 
Contemporary technology also brings forth, but not from behind a mountain, 
rather from within a mountain – it extracts and unearths (herausfördern, zutage 
fördern). It does not seek different views, does not adapt to nature, but forces a 
mountain to open itself (erschliessen), it exposes nature (herausstellen). It thus 
does not let nature guide it, rather guides itself through nature and secures this 
guiding with an enframing (rack/stand) (Gestell) in mine shafts and other 
necessary constructions (material enframing), which enable to securely and 
optimally unearth and process the content of a mountain. The mountain (the 
bowels of Earth) thus becomes for man a strike, a reserve (of natural resources), 
which is opened (aufschliessen) and an important parameter of which is now the 
stand or supply of its stock (Bestand) – as it must pay off the efforts of setting 
the enframing. At the same time this enframing closes up previous production, 
which ran on the ways of thinking, of gathering, both by dump-hills (Berg) as 
well as by mining constructions (verbauen). 
Carolyn Merchant (2004) describes on the basis of several sources (she 
quotes both Antique authors like Ovid, Seneca, as well as Renaissance and 
contemporary authors like Paracelsus, McLuhan, Valentine) antique under-
standing of the Earth as a nurturing mother, from whom everything on her has 
been born, both animate and inanimate and also that what is in her are fruits of 
her womb and entrails, ripening in her. The Earth was imagined as a human-like 
organism, which has a circulation system (streams, seas) and several functions 
characteristic to organisms (breathing, perspiration, metabolism). Mining 
“natural resources” (minerals, ores) was imagined as cutting open the womb or 
entrails of mother Earth. The Earth bestows on her surface what she wants to 
allow man to use, and keeps in herself what she does not want to allow man to 
use.96 Such an understanding entails as well a moral attitude: the Earth as a 
mother, as the bearer, nurturer and keeper of life is sacred, she must be 
                                                 
96  This material consideration and treatment parallels mental consideration, held for 
example by Socrates (who can be regarded as a shaman; De Crescenzo 2007 Part 2: Ch. 1) 
that one should rather involve in ethics as human affairs than in physics, because Gods hide 
from humans what they do not want him to know (Pelseneer 1949: 40). 
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honoured; mining metals and minerals out of her is violation of her sacredness 
(that she avenges, for example in the form of earthquakes), hence inadmissible, 
immoral activity. 
Such an attitude still endured during the Renaissance, but growing interests 
of the mining industry in the conditions of commercial revolution in the 16th 
century imposed creating of a new conception of the Earth and of nature. So 
Merchant describes, basing on Adams, Agricola and others, the conflict of old 
and new conceptions. The new conceptions aimed to suggest that the Earth is in 
fact not a benevolent nurturing mother, but a wicked stepmother, who conceals 
from man resources useful for him, and that the damage resulting from mining 
(like environmental pollution and destruction) enables these to be exploited 
advantageously (one can, for example, cultivate fields on areas where forest 
have been cut down for metal smelting, and construction materials lost in the 
form of wood can be indemnified by the income from mining). Also the moral 
decline that the new conception brought with it spoke in favour of the old view: 
metals evoked greed and lust, drive brutality and violence, polluting human soul 
like mining pollutes Earth’s womb. At the same time, mining activity was 
regarded as changing the Earth: she was not a nurturing mother anymore, but 
bore indiscriminately monsters into life and receives passively their violence 
(ibid: 424–425; Merchant refers to Spenser 1758). By strengthening of new 
values (growth of human well-being with exploitation of natural resources) 
contrariness toward technical study and exploration of the Earth decreased. 
Although Merchant recognizes that mining of resources had been, from time 
to time, carried through with weaker moral sanctions already earlier, the domi-
nant attitude was, however, honouring the Earth as an organism. Consequently, 
this activity and processing of metals were regarded with greater attentiveness: 
they were bound with special rites of purity, special power was assigned to 
smith-work and -tools. Celts, for example97, honoured as sacred the sites where 
they extracted rocks or ores from inside the Earth, bound them with spirits or 
gods of the Earth and donated the gods and the Earth for their gifts.98 This could 
be compared to Heidegger’s ‘way of thinking’: the attention that was focused on 
opening the Earth’s womb for human well-being and on exploiting her riches to 
create things is like a way of thinking, where senses must be pure and notice 
that which is concealed (in the mountain), the bringing forth of it, and things 
from it.99 In contrast to this, the commercial turn brought along a disposition 
                                                 
97  The example told by Frank Suttner on an excursion concerning sacred sites of Aachen in 
spring 2012. 
98  This exemplifies Heidegger’s conception of Ding, ’thing’, as a gathering site for the 
Fourfold (Geviert) – Earth and Sky, Mortals and Divinities: the Earth, or places, particularly 
the mining sites were for Celts such kinds of ’things’, gathering sites, not plain reserves of 
resources. Furthermore, this thankfulness towards those sites evinces of “personification” of 
the Earth – she may have her own telos, but nonetheless she is so generous as to donate to 
humans from the fruits of her womb. 
99  Things were dealt with concernfully; Glazebrook (2000: 109) includes “the context of 
equipmentality and [things’] involvement” into the constitutions of things in concernful 
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according to which Earth must be profitable in the form of richness, glory, 
technical or military success. A conceptual change took place: Earth and what 
was born from her were not an animate organism anymore, but they were to be 
taken account of in the key of expenses and incomes – they were to be mea-
sured and calculated; that is, Earth and Earth’s womb had turned into a stock, a 
standing-reserve, which was to be profited from and the supply of which was to 
be monitored.100 In accordance with this, mining, setting of landscape and 
nature or rebuilding it (or even obstructing (verbauen) it) became admissible in 
such a way that profitable resources could be extracted. This at once closes the 
previous ways of thinking, as they cannot be commercially evaluated (or rather 
are not profitable). 
Technology as cognition of the world thus indeed seems to have changed: 
previous technology focused on concrete thingness and interlocking of things 
with the overall entirety of nature and society, things gathered in them steps, 
each of which brought to them in their own way – or rather, the taker of those 
steps gathered them into a thing; or by exploring what is, that what unconceals 
itself disposes the exploring mind and thereby shapes (or limits) it, which on its 
part shapes the way the explorer’s mind shapes the path of exploration and thus 
the world – what and how will be unconcealed (Heidegger 2003: 258 (1977b: 
19)): 
 
That which primordially unfolds the mountains into mountain ranges and 
pervades them in their folded contiguity is the gathering that we call Gebirg 
[mountain chain]. 
That original gathering from which unfold the ways in which we have feelings of 
one kind or another we name Gemüt [disposition].101 
 
It can also be understood thus: wandering the length and breadth (durchziehen) 
of mountains, views open to the wanderer (thinker, craftsman, smith), mountain 
range opens itself, displays its details (entfaltet) and sets the disposition of the 
wanderer. Contemporary technology, by contrast, generalises things into 
abstract relations between reserve/supply parts which are detached from their 
original context and environment and which have no own causa finalis, the 
relation of cognition is not anymore the relation between a human being as 
arche and a thing’s coming into being, but rather something like the relation 
between a storekeeper and stand/supply of stock. 
 
                                                                                                                       
dealings, contrasting it to the theoretical attitude, where “such involvement does not belong 
to beings.” 
100 Glazebrook (2000: 113) expresses a similar understanding of the meaning of techno-
logical Gestell: nature is set upon “to unlock and expose its energy for stockpiling.” 
101  “Was die Berge ursprünglich zu Bergzügen entfaltet und sie in ihrem gefalteten Beisam-
men durchzieht, ist das Versammelnde, das wir Gebirg nennen. 
Wir nennen jenes ursprünglich Versammelnde, daraus sich die Weisen entfalten, nach 
denen uns so und so zumute ist, das Gemüt.” (Heidegger 1959a: 27) 
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2.2. Contemporary science and technology as ways  
of studying nature: an eco-feminist approach 
 
The preconditions, described in the previous section, for relations between 
cognition of nature and the Earth and applying technology, arising from social 
practices, guide the way to examining relations between technology and 
scientific theory. One of the conditions for the arising of such practices like 
contemporary science and technology is a change in attitude towards nature and 
the Earth as treated in the previous section, where she comes to be regarded as 
something that can be divided into reserve parts and arranged as an order 
(bestellen). In this section I consider more closely the acting of science and 
technology as bringers forth of nature in the form, corresponding to the 
enframing, of division into parts. Here too I use ideas from Merchant to 
concretise the relationship between man and nature, appearing in the practices 
of science and technology. Whereas in the previous part the guiding idea was 
the Earth and nature as the mother whose child man is, then here nature appears 
as a female and man is imaged as a male who tries to seduce her. 
Heidegger discerns ways in which that what a mountain conceals from view 
is brought into unconcealment, or how cognition of it is built up. He regards 
previous technology as an activity which helps nature to appear such as she 
would not appear by herself, gathering her capacities into an aimed thing. Con-
temporary technology is regarded as challenging nature, ordering (Bestellung) 
her to appear in a given enframing. While in mining, Earth is ordered in such a 
way that natural resources are quarried and delivered as a stock, then in 
technology, nature is ordered in such a way that she appears as a composition of 
(standing-)reserves of forces. According to Heidegger, nature herself requires 
such ordering from man by constantly concealing herself from him (2003: 257 
(1977b: 19)): 
Thus when man, investigating, observing, pursues nature as an area of his own 
conceiving, he has already been claimed by a way of revealing that challenges 
him to approach nature as an object of research, until even the object disappears 
into the objectlessness of standing-reserve.102 
This can also be understood thus: man is after (nachstellt) nature as his study 
area and lays into her (angeht) as into an adversary, into an object, and regulates 
her. As such, technology is ruling the nature, harnessing, enframing her; nature 
as an adversary is reduced to a composition of controllable forces. 
A similar attacking and tracing, challenging enframing is applied in science 
(Heidegger 1959a: 29): physics sets nature in an experiment in order to study if 
and how she answers to such a setting. In an experiment, physics gathers forces 
                                                 
102 “Wenn also der Mensch forschend, betrachtend der Natur als einem Bezirk seines Vor-
stellens nachstellt, dann ist er bereits von einer Weise der Entbergung beansprucht, die ihn 
herausfordert, der Natur als einen Gegenstand der Forschung anzugehen, bis auch der 
Gegenstand in das Gegenstandlose des Bestandes verschwindet.” (Heidegger 1959a: 26) 
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into a certain stock, it regulates them appropriately. Forces must be calculable. 
As in contemporary technology concrete thingness is not essential (a thing with 
its occasioning (“causal”) relations in the entirety of being), neither are concrete 
occasioning relations and material singularity essential in physics, rather it fades 
out into a provoked appearing of supplies, deploying one after another or 
simultaneously (ibid: 30). By this, (technological) science, particularly experi-
mentation as the activity of bringing nature into the (mathematical) form of the 
scientific enframing, does violence to nature, making beings observable as what 
they are (Glazebrook 1998). As Trish Glazebrook (2000) says – modern science 
deprives nature of its causa finalis, of its own end, to superimpose human-
determined ends upon her (that will be achieved through technology, technical 
treatment of nature).103 
But just like in mining, so also in technology and scientific experiment, not 
everything that occurs (occurring truth, unconcealment) depends solely on man, 
is in his power (Heidegger 2003: 257 (1977b: 18)): 
Since man drives technology forward, he takes part in ordering as a way of 
revealing. But the unconcealment itself, within which ordering unfolds, is never 
a human handiwork, anymore than is the realm man traverses every time he as a 
subject relates to an object.104 
Here one can surmise an allusion to the stand that man is the measure of all 
things: man takes himself to refer to nature (“he as a subject relates to an 
object”); that is, man measures everything on the basis of himself (in his 
enframing) and he builds an imagination as if he himself had created the nature 
set in this way. But Heidegger points out that exactly this stand, which stems 
from the delusion that nature has entirely the form of the enframing (a non-
corporeal composition of abstract forces), is the greatest danger to human 
nature. 
Here Heidegger’s vocabulary allows once again to see associations with 
Merchant’s treatment of attitudes towards nature and science in the dawn of 
contemporary science. When it was for man already morally admissible to 
invade into mother Earth, into nature, in order to get at metals and minerals 
concealed in her, then the human power and rule over nature had been 
instituted. Merchant refers mainly to Bacon as the advocate and expander of the 
new moral attitude from technical to scientific activities (Merchant 2003): man 
was the ruler of nature, until he fell into the original sin, in which woman was 
guilty, and was cast out of the garden of Eden, thus lost his dominion over 
                                                 
103  John Lunstroth (2009) says: in 11th–19th centuries, nature was claimed to have no moral, 
no essence. 
104  “Indem der Mensch die Technik betreibt, nimmt er am Bestellen als einer Weise des 
Entbergens teil. Allein die Unverborgenheit selbst, innerhalb deren sich das Bestellen ent-
faltet, ist niemals ein menschliches Gemächte, so wenig wie der Bereich, den der Mensch 
jederzeit schon durchgeht, wenn er als Subjekt sich auf ein Objekt bezieht.” (Heidegger 
1959a: 26) 
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nature. Science’s task is to re-establish this dominion, and this is only possible 
by invading into her womb like into a mine and shaping her like on an anvil. 
Nature is imaged as a woman and re-establishing power over her as (violently) 
seducing her, penetrating her dark plots and caves, to uncover her secrets; 
contemporary science was to help get to know nature, to then exploit this 
knowledge in harnessing her to serve man, to “conquer and subdue” her, even 
rape and torture her like under inquisition. In scientific experiment, with the 
help of mechanical arts, human knowledge must help him harness his dominion 
over nature, dissect her and shape the nature through man’s hand.105 
Merchant calls this approach sexual imagination. Her interpretation can be 
not agreed with, like Alan Soble (2003) who claims that Bacon’s allegories have 
been misinterpreted. However, the allegories of gender and sexuality obviously 
had an important impact on society at those times in deprecating femininity and 
boosting masculinity into ground principles of science and technology (Scharff 
and Dusek 2003: 414). In this light, Heidegger’s treatment of being after 
(nachstellen) and organising nature and laying into her (angehen) seem to fit 
well with the masculine understanding of science that traces nature as a female 
being and tries to conquer her. Both practical handling of nature and the Earth 
(mining, producing), as well as theoretical examination, is forcing her to open 
herself through a stand or enframing (mechanical arts), to disclose her secrets.106 
That what is disclosed appears for sciences in an abstracted form as a reserve, 
that can be subdued to human will, that is, calculate and exploit to reveal new 
secrets by further shaping nature. 
In both treatments there are two further aspects important: firstly, that man 
has been forced or challenged by nature to examine her provocatively, com-
pellingly107, and secondly, that what appears in the course of examination is 
                                                 
105  Also Heisenberg likens scientific-technical research and the brought-forth thereby to 
cutting open a human body (for example in a surgical operation) – both can incite estranging 
(Heisenberg 1955: 14). 
106  As Laudan (1984: 58) reports, the prominent attitude in the 18. century science towards 
observability fostered that “science should limit itself to those observational “laws which 
nature reveals to us”” (Bailly, quoted from Prevot 1805), that can be understood, not only as 
a prohibition to make up hypotheses, but also as remains of the taboo in respect to the Earth, 
of nature, a prohibition from invading and possibly blocking her inner self. 
107  As Prof. Matjus explained, Gestell is not a human doing, something that he makes up 
and imposes upon nature; rather man is challenged by nature into Gestell, he already finds 
himself inexorably forced in it that he cannot get out of. Gestell is normative in the sense 
that man must act according to it. In the following I will try to open to some extent what this 
means that man is forced into Gestell. However, if it is understood in the sense that man is 
forced into the technical-social situation that he is born into and that he has come into in his 
everyday doings, as I understood Prof. Matjus, then this is not so much different from any 
earlier (ancient) human situation, as in any era, one was born into a certain technical-social 
situation that determines one’s ways of thinking and perception and sets one’s dispositions, 
so the inexorability of this situation cannot in this sense differentiate contemporary 
technology from ancient technology. Rather it may be that in contemporary situation, 
technology is everywhere, the world (nature) itself is defined in technical terms (expressed 
as impossibility of understanding the world unless one can model or measure or manipulate 
61 
only partly in human power. The first can be gathered in Merchant’s pre-
sentation of the story of the garden of Eden: female-nature lured male-man into 
a state where he does not dominate nature anymore, but is rather dominated by 
her, in Heidegger’s words – man is in unconcealment for nature; and the other 
aspect follows from the requirement that, in order to dominate nature, one must 
know her, her secrets, because only by knowing nature, by harnessing her own 
laws, it is possible to dominate over her. Even if man rules nature technically – 
and in Bacon’s understanding just then – nature discloses herself – and just 
herself, not something created by man, not human power (Gemächte). In such a 
feministic context we should also ask about the last mentioned word – 
Gemächte – if Heidegger has used purposefully exactly this word? In Estonian 
translation there is ‘power’ in this place, which could also be ‘Macht’ in 
German, in English translation there is ‘handiwork’, that is ‘Handwerk’ or 
‘Geschöpf’. That Heidegger has willingly chosen a word related to (male) repro-
ductive potency to express human capacities, is also suspected by Johannes 
Fritsche, who analyses the use of gender notions ‘Geschlecht’ and ‘Gemächte’ 
in Heidegger’s works (Fritsche 1999: 188–194). Merchant’s discussion allows 
to surmise that the image of sexual dominion and potency has indeed, more or 
less consciously, shaped the essence of contemporary science and technology, 
and one may speculate that Heidegger has also perceived the nature of 
technology and its aimed effect in this way. This would be in good accordance 
with his attitude towards contemporary technology, while he explicitly and 
acutely expresses what implicitly resides in techno-scientific worldview – the 
male dominance and suppression of female – and thereby denies the legitimacy 
of this worldview. 
 
2.3. Interpreting Heidegger’s conception of enframing  
as the essence of contemporary science and technology 
 
In this section I consider more closely what is this stand, enframing, which 
determines the way how contemporary science and technology examine nature 
and reveal truth. This is to specify the exact science’s nature as epistemic 
Leitbild setting norms to other sciences (normativities 2a,b) and broader 
(everyday) material-practical handling of the world (normativity 3b). I focus on 
physics as the science which Heidegger himself in 1959a,b mostly focusses on 
and which is commonly understood to underlie (a considerable portion of) 
contemporary technology. In order to sharpen Heidegger’s distinction between 
earlier and contemporary technology and cognition, I accommodate his analysis 
into the context of science practice and the notion of phi-science coined by Rein 
Vihalemm. As measurement has a fundamental role in exact sciences, parti-
cularly in applying them on empiria in the form of experiment and technology – 
                                                                                                                       
it; e.g. Bacon, Kepler and others, referred to in Hand 2004: 4–5; Feynman 1965: 58; 
Heidegger 1959b: 58, quoting Max Planck), whence one has an ever scanter possibility to 
come to nature without human-technical mediation. 
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which also Heidegger has drawn attention to – I touch cursorily upon the nature 
of measurement in the context of exact sciences (Appendix 4 gives a more 
thorough account of measurement). 
The most important notions that characterise contemporary technology in 
Heidegger’s thinking are enframing (Gestell) and (standing-)reserve (Bestand) 
introduced in previous paragraphs. The former conditions the latter (Heidegger 
2003: 258): “We now name the challenging claim that gathers man with a view 
to ordering the self-revealing as standing-reserve: Ge-stell.”108 Heidegger says 
that the enframing is not technical: devices and people working on them belong 
to the enframing as parts of it and its arrangers, but enframing in itself is 
something else: it is a destining way of revealing, that originates from the forth-
bringing revealing (poiesis), but sets it wrongly or blocks it (verstellt) (Heideg-
ger 2003: 262). As the essence of technology, enframing is what endures (ibid). 
The enframing seems to appear as the way how man perceives the world or how 
the world or being appears to him, how he limits it: it is the way for man to 
come to see and handle the world as a standing-reserve. 
What is it then, that Heidegger calls enframing? To clarify this, I consider 
what he says about science as nowadays the basis and pathfinder of technology. 
Just as it holds about contemporary technology, it also holds about con-
temporary physics that its essence is not determined by the use of devices (ibid; 
emphasis added): 
Modern physics is not experimental physics because it applies apparatus to the 
questioning of nature. The reverse is true. Because physics, indeed already pure 
theory, sets nature up to exhibit itself as a coherence of forces calculable in 
advance, it orders its experiments precisely for the purpose of asking whether 
and how nature reports itself when set up in this way.109 
First I consider, what coherence of forces means. In the example of hydro-
electric power plant (Heidegger 1959a: 2003) such a coherence emerges thus: 
stream as a natural object is harnessed as a source of pressure – it is reduced to 
“pressure” (or “energy”) as one of its properties, and water turbine as a 
technical object is harnessed to transmit this force – it is reduced to “pressure” 
and “torque” as its properties. This means that things lose their thingness and 
objectness, they are abstracted into acting forces. It is the same in an experi-
ment: when for testing a law of physics the conditions are staged in which that 
what the correspondent equation says should take place, it is not the concrete 
apparatus to bring forth those conditions that is important, but only its certain 
                                                 
108  “Wir nennen jetzt jenen herausfordernden Anspruch, der den Menschen dahin versam-
melt, das Sichentbergende als Bestand zu bestellen – das Ge-stell.” (Heidegger 1959a: 27) 
109  “Die neuzeitliche Physik ist nicht deshalb Experimentalphysik, weil sie Apparaturen zur 
Befragung der Natur ansetzt, sondern umgekehrt: weil die Physik und zwar schon als reine 
Theorie die Natur daraufhin stellt, sich als einen vorausberechenbaren Zusammenhang von 
Kräften darzustellen, deshalb wird das Experiment bestellt, nämlich zur Befragung, ob sich 
die so gestellte Natur und wie sie sich meldet.” (Heidegger 1959a: 29) 
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properties (e.g. which ensure reliability of its readings). This law of physics, 
which is necessarily in a mathematical form, gathers as such certain “forces”, 
which are theoretically (mathematically) defined. Nature is reduced to well 
defined dimensions and quantities (see also Appendix 4), and those are joined in 
a mathematical formula, according to which an experimental enframing is 
designed. Heidegger images physical theory as a fabric (1959b: 56): science sets 
the real or actual (das Wirkliche) so that it appears as fabric (Gewirk), or as a 
foreseeable outcome of applied causes that are joined and estimated in a 
network. Indeed, in physics, elements (quantities) are joined by definitions and 
deductions, they make up something like a web or fabric, and combining those 
quantities with each other enables to foresee possible experimental outcomes. 
Second, what does calculable in advance mean? Of course, physics theory is 
necessarily mathematical and comprises calculation and prediction. “The 
methodology, characterized by entrapping securing, that belongs to all theory of 
the real, is a reckoning-up (Heidegger 1977c: 170)110”, that is, it is mathe-
matically defined, what of nature and how is brought forward, nature is been 
after mathematically. The non-perceivable (non-visualisable) essence of con-
temporary physics stems from its (theoretical-mathematical) enframing that 
requires that nature be adjustable as a composition of supplies. Also when 
applied to objects, it is necessary for science: that nature reports herself as a 
system of information, ensurable by calculation. Causality is not anymore oc-
casioning, bringing forth, but “is shrinking into a reporting – a reporting 
challenged forth – of standing-reserves that must be guaranteed either simulta-
neously or in sequence (Heidegger 2003: 259)”. It is measurement as the pro-
cedure of assigning numbers to objects or properties on a measuring scale (e.g. 
Hand 1999) that brings nature forth as mathematical and calculable, shrinks her 
into compositions of variables: in contemporary science as theory, what is 
important is the method of observation, which in physics is measuring, mea-
surability (Heidegger 1959b: 58). 
I will compare Heidegger’s treatment with a contemporary constructive-
realist account of science by Rein Vihalemm (e.g. Vihalemm 1989, 1995). Phi-
sciences (physics-like sciences) are built on constructive-hypothetico-deductive 
method of study: 1) they construct their study domain mathematically, that is, 
their theory consists of mathematically defined models and the world (“nature”) 
is studied according to how it corresponds to mathematical constructions of the 
theory; 2) on the basis of those mathematical constructions hypotheses are built 
up that are tested in an experiment or observation; 3) idealised laws, abstracted 
mathematico-experimentally, are deducible from each other mathematically. 
Those sciences adjust the world to their cognition, and their laws instruct by 
which experiment or observation is it possible to see the world in this way. The 
method of non-phi-sciences, in contrast, which originates from natural history, 
is classifying-descriptive-historical: they divide the studied world into classes 
                                                 
110  “Das nachstellend-sicherstellende Verfahren aller Theorie des Wirklichen ist ein 
Berechnen.” (Heidegger 1959b: 58) 
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according to their detailed descriptions, where also historical development of 
what is studied must be taken into account. Those sciences adjust their 
cognition to the world – they must notice all details and phenomena as a whole 
in order to adequately describe it. However, the models of phi-sciences are not 
merely mathematical constructions, but derived and tested in real experi-
ments.111 Experiment is the practical activity of science through which it brings 
the world forth in its specific way, achieves its peculiar world cognition 
corresponding to its mathematical (unique, apodictic) kernel (Vihalemm 1979: 
44–50, 171–186, 191–198).112,113 
On this background of practice-based understanding, let us again look at 
Heidegger’s account of the essence of science114. We notice that the first feature 
of phi-science – being mathematically constructive – and the abstracting and 
idealising practice of phi-science correspond to the most important elements of 
his account: the first, correspondingly, to the calculating and measuring stand 
and enframing, and the second to supply (standing-reserve), reducing things to 
their few properties the stand (intensity) of which is measurable. In this same 
ideality, mathematicalness, is also concealed this enduring, this dwelling, which 
is to constitute the essence of contemporary technology: namely the uniqueness, 
universality and necessity of mathematics constitute the enduring kernel 
(enframing) of phi-science, that also ensures the endurance of its practice – 
reproducibility of experiment or of experimental results. Also the essence of 
contemporary technology should be understood in the same way: if it is based 
on phi-sciences, its composition is mathematically determined and calculated, 
functions (like transmission, transformation etc. of forces) and end outcome 
(like availability of electricity to end user) are important, they can be realised 
with different concrete apparatus, so the concrete apparatus is unimportant. 
 
2.3.1. Gewirk and Gestell, abstraction and matter 
 
In the last paragraph, I interpreted Heidegger’s notion of Gewirk as the con-
temporary “laws of nature” (or scientific laws). As Heidegger notices, mathe-
                                                 
111 Empirical interpretations are essential to physics as empirical science: the mathematical 
formulae would be pure mathematics and no physics if they had no empirical interpretations 
(Stepin 1999a: 60–66, 207, 220–232; 1999b; Feynman 1965: 55) 
112  Heisenberg (1955: 45) expresses a similar conception about the characteristic link of 
contemporary science to world cognition and practice with a quote from Freyer: “I believe 
for handling; I handle for understanding (‘Credo, ut agam; ago, ut intellegam – Ich glaube, 
um zu handeln; ich handle, um einzusehen’) 
113  In Appendices 2, 3 and 4, I criticise the inattentive expansion of this abstracting and 
idealising approach and taking it for the provider of the essential knowledge about the world 
(particularly taking as unimportant the properties abstracted off and the following inatten-
tiveness about them). 
114  A considerable portion of the comparison of practice-based approach to science and my 
interpretations of Heidegger’s phenomenology is given in part I of Appendix 3. 
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matical science is believed to be a true description of reality or actuality115, so 
the reality, the world itself that is represented with the theory, appears as a fabric 
(of well defined attributes). However, seeing the world as a fabric (of laws) is 
not at all new. In China, the inexorable order of nature that no-one and nothing 
can bypass is called with words stemming from silk processing: disentangling 
threads, weaving and forming the selvage of the fabric or web (Needham 
1951b: 206–207). The world was recognized as a web or a pattern, of which all 
that there is are its nodes, or beings and things and their relationships make up 
this ordered, patterned web (ibid: 208). This web, the order of the world, is 
normative in the sense that man must conform to it in order not to bring peril 
(ibid: 207). As in (Confucian) China, human laws were required to conform to 
laws of nature, man was regarded as a part of nature, of the web, not somehow 
separate from it as an observer and manipulator of the world as of an object. 
Human deeds were understood as happenings in this web and if they did not 
conform, the natural order or pattern was disturbed (ibid: 199–200). 
This interrelatedness of what we nowadays discern into human or social and 
natural spheres is not unique to the Chinese. Jean Pelseneer (1949: Ch. I) 
reports about popular beliefs from various peoples about interrelations between 
occurrences in the world that were regarded as interdependent, without discri-
minations (as nowadays held) between different kinds of occurrences, including 
discriminations between human and natural affairs. “Man tends to confound 
himself with nature”, or there is no nature for him (ibid: 20).116 Everything 
could cause anything, everything was considered possible and everything was 
mystical for the primitive peoples (ibid: 30). One can hear in this description a 
kind of interwovenness of the world and wilderness, or rather the absence of the 
world (as distinct human times and places) and equally of wilderness, as all is 
yet concealed, limits have not yet been drawn. Pelseneer understands this also 
as absence of laws and of nature – miracle was the most natural thing, there was 
no understanding of law of nature (ibid: 60; Bodde 1979: 142, points out the 
transition of emphasis in conceiving of nature from miracles or inordinate 
occurrences to orderly or normal occurrences in Europe in the 16th Century as 
contrasted to China in 4th–3rd Centuries B.C.). This seems to contrast with the 
Chinese understandings, where “nature” was assumed to have “its” laws, its 
order. However, the contrast pales somewhat when ‘law of nature’ is considered 
with its theoretical connotation that Pelseneer may have held: the Chinese 
                                                 
115  Lovitt (Heidegger 1977c) and Glazebrook (1998, 2000) translate the word ‘Wirklichkeit’ 
as ‘reality’. I prefer ‘actuality’ as it retains the association ‘act’ – ‘actuality’ as is Heidegger’s 
‘wirken’ – ‘Wirklichkeit’, which I think is important for the change of the notion of fault or 
debt, or the rising of the notion of cause from it, that Heidegger (e.g. 1977a) also emphasises 
in relation to the genesis of the (contemporary) world picture. 
116  Hägerström (1953: 154–156) reports about law or morals of primitive peoples that they 
did not discern whether the feeling of conative impulse – that something “must/ ought to be 
done” – was conditioned naturally or socially. Stepin (1999a: 313) states that the stringent 
distinction between humans as spirited, sensuous beings, and the rest of the world is 
characteristic to the technogenous societies, not to traditional ones. 
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(Taoists) did not consider nature to be comprehensible for man with reason and 
theory (Needham 1951b: 225, 226, 229; Sivin 1985: 46), hence fixing laws of 
nature in humanly logical or mathematical language may have been regarded as 
arrogant and unreasonable, like Taoist and other Chinese (except Legalist) 
understandings of human laws was that writing them down is unreasonable 
(although partly for other reasons than hold for laws of nature; Needham 1951b: 
198–199, 212–213; Bodde 1963: 382). 
Although both Bodde (1963: 375, 394) and Peerenboom (1990: 314–315) 
emphasise the indiscrimination of nature and society by the Chinese in general 
(Bodde says that natural and social orders were fused by the Chinese and 
correspondingly both nature and man are subject to the same fixed laws tse; 
Bodde 1957: 719), they (as well as Needham) talk about distinctive laws 
concerning natural and social orders in Chinese society, and of corresponding 
words for ‘law’ (li and fa correspondingly for natural and social laws), which 
refers to distinction between human (social) and natural worlds. Particularly 
they saw natural order as immutable and unchanging, social order as changing – 
that is (one reason) why Taoists regarded it unreasonable to fix human laws in 
writing – and the requirement to harmonise human laws or social order to 
natural laws or natural order. This seems to evince of them having brought the 
being to the fore and to still-stand and made natural regularities into a more or 
less knowable and reliable notion, enabling the grounding of human laws on 
natural laws. Thus it renders my interpretation of this cognitive stand as 
concealment or not-yet-being-limited in Heideggerian sense dubious. It is still 
possible to argue that seeing those spheres as mutually impacting each other in 
possibly unforeseeable and deep- and far-reaching ways mingles those spheres 
indissolubly into each other and confuses their limits, and in this sense they do 
not limit each other. And on the other hand, for two spheres to limit each other, 
they must first be discerned and discriminated, which may have not been so in 
those ancient communities, as cited authors report, and it is only our con-
temporary thinking that makes the distinction (which I cannot avoid) and extra-
polates it or its negation to bygone times. 
Also causality has been likened to fabric: Heidegger’s notion ‘Gewirk’ 
(reality as seen through contemporary scientific theory) is meant as “surveyable 
series of related causes (Heidegger 1977b: 168)”117: actuality becomes pursu-
able and looked over in its acting. Cartwright (1989: 166–167) talks about 
“fabric of causal concepts”. Let us notice the difference with the attitudes 
described in the last two sections: whereas the focus seems to be on causing or 
occasioning in both contexts, then earlier it was the things (or beings) and their 
(causal) relations themselves that make up a fabric, here it is concepts – 
                                                 
117  “Die Wissenschaft stellt das Wirkliche. Sie stellt es darauf hin, daß sich das Wirkliche 
jeweils als Gewirk, d.h. in den übersehbaren Folgen von angesetzten Ursachen darstellt. So 
wird das Wirkliche in seinen Folgen verfolgbar und übersehbar” (Heidegger 1959b: 56). 
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something of human (theoretical) origin.118 Holmes (1987: 997) reflects upon 
the (scientific, quantitative) causality-thinking in law: “The postulate on which 
we think about the universe is that there is a fixed quantitative relation between 
every phenomenon and its antecedents and consequents.”119 Like in Chinese 
‘world as web’ there is assumed certainty and fixity in the notion of cause. 
However, laws of nature li for the Chinese were not something that man could 
look over or survey, and grasp into and fix in a theory and mathematics; and it is 
not something that man sets, let alone sets upon, the real: the order of nature is 
in nature herself, not arranged in her by man.120 For contemporary science as a 
theory of actuality, reality brings itself forth as an object, that is, something 
clearly delimited from the subject (man) and standing opposite to him, and 
science, responding to this, reclaims actuality into objectness (Gegenständig-
keit) (Heidegger 1959b: 48). By this, man as a subject limits himself from 
nature as an object, delimits reality as a sphere of research activity, of obser-
vation and control. Objectness of actuality is secured by arranging and pro-
cessing it and prior determining of the possible framing of questions (ibid: 56–
57; Glazebrook 1998). This attitude for the administration of causes and 
concomitant principles of causality may stem from the historical origin of this 
concept that Kelsen (1939/1940) reports: it comes from the principle of 
retribution or reward that was at first strictly social, hence humanly-socially 
determined, and only later (by Pre-Socratics) carried over to the natural 
realm.121 
In contemporary physical theory, as argued above (paragraph 1.3.1), there 
are no causes. Causality works in time, but there is no time, so the fabric of the 
world becomes timeless. Theory as described by Taagepera (2008: Ch. 5; see 
also Appendix 2) as interlocking web of concepts (variables), where concepts 
                                                 
118 This switch in emphasis may reflect the coming to the recognition that the interrelations 
seen as pertaining to nature are a result of human interpretation of nature and of his 
interaction with nature. 
119  This corresponds to Cartwright’s claim that “causal capacities and their strengths go 
hand-in-hand” (Cartwright 1989: 77). 
120  Although it is setting upon nature, upon the real, that effects or occasions her coming 
forth in a way not her own, if this setting upon may also be interpreted as disturbing the 
natural way of social being-together – to which natural order was normative in China. It may 
also be questionable, whether the order that the Chinese assigned to nature was that of 
causality in the sense given in paragraph 1.3.2 – it may be that this or similar kind of 
causality or occasioning was indeed associated only with human actions (upon nature). 
121  The principles of retribution or reciprocity were: a deed is to be reciprocated only once 
and equally to it, from which the principle of equality of cause and effect stems (also the 
conservation laws in physics); retribution or reward always follows the reciprocated deed, 
from which the order in time and clear distinction of cause and effect stems (Kelsen 
1939/1940: 106–108). Kelsen criticises the thus generated notion of causality for its 
inappropriate request for clarity and discrimination in matters nature on the illegitimate 
example of matters society (see also footnote 51). So both Heidegger and Kelsen relate the 
origin of ‘causality’ to legal concepts, but they emphasise different points of inadequacy in 
its evolvement (illegitimate analogy between natural and social spheres vs illegitimate 
objectification of the natural sphere). 
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are quantifiable attributes, mutually mathematically definable and thus deter-
mining each other, and as described by Paul Davies, express this understanding 
of physical mathematical theory as a web. Davies (1995: 264) characterises 
physics theory thus: physical notions are code-words which denote complex 
properties in mathematical models that sciences use to link facts of observable 
reality to each other; those notions become so customary that one comes to 
assign them equivalents in external reality, but in contemporary physics reality 
is relations between observations, not the external world, as due to in-
discernibility of the subject and the object, one also cannot discern ‘the exter-
nal’. This can be interpreted variously in Heidegger’s light. This ‘external’ 
fades, on the one hand, because reality is set and processed in an experiment, 
where each setting and processing is in its part determined by enframing, by 
some physical theory – the “reality” is worked out to respond to the enframing. 
On the other hand, reality fades in pure theory where, as Heidegger expresses it, 
the subject and the object are absorbed as reserve parts. In such a form, the 
enframing reaches its utmost durability, as pure (mathematical) theory does not 
let itself be disturbed by the differences of concrete material circumstances. 
Thus in a laboratory experiment, Gewirk is enacted: a network of properties is 
created and it is believed that those properties in this shape act or work. That is, 
not material things themselves but their properties act. Cartwright (1989: 141) 
says something similar: properties [not things?] have capacities; and causes 
have capacities (ibid: 121). For example, the property of being aspirin is a 
certain kind of Gewirk: as it is a material thing that is assigned this property, it 
is multifarious, it has various properties and relations with what it comes in 
touch with, including various properties that are called chemical. Some of them 
are considered as defining aspirin (or defining the property of being aspirin). On 
this basis Cartwright says that something has the property of being aspirin – it 
possesses said bunch of chemical properties which is regarded as defining 
aspirin.122 If we simplifyingly regard salicylic acid as the defining “property” of 
aspirin, we are lead to an even starker contrast between the (material) thing and 
reductive Gewirk: the willow with all her being is first reduced to her bark as 
the useful part of it against head-aches, and this, on its part, is reduced by 
science to a chemical composite, acquiring its name after its descent from salix, 
that effects this alleviating of head-aches. So the one who was an integral node 
in the fabric and pattern of nature and man in their indissoluble being-together, 
has become an idealised and abstracted concept in the laws of chemical and 
biological theories. 
Why is it necessary to call ‘being something’ ‘the property of being some-
thing’? So that it would be possible to formulate “laws” ‘ravenness implies 
                                                 
122  Cartwright could also be interpreted as saying: a thing has the property to be aspirin and 
due to this it has the capacity to alleviate headache. On this reading, do capacities refer to the 
thing as a gathering site, something in and of itself, of its inherent being? However, the 
inherent being of a thing cannot be reduced to a bunch of properties of disciplinary bearing. 
Now arises the difficult question, what is this inherent being of a thing that makes it up as a 
gathering site? This will be to some extent touched upon in the next paragraph. 
69 
blackness’, ‘aspirinness implies headache-alleviatingness’ etc. – that is, to 
formulate Universes of Properties? For it being possible to express “pure 
object” without properties, that x that properties can be assigned to? But what is 
that x without properties? Can things/entities exist without determinate pro-
perties? Lowe (1989, 2009) argues on the basis of the structure of some 
languages (Russian) that the ‘being somehow’ (having certain properties) is 
inherent to things (as in Russian, attribution sentence requires no ‘is’). In 
Aristotle’s conception of the four debts (to be focussed on in the next 
paragraph) the debts inherent in a thing or making up its nature are claimed to 
be “brute” matter (protomatter) and form (the ‘x’?), whereas quality (powers), 
quantity (mass-energy) and relation (the ‘F’ and ‘G’?) are said to be external 
debts (accidents) (Wallace 1997: 64–66).123 Rouse, inspired by Heidegger, 
argues for the same on the grounds that what is, is only through our practical 
interaction (that is, relation) with it, where entities acquire their meanings, that 
is, determination of their properties; however, Heidegger distinguishes existence 
from essence, and believes in being of things independent of human cognition 
(see Kochan 2011: 91 ff.), that I also believe in. Does this belief imply the belief 
that an ‘x’ can exist without properties? No, it rather implies an epistemic 
humility similar to the Chinese attitude described above. An account of 
properties as attributable refers firstly to the transcendent view of laws, or 
accordingly of properties (and it may be said, at least in some contexts: “episte-
mic access of properties consist in the laws”124), which may be considered 
dangerous as implying passivity, lifelessness and disorderliness of nature as if 
awaiting human ordering of it (Mumford 2004: 202–204) – thus possibly 
leading to mis-ordering or blocking the world; and secondly it refers to the 
Gestell-attitude: Man creates shelves (clearly delimited categories) on which he 
sets well defined, sorted and arranged properties that can be combined in 
creating or describing objects; and objects, on their part, are perceived as 
combinations or webs of well defined properties – as Universes of Cases and 
nothing more.125 Objectness becomes the durability of the stand determined by 
the enframing: “The relation of subject and object realises only in their pure 
character of “relation” or enframing, where both subject and object are absorbed 
as reserve parts/supplies (Heidegger 1959b: 61).” Account of properties as 
                                                 
123  That the mere form (like a silhouette) of a thing makes up its nature can accord with the 
above presented ancient Greek view of being as being seen. I am sceptical about such a 
discrimination and the specific favour of the form as the nature of thing, as mere form 
without regard to matter and how the thing relates to other things cannot exhaust its being to 
my mind, and the “accidents” I see as inherently dependent on the matter and form of the 
thing. 
124  Michael Esfeld in his paper “Structures, Dispositions, and Causation in Fundamental 
Physics”, on the seminar “Causation and Structuralism”, 8.2.2013, Cologne, Universität zu 
Köln 
125  This seeing the reality as entirely apprehensible in compositions of well defined 
properties, or models, is evinced also in Alchourrón’s and Bulygin’s account of logic of law: 
they say that although no model can capture all aspects of reality at once, there is no aspect 
of reality that could not be captured by any model (Alchourrón and Bulygin 1971: 9). 
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being there solely through human practical interactions with the world refers to 
the epistemic arrogance that one can know everything, as if the world were 
merely human handiwork, whereas in the realist understanding of nature, these 
are merely the properties that manifest themselves and deserve attention in 
human practices, but they do not exhaust nature (or thing). A theory of reality in 
this form diverges from the cognizable reality to the extent that the actuality 
represented by it is impossible to perceive in nature (good examples of this are 
Higgs bosons – massive scalar particles, or in a simplified expression, “em-
bodied mass”(!), and strings: the former were long tried to be found in experi-
ments without great success and the recent results are unsure, the latter has not 
yet even lent itself be translated from theoretical language into experimental 
language).126 Therefore the sentence in the previous but one section “actuality 
becomes pursuable (verfolgen) and looked over (übersehen)” could rather be 
read “actuality becomes traceable and overlooked.” 
On the basis of practice-based philosophy of science adopted here (para-
graphs 1.3.2 and 2.3 – account of phi-science), scientific theory and cognition 
cannot be quite arbitrary, as it has and is formed in interaction of man and the 
world. Although talk of (measurement) errors and uncertainties due to material 
idiosyncrasies is guided by a theoretical enframing (see Appendix 4 about this; 
also Hon 2003: 190), there is irreducible materiality in concrete handling and 
application of laboratory equipment. Proper application requires material 
experience that evolves only in practical handling of the apparatus, in manual 
activity, through which man develops a bodily cognition of the apparatus as a 
material thing (Baird’s (2003) notion of ‘thing knowledge’). On this concrete 
material individual level modern technology seems to resemble earlier techno-
logy that can also be understood as non-phi-scientific: wandering a path, 
whether that of thinking or that of perception, is like historical development of 
cognition, but at the same time historical development of technology; the views 
opened to the thinker – a smith, an engineer or a technician (causa efficiens) – 
are gathered into new knowledge. In Heidegger’s account, this would not do 
(Glazebrook 2000: 95): unlike Aristotle, Heidegger does not deem oneness with 
the thing to equal knowing the essence of the thing; hence Baird’s thing 
knowledge as material knowledge does not bring knowledge of the essence of 
the thing as Heidegger thinks of it (essence as not material). What then is 
essence? Suppose the essence of a tree is treeness and materiality belongs to 
treeness, then materiality, or matter, is (contra Heidegger) at least partly the 
essence of a tree. Analogously materiality or matter is a part of the essence of 
(laboratory) equipment. As techne is not equipment but knowledge or skill, then 
with contemporary laboratory equipment, it is bringing the world into this 
                                                 
126  Agassi (1956 Part II: 405) claims ad-hocness of the fluid theory to be “rooted in the fact 
that it is a method of speaking of a property as if it were a subject” – which seems to hold 
similarly in case of Higgs boson. However, Stepin (1999b) considers this as a constituent 
feature of the theoretical knowledge that properties come to be treated as objects. Hence not 
only objects come to be taken account of in terms of properties, but also the other way 
around – the distinction between those categories evades, as Heidegger claims. 
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mathematical Gewirk and into still-stand, that also means making the world and 
nature technical in both the anthropological as well as instrumental senses. 
Not only Gewirk, but also Gestell is a historical conception, if understood 
either as the essence of techne in the first place – appropriating natural things 
for technical ends according to preconceived projects (Glazebrook 2000), or as 
the analytic standing – dissecting the world into elementary indivisible parts, 
making up a system that possibly can combine or be combined to make up 
everything else. Instances of manifestations of such dissecting are the various 
systems of elements that all the matter is supposedly made of127: {{earth, air, 
water, fire}, {love, hate}}, {water}, {air}, {homoiomerion}, [Pythagorean] 
{numbers}, (De Crescenzo 2007: Part 1; Collingwood 1965: Part I), the atomic 
theories of matter (van Melsen 1957), but also the idea of the four debts or 
“causes” (aitia), yin and yang and the five elements earth, wood, metal, fire and 
water in the Chinese view of nature (Needham 1951b, Bodde 1957, 1963, 
1979), and many others.  So already in Antiquity, although there was no shaping 
of matter on the basis of those theories, the world was mentally dissected into 
exclusive compound particles, that could either be material (matter, substance) 
or immaterial (like the Pythagorean numbers or laws of nature128) and which 
guarantee a kind of security by being unchangeable (Collingwood 1965: 11). I 
think that enframing should also be regarded more broadly than Heidegger 
does: it is both a scientific theory, but also a broader view of the world (as 
described in Vihalemm 1979: 40, 183–184), that has been formed in an 
interaction of nature and society and that also disposes one to act on them in one 
way or another, that is, it determines causa finalis. Man cognises the world 
through an enframing, some worldview, and reduces it to some composition, be 
the reserve parts atoms, forces or measurable properties. Silversmith reduces 
silver to a material, causa materialis; a village commune reduces forest to 
building material (which is not any longer there when the forest is cut down for 
smelting metals); town inhabitants reduce river to a source of fish necessary for 
making delicious dishes (which it is no more when mines pollute the river 
water). In this respect, also Merchant is mistaken when she generalises and says 
that the earlier worldview was ecological – for an ecological worldview to 
emerge, also nature must claim man in a more manifold, complex mode, namely 
so that the complicatedness and non-fitness into an enframing of her “com-
positions”, “standing-reserves”, comes forth more sharply, and perhaps more 
painfully, already irretrievably. 
John Finnis’ (1980) discrimination of the world into four kinds of order (or 
four kinds of Universes of Discourse), and correspondingly human endeavours 
                                                 
127  Curly brackets {…} stand for sets, that is, for systems of basic elements theorised to 
make up the world; elements of the systems in the brackets are separated with commas. 
128  However, as De Crescenzo (2007 Part 1: Ch. 8) states, Pre-Socratic Greek thinkers 
hardly imagined anything immaterial or ideal, and even the Pythagorean numbers as basic, 
elementary building blocks of the world were imagined with a certain thickness. Whether 
laws of nature in the Antique comprehension were essentially material or immaterial is also 
not unquestionable; more about this in the next paragraph. 
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that are related to those orders, is an evidence of the Gestell-shaped thinking 
and of dissolution of the entanglement of natural and human spheres, and 
thereby I regard it as an illustration of the contemporary Gestell-shaped (world-)
cognition, or the violent setting of the world, reduction of being, into objects of 
different (scientific) disciplines: I. order humanly understandable but not 
creatable, studied by natural sciences; II. order brought into human under-
standing (fields of discourse), studied by logic, epistemology, etc.; III. order 
humanly imposed upon matter, studied by arts, technology, linguistics; IV. order 
in actions and dispositions, studied by psychology, political and legal science, 
etc.. Such discrimination also supposedly underlies differences in the laws that 
are formulated in different (scientific) disciplines. Finnis’ approach manifests 
the drive towards order, ordering the world in perception and in action, and in 
this way rendering it easily administrable and controllable for man with 
disciplinarily specialised theories, means and methods piece by piece, without 
regard to the complicating wholeness and interrelatedness. Just a few hints 
suffice: how and what can be thought and told about nature (II order), and how 
it is shaped (III and IV order), influence how nature can be perceived, what 
cognition can be built up of her – or what is unconcealed of her (I order). 
Oliver Wendell Holmes’ view of how legal theory, or legal treatment of the 
world evolves, exemplifies the abstractifying action of scientific Gewirk and fits 
with the above given comparison of law and science by Dretske (paragraph 1.2), 
both of the theories being abstracting and idealising. According to Holmes 
(1897, 1899), law develops towards idealisation case by case: by treating a 
concrete case (an element of a Universe of Discourse), a lawyer has at first a 
description of a situation from parties and witnesses; from this description he 
has to eliminate all details that do not pertain to the legal character of the 
situation, and retain only the abstracted description containing purely legal 
terms (elements of a Universe of Properties). Holmes shows on the basis of 
examples of particular areas of law how different cases came to be treated as 
subspecies of one and the same kind of interaction (an element of a Universe of 
Cases), thus economising legal language and legal code through abstraction of 
inessential details and idealisation of essential features. This generalising 
tendency can be seen as analogous to various examples of generalisation of 
different phenomena under one heading, like the examples of medicine and 
mathematics in Babylonia, Egypt and Greece mentioned in paragraph 1.1, or 
generalising various material situations into one concept and phenomenon of 
electricity129 (Agassi 1956 Part II: 400–404, Hand 2004: 236–238, about units 
of electricity). In a sense, the de-subjectivation that Holmes describes (i.e. 
eliminating subjective elements from the descriptions of judicial cases) 
contributes to the de-objectivation in Heidegger’s sense (that the world loses its 
objectness, its concrete material ob-jectivity (Gegenständigkeit). That is, 
                                                 
129  Stepin (1999a: 85, 93, 163) uses this instance of unifying electrical phenomena as an 
example of his partial and fundamental theoretical schemes; the model of power lines 
enabled to connect the different kinds of electricity. 
73 
subjectively sensuously given things or objects of the material world are 
rendered more “theoretical”, or “ideal”, by tearing off their sensuously identi-
fying idiosyncratic properties and treating them as having only the attributes 
allowed by, or essential in, the theory. As the theory is thought to be non-
subjective in the sense as holding for the objective world independently of any 
individuals, the treatment of things is in this sense de-subjectivated. Thus things 
transform from concrete objects to embodiments or representatives of theo-
retical entities, that is, they become de-objectivated.130 Through such abstracting 
process, law is to achieve compactness that enables jurists to logically draw 
concrete applications from a small set of legal codes. This resembles claims to 
the fundamental compactness and unity of scientific theories in the sense of the 
theoretical possibility to derive all particular laws from a small set of general 
laws (e.g. Feynman 1965: 49–50). Langdell has in mind a similar process of 
making law compact, but through classification and arrangement of legal 
doctrines (Haack 2007), which resembles natural scientific approach to 
theorising as classifying-descriptive-historical (in Vihalemm’s under-
standing).131 
One could see here a way how the development of science, particularly the 
idealisation and abstraction, and methodological unification through mathemati-
sation, has affected understanding of the world and of science as purportedly the 
true description of it, and hence the criteria for a discipline to count as 
scientific.132 However, the examples that Holmes gives about the development 
of legal concepts towards unification and generalisation reach back to the eras 
when contemporary science was not yet born and could not therefore have set 
any norms of knowledge and rationality. Rather, I surmise that the genera-
lisation process is more general in (Western) cognition and world picture, and 
theories in sciences and law are just manifestations of it, as are laws that are 
formulated, to be applied to organise the world or believed to describe it. It is a 
way of simplifying comprehension and manipulation of the world. The tremen-
dous success of exact sciences in their cognitive activities and applications has 
created an image of them as having a privileged epistemic access to the world. 
The requirement that laws of physics, as they are mathematically formulated, 
must apply independently of concrete place and time and of other circumstances 
that are deemed irrelevant to the phenomenon of interest to the physical science 
(Descartes, referred to by Dorato 2005: 23), has guided the cognition and 
                                                 
130  This corresponds to the above expounded Heideggerian understanding of contemporary 
science: both things as well as human beings, then objects and subjects, are abstracted away, 
the subject-object relationship evades, and a pure abstract theory remains as the “true 
description of the world” (Heidegger 1959b). 
131  See Pantin 1968 for an exposition of natural scientific methodology. 
132  Agassi (1956 Part II: 371; underlining in original): “The methodological point is this: the 
more general a theory is, the more scientific it is. When ’under the condition A’ is prefixed 
to a theory, its scientific character deteriorates; it becomes more ad-hoc, it becomes, if you 
will, less an explanatory theory and more and more an economical description of its past 
confirmations.“ 
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theoretical and practical treatment of the world under the honorary title of 
science. The mathematical language is seen as a universal language independent 
of any natural language. In this respect, law resembles science, as Lunstroth 
(2009) points out, referring to the colonial practices of law: they both claim to 
be universal and universally applicable – as I see it, the claim for universality 
rests on their generalising and idealising nature, as contingent circumstances 
and peculiarities of concrete situations are regarded as noise and hence as 
irrelevant to the phenomenon, and their abstract categories are taken to be uni-
versal by interpreting the real world situations in their terms and designing the 
world accordingly (for science the designing practices, besides experiment, 
have been colonial practices like for law; see Anghie 1999 and Harding 2003 
for this). The regular abstract “world” of ideal well-defined categories and 
relations established by theories is claimed to be onticly primary with respect to 
the irregular and “imperfect” local material worlds (e.g. Woodward 1989, 
Dorato 2005: 24, about Galilei and Descartes, Stepin 1999a: 74, contrasting an 
idealised mathematical law as “reliable, true knowledge” to empirical gene-
ralisations).133 However, there are approaches that urge the other direction – 
accounting for the complexity and multifariousness of nature and occurrences 
that escape theoretical treatments, scientific or legal: the phenomenological and 
hermeneutic approach in judicial handlings (Hermann 1982) urging the decisive 
import of individual, idiosyncratic aspects of concrete situations in which 
human beings find themselves; Nancy Cartwright’s urge on the fuzziness and 
ambiguity of the material world deviating from the elegant mathematical 
descriptions imposed on it by sciences (Cartwright 1983, 1989, 1999); the 
“reenchantment of the world” as a reaction to the pretensions to “disenchant-
ment of the world” by science and the ecologically disastrous results of this 
claim, and the parallel deep-ecology movement (Naess 2003, Devall 2003). 
 
2.3.2. Roots of normativity of (mathematical) laws of nature 
 
There are various theses about the (historical) origins or grounds of the notion 
of laws of nature or some essential features of them: political or sociological134, 
theological135, juridical136 (nearly equal with the theological), etymological137, 
                                                 
133  In Appendix 4 I argue on the basis of measurement errors and uncertainties for the ontic 
primacy of (material) irregularities and the need for a more pragmatic (vs representational 
and even substantial) understanding of measurement and of fundamental physical theories. 
134  Zilsel 1942a, 1945, Keller 1950, Molland 1978, Lunstroth 2009, Harding 2003, 
Merchant 2003, Henry 2008, Lemons et al 1997, Tinker et al 1982, Dorato 2005, Gorelik 
2012a,b,c; about the Chinese laws of nature or science Needham 1951a,b, Sivin 1985, Bodde 
1957, 1963, 1979, Lin 1995 
135  Oakley 1961, 2005, Dorato 2005, Henry 2001, 2004, 2008, Jalobeanu 2001, Beebee 
2000, Gorelik 2012a,b,c, Miller 2003 
136  Oakley 1961, 2005, Stratan 2008, Gorelik 2012a,b,c, Bodde 1957, 1963, 1979 
137  Ruby 1986; about the Chinese laws of nature Bodde 1957, 1963, 1979, Needham 1951b 
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technological-mathematical(-economic)138, metaphysical139; the categorisation 
being necessarily conditional and imputed, as based on how lines are drawn 
between those spheres nowadays, thus overlapping in several cases (e.g. 
theological-juridical, juridical-political, sociological-metaphysical, technologi-
cal/technical-metaphysical etc., metaphysics accompanies each argument and 
line of development and etymology probably has no own being independent of 
other lines of evolution), or hybrid or combined hypothesis140. Most of these 
possible origins have normativity explicitly in them (juridical, theological), or at 
least some element or flavour of it in one or another sense. I will briefly present 
some of these theses with an emphasis on the kind of normativity in them and 
their relevance to my argument about their normativity or prescriptiveness, and 
particularly normativity of mathematicalness.  
Technology as something directly involving human activity (particularly 
technology as an instrument) correlates with one of the defining elements of 
normative systems – Universes of Actions. As Trish Glazebrook (2000) argues, 
contemporary science erases the distinction between physis and techne, or 
natural things and artefacts, so development of technological thinking will 
inform about the essence of science and of its normativity. For analysing the 
various aspects of origins of normativity in science, two distinctions will be 
informative, overlapping in some cases and pointing towards the variability of 
views on the nature of nature, hence on the meaning of laws of nature (and also 
of laws of society), that was touched upon in the previous paragraph. Firstly, the 
division of comprehensions of laws (of nature) as either immanent/inherent or 
transcendent/imposed (Oakley 1961, 2005, Jalobeanu 2001, Henry 2004, Glaze-
brook 2000): laws as immanent mean that essences or properties of things 
correlate with relations between them, that they are mutually dependent; 
transcendent (or established, superimposed) laws mean that things and their 
essences are independent of, and do not affect, each other, relations between 
them are established from without and cannot be known merely knowing 
properties of things (Oakley 1961: 435, referring to Whitehead 1937). Secondly, 
the enframing of four debts or faults or “causes” of things (causa materialis or 
matter (ύλη), causa formalis or form (μορφή or εΐδος), causa  efficiens or 
ground (αρχή, that brings forth a thing or a change), and causa finalis or end 
(τέλος, why something is brought forth)) that I see closely related to the split 
between immanence and transcendence of laws of nature.141 
                                                 
138  Zilsel 1942b, 1945, Rothbart 2007, Stratan 2008, Henry 2001, 2008, Hanzel 2008, Hand 
2003, Authier 1997, Serres 1997, Benoit 1997b, Ruby 1986, Lin 1995, Ritter 1997a,b, 
Tinker et al 1982, Gorelik 2012a,b,c 
139  Thorndike 1955, Henry 2004, 2008, Hine 1995, Benoit 1957a, Collingwood 1965, 
Dorato 2005, Heidegger 1959a, 1977a,c, Glazebrook 1998, 2000, Merchant 2003, Miller 
2003, Molland 1978, Needham 1951a,b, Remus 1984, Jalobeanu 2001 
140  Stratan 2008, Henry 2004, Gorelik 2012a,b,c, Stepin 1999a,b, 2005, Dorato 2005 
141  Heidegger’s (1959a) example is of a silver chalice: its matter is silver, form chalice, 
ground the silversmith, and end is sacrificial rite. This is the debts for an artefact; an 
example of a natural thing might be: a tree has wood as matter, treeness as form, itself as 
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The etymological, juridical(-political) and theological theses about the origin 
of ‘laws of nature’ lie very near to one another. In the etymological thesis, 
emphasis is on order and regularity brought or denoted by laws. The meaning of 
the word ‘law’ in itself implies normativity – a statement of a prescriptive 
nature, a prescription (from someone) to be followed (by someone): lex was 
understood both as jurisdiction, and as “principles laid down by authorities or 
developed by custom for the practice of various disciplines” (Ruby 1986: 347). 
Regula, that Ruby sees to be related with the evolution of the notion of law of 
nature, referred both to straightedge or ruler and to a guideline or standard. 
Nomos, the Greek equivalent of lex, meant rules for studying and interpreting 
some particular subject, some particular Universe of Discourse (like in oiko-
nomia or astronomia) (ibid); nomos stems from administration: administrative 
units for land and analogously for the sky, relating to moral and social order or 
the order of observing the sky (Pelseneer 1949: 61). Bodde (1957, 1963, 1979) 
handles in principle the same issue in the Chinese understanding of laws, where 
terms of legal or moral laws (tu, tse) were applied to denote natural regularities. 
However, the ‘fa of nature’ which denotes the mathematical laws of nature in 
contemporary sense, is a contradictory expression: fa stands for prescribed, that 
is written, law, but in the Chinese understanding of nature, nature is sponta-
neous and cannot obey any prescriptions (Needham 1951b: 228). As Ruby 
suggests, laws and rules, including nomoi, as what at first were meant as 
regularity prescribed for conscious human behaviour and operation, later came 
to be seen as regularity in things, or nature, themselves, starting with the most 
general logical principles, other mathematised regularities following – as mathe-
matics is apodictic, so mathematically describable natural regularities must be 
necessary. I see this process to be related to the technical-mathematical thesis: 
when (in the mechanistic world view) the world is seen as a machine whose 
separable parts perform certain functions, the laws pertaining to this machine 
can only be descriptive because a machine can have “neither plans nor con-
scious motives” (the emphasis on descriptiveness in contrast to God as 
legislator, prescriber of laws to nature) (Dorato 2005: 3). I will come to the 
mechanistic thesis later. Another line of development, relevant to ‘lex’ and the 
Chinese notions for law, is provided by the theological-juridical thesis (which 
also discharges into the technological thesis with the emergence of mechanistic 
world view; Dorato 2005: 2–6). 
In juridical and theological theses, it is not only the order and regularity in 
focus, but its origin or the “lawgiver”.142 ‘Laws of nature’ is often seen as a relic 
of the conception of divine legislation – laws prescribed by God to be followed 
                                                                                                                       
ground and again itself as its end – treeness (perhaps including blossoming and bearing fruit 
and offering shelter to lichens and moss, birds and animals). 
142  I call ’juridical’ those theses which explicitly state the common origin of laws of nature 
and natural (moral or juridical) laws, like Oakley does, and Bodde for the corresponding 
Chinese conceptions. The thesis that links the emergence of written laws of nature with 
written or codified law (Needham 1951a,b), I categorise under the political-sociological 
thesis. 
77 
by nature, or in the animistic world-view as wilful regulating of the world by 
spirits (Dorato 2005: 1–2; Collingwood (1937–1938) regards also the notion of 
causality as now attributed to laws of nature metaphorical as if stemming from 
an animistic world view). Here the difference between laws as immanent or as 
transcendent to nature is essential: the prescriptions by a God are transcendent 
to nature as being superimposed by someone from outside her, spiritual 
regulating is (presumably) immanent, as spirits are seen as inherent in nature. I 
take both these as belonging to the theological thesis and consider them more 
closely in the following, as the difference is essentially important to my 
consideration of normativity of science. 
In the Chinese understanding of nature, laws are immanent to the nature 
being there materially – the pattern of nature is not woven by anyone but is 
there as the natural order, in the very material being of the world. “[E]very 
event and thing has each its own rule of existence (Needham 1951b: 216: 
quoting Chu Hsi, emphasis in original)”, no general, universal laws are 
assumed. The ground is nature herself, but also man, as human doings could 
occasion nature to behave differently from her own ways. This sounds like 
mixing of nature and technology analogously to contemporary climate and 
environmental engineering, only that in the Chinese understanding the ways of 
nature cannot be planned and calculated, hence a fundamental assumption of 
technology is missing.143,144 Similar assimilation of natural and human grounds 
were (and still are) characteristic to folk beliefs, of which numerous are 
described by Pelseneer (1949). Hence both the Chinese as well as other peoples 
had prescriptions as to how to behave in certain natural conditions, for example 
in certain times of year.145 Also in Stoics’ understanding of nature, social laws 
(moral and legal norms) were to accord with laws of nature, whereas laws of 
nature were regarded immanent in nature (Oakley 1961, 2005, Henry 2004, 
Bodde 1979, Dorato 2005: 6–9), whereby Hellenic view of Cosmos as rational 
reflects what was considered rational, normal or natural in the society; this 
rationality was extended, projected onto nature (Dorato, ibid). However, Stoics 
can be debated about whether laws of nature are immanent in their view or 
transcendent: Needham (1951b: 222) sees a difference in that in Stoicism, 
                                                 
143  But also when trying to engineer climate and environment, this assumption is hardly ever 
satisfied. 
144  Another analogy with technology in the Chinese understanding of nature is likening the 
main natural rhythms – the four seasons and Earth and Sky – with tools that “represent” the 
essence and working of those rhythms, which “govern” nature and society like those tools, 
with similar principles (Bodde 1957). This, however, need not counter the Chinese view of 
nature, as technology or invention in China was spontaneous, based on experience, not 
purposeful (aim-oriented), planned experimentation (Lin 1995: 276), and thus answered the 
social-natural life-world. 
145  Examples from Estonian folklore: staying awake during the Yule night to help the Sun 
start the new circle of year, or keeping silence during the souls’ time in Fall, for the souls of 
the ancestors are said to wander around, which can be related to the general condition of 
nature at that time – everything is dying, slowly falling asleep in anticipation of winter, 
greyness prevails over colours, darkness prevails over light. 
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things were taken as “citizens” subordinated to universal laws, whereas in 
Taoism things make up the pattern that is the laws of nature (also Dorato 2005: 
9). De Crescenzo (2007 Part 2: Ch. 9) titles Stoics the first real pantheists. The 
difference between the Chinese and animistic views and Stoicism may be 
traceable to the Greek enframing of debts, where these four aspects of things are 
discerned, which may have not been so in the other earlier societies, thus it 
could not have set the mind to partition things in the world into such elements 
(matter, form, ground, end). In Spinoza’s (and Leibniz’s) conception of laws of 
nature, again materiality is essential: he favoured laws inherent in concrete 
material individual beings as the true laws of nature, pertaining immediately to 
substance, in contrast to the more abstract intra- and inter-species laws (Miller 
2003), and similarly to the Chinese and Stoic views, he considered laws of 
nature as the guide to be followed by human and social laws (ibid: 267–268). 
However, he regarded laws as an independent entity and independent causal 
actor (which may have been influenced by Descartes) (ibid: 265–266), even 
though immanent in matter and stemming from the thing’s essence. In all these 
accounts, nature is taken to have her own being or essence, her own ground and 
end. This kind of comprehension is exemplified and illustrated by the above 
mentioned Celtic understanding of the sanctity of Earth.146 The Renaissance 
understanding of nature was most honouring: she was regarded as comprising 
both her own ground as well as end in her; her every detail was taken as worthy 
of attention and respect (Collingwood 1965: 93–94). Scientists like Kepler or 
Gilbert reflected upon the planet having a soul: planet knowing the geometric 
laws according to which it moves (Zilsel 1942b: 267), Earth moving herself 
with the help of her magnetic kernel (Henry 2001: 117). This is often called the 
organismic view of nature (or Earth), already exemplified with Merchant’s 
disquisition above (paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2), that Needham also takes the Chi-
nese view to be (by comparing essential features of the Chinese understanding 
of laws of nature; according to Bodde (1979: 154–155), the notion of laws of 
nature in China was mainly developed by animists, that comes close to the 
organismic view.) 
In the Old Testament, “law” (or the word translated thus) means both ‘limit’ 
or ‘border’ as also ‘inscription’ (the Ten Commandments), thus alluding to the 
limits that human beings and nature are not to overstep (Dorato 2005: 6). Also 
the concept of retribution or punishment was present in ancient thought of laws 
of nature or natural laws: that which gives the laws that beings in the world 
must obey, is also responsible for the results of injustice: “the fault (cause) is 
                                                 
146  Many examples could be brought of native peoples who venerate and sanctify nature 
(Earth, trees, formations of landscape etc.) as having her own essence and ends and as being 
indissolubly imbued in the being of that people, this sanctification guiding the people’s 
conduct towards nature. A rather broadly extended taboo was carving, that is injuring the 
Earth, her surface: it is prohibited in sacred groves (e.g. in Estonia); some American indi-
genous peoples avoid cultivating land with such techniques that carve the ground (Merchant 
1983: 106); Mongolians restrain from wearing shoes with profiled soles to avoid damaging 
the Earth’s surface (Mets 2012). 
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inevitably followed by the punishment (effect)”, exemplifying the indistinctness 
of description and prescription that Dorato ascribes to the pre-Modern eras 
(ibid: 6–7).147 In both Hellenic as well as Semitic understanding of natural 
order, things are thus foreseen their limits or borders that they are not to 
transgress, and if they do, they must pay penalty for this (Dorato 2005: 6–7, 
Heidegger 1977b), thereby there is no difference made between natural and 
social affairs: being is taken as a whole in its diversity (Heidegger 1977b: 331), 
everything is subsumed to “laws” or to its proper limits and punishments for 
injustice with respect to those limits. Such a concurrence of what now are 
discerned as fault, pertaining to morality, and cause, pertaining to nature, is 
highlighted by Heidegger (1959a) in his contemplation about 
(mis)understanding of the four debts. There are, however, significant differences 
between Hellenic and Semitic understanding of laws as proper limits of things 
or beings: in Semitic understanding, the limits are superimposed by a higher 
kind of being (God) from outside nature, in Hellenic view, the limits are 
inherent in things (Jalobeanu 2001, Oakley 1961, 2005, Henry 2004); and the 
Semitic laws are given by God in a “written” form, or carved into stone, hence 
stable and settled once and for all – the world, its order, is brought to still-stand 
and revealed (I will come back to this aspect particularly with the technology 
thesis). 
However, immanence of order in nature is not so straightforward in Hellenic 
view. One clue to this is given by Pelseneer’s (1949: 32) contention that poly-
theism was a partial objectification of the world [cognition]: instead of acting 
immediately on nature as did the most primitive peoples, one acts on gods and 
spirits. I understand this as a step towards “abstracting form, end and ground 
from matter”: the various gods stand for, or are responsible for different parts or 
aspects of the world (and wilderness?). Hence the principle of the order of a 
thing is not anymore in the thing itself, but in something outside the thing. 
Another clue is given by Glazebrook (2000) in her discussion of Aristotle’s 
view of the four debts: nature, Aristotle says, never reaches her (ideal) form and 
is thus always in becoming with the aim to reach it. Hence the form that a 
natural thing, a small tree for example, at any moment has, that is inherent to 
that natural thing at that moment, Aristotle regards as imperfect; and as the tree 
never reaches its perfect form, this form, the ideal order of this natural thing, 
remains transcendent to it (Wallace’s (1997) explication of Aristotle’s four debts 
and essence and accidence (in paragraph 2.3.1) confirms this conclusion). These 
moments may constitute yardsticks to the alienation of nature of her own 
essence and end, underlying contemporary technology. It seems like in the 
Chinese understanding order really is immanent in the material nature, but even 
there we find abstractions in the form of the five elements, yin and yang and 
reduction to few outstanding features. As referred to in footnote 144, natural 
phenomena were ascribed concrete functions, derived from human practice, 
from working with tools. The complex and multiply related natural rhythms and 
                                                 
147  See also Kelsen 1939/1940 about this and footnote 121 here. 
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things are reduced to a few simplified abstracted functions of aim-oriented 
tools. This may be primarily a pragmatic approach to render the complex orders 
of nature understandable to the extent that human (moral, legal) norms could 
lean on them; and if it is so, it may in this aspect resemble contemporary science 
that also tries to render nature understandable for man to follow her laws (as 
Francis Bacon urges, Merchant 2003); however, the attitude in and aim of 
following the laws of nature remain different (Stepin 1999a,b, 2005). 
Glazebrook (2000: 98–108) brings forth essential differences that were made 
between natural and artificial things by Aristotle (whom Heidegger sees as the 
cusp of pre-Socratic thinking; ibid: 99), and which are essential for my account 
of normativity of science: nature has her ground and her end (e.g. treeness) in 
herself, inherently to nature, whereas artefact has its ground and end outside of 
it, transcendentally to the artefact; for nature, her end is her form which she 
never achieves perfectly, and this end, or “moving” or becoming towards this 
end, is the ground of (change in) nature; in contrast, an artefact reaches its form 
and will be completed. An essential feature of technology – preconceived 
project (Entwurf), and namely preconceived by the bringer-forth of an artefact, 
who is its ground (causa efficiens) (Heidegger 1977a, Glazebrook 1998, 2000) – 
is yielded by the two said differences of techne from nature: the ground of an 
artefact drafts the form of the artefact and imposes this form upon matter, 
bringing the artefact into completion. The erasing of distinction between fysis 
and techne in contemporary science means for Heidegger that science deprives 
nature of her own end, so that technology can superimpose its end on nature 
(Glazebrook 2000: 107; Collingwood (1965: 93–94) says the same, the 
Renaissance having been the turning point). I think this means at once that 
contemporary science and technology want to bring fysis to still-stand148 that 
offers security. Law as transcendent would associate in Heidegger’s account 
with techne, as the end and form are superimposed upon the subject of the law 
from outside. I think that the Greek notion of four distinct debts enabled and 
perhaps co-occasioned this abstracting from material circumstances in the first 
place, as matter was in this enframing already at least mentally separable from 
the other aspects of a thing. This may have happened on the example of 
technology, where, in contrast to nature, matter and form do not belong together 
necessarily but according to the craftsman’s choice (Glazebrook 2000: 105–
106). Such conscious choice, however, can only be made if there really are 
known different kinds of materials which can function in the same way and 
hence be chosen from among for a certain kind of artefact, or being imposed the 
same form. Hence matter and form might have been seen as more necessarily 
bound to each other in artefacts in the dawn of tools and of artefacts at all, that 
is, when natural objects came to be applied as tools for functionalities that were 
                                                 
148  Ernst Mach: fact is a phenomenon fixed in measurement and experiment (Stepin 1999a: 
283); Ilya Prigogine: Measurement is the irreversible process of birth of stability in 
dynamical chaos (ibid: 204); I think measurement brings in some sense stability or fixity in 
any process and state of affairs – if not epistemic (or is epistemic stability illusory), then at 
least psychological. 
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found in them (e.g. that a certain stone can have hard sharp edges that can be 
used for cutting). Heidegger’s understanding of techne as essentially imma-
terial, and in general his understanding of essence also abstracts from causa 
materialis. 
The legislator, that is – imposer of form upon matter, that modern laws of 
nature are mostly associated with, is the Christian God whose forerunner and 
Leitbild is the Semitic God, transcendent to the world and legislating it from 
outside. The great pathfinders of modern science like Newton, the Bacons, 
Descartes, Galilei, took laws of nature as laws prescribed by that God that 
nature is to follow (Zilsel 1942b, Jalobeanu 2001, Oakley 1961149, 2005, Stratan 
2008).150 With the voluntarist theology and nominalist metaphysics endorsed by 
the church, one can associate various tendencies. On the one hand, as science 
has been something dealing with certainty, something that can be known, that is 
stable and reliable, as the (material) world was claimed to be entirely under the 
discretion of a transcendent God, this occasioned theology to be the epitome of 
science for some time, as dealing with that very ground of (the only) possible 
certainty (Benoit 1997). On the other hand, to bring some feeling of certitude 
and repose to human mind, this very God was assigned stability, he was claimed 
                                                 
149 Oakley (1961: 440) points to nominalist philosophy in the Middle Ages and Renaissance 
which implies imposed or transcendent laws. 
150  This coming to domination of the view of laws of nature (and in parallel with this, of 
natural (moral) law) has strong political grounds, namely the church effectuated the abolish-
ment of the immanent (realistic) view of laws of nature, replacing it with voluntarist 
theology that was to save the almightiness and unlimited will of God (Henry 2004: 88–89; 
Oakley 1961: 438). I call this thesis political for I surmise that the background of the 
church’s decision is the will to retain power: voluntarist theology presumes that God has 
unlimited power to choose how to steer the world and he can also change the laws with 
which he governs the world at his discretion; church as the enlightened, the privileged to 
know God’s truth, has access to God’s decisions, but not the laymen. This attitude that laws 
of nature, or truth, is only accessible to few (Henry 2004: 79) has many parallels: in China it 
was surmised that li, the unchanging law of nature and basis of morals, was known to noble 
people but not the low ones who needed to be governed with written law fa or subsumed 
under the government of the nobles (Peerenboom 1990); the high esteem and authority of 
wises among governors in Babylonia (Ritter 1997a) and of scientists and technocrats today is 
the same. 
The sociological thesis of Zilsel (1942a) and Needham (1951a,b) about the genesis of 
contemporary science exemplifies anthropomorphism: it is hypothesised there that the notion 
of laws of nature is grounded by the social order or polity – namely kingship as the source of 
laws and of social order suggested the world view that order comes from a sovereign in the 
form of laws superimposed upon inferiors, and so also order in nature may come from a 
sovereign – God – and is imposed upon things and being in the material world in the form of 
natural laws. This view of the origin of laws of nature has been criticised (Oakley 1965, 
2005, Henry 2004); however, it may represent (a part of) some underlying, non-conscious 
and non-explicit condition (e.g. as the basic deeper level of culture in Schein’s (2010) 
analysis of culture; see footnote 74) for the conception of administration or ruling by one 
higher power that all else must obey as being subordinated to it. Thereby the theological 
thesis is a more conscious layer on the same level as science itself (Schein’s middle level of 
culture), and the sociological conditions are underlying them as well. 
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to stay by the laws he has established and imposed on the world and not change 
them, so that the laws can become known to man by empirical inspection, as 
Ockham, Suarez, and others surmised (Oakley 1961: 441–443). So also for 
Descartes, laws of nature, which he considered to be mathematical in form, are 
a manifestation of God’s immutability: laws are immutable and universal in the 
sense that they are valid in all places and in all times, and their constancy is a 
reflection of the constancy of the divine creator of the natural world (Dorato 
2005: 23). 
Both in China and in Ancient Greece, order and laws of nature were thought 
to be fixed and unchanging. But this nature for the Greeks was not the 
sensuously perceivable material world, but the essence of things (Collingwood 
1965: 11, 44–45), theories or speculations of the “fundamental” or “basic” 
constitution of matter (see the listed “basic elements” in the previous para-
graph). In China, there was no theorising about nature and her laws due to her 
complicatedness, no mathematizing, (hence) no speculation151,152; theoretical 
thinking was restricted to practical spheres, to solving concrete practical 
problems (Sivin 1985: 46). Stepin (1999a,b, 2005) takes this theorising attitude 
since Antiquity as one of the foundations of contemporary science (as does 
Needham 1951a,b). For Descartes, laws of nature were not about the actual 
world, but about conservation of movement that was consciously considered by 
him as non-actual, purely ideal circular and straight motion – although he 
claims there be no other kinds of motion than circular (Jalobeanu 2001: 11–13), 
which is a brave speculation. It seems like there had been an evolution towards 
epistemic unity in the sense that the things to be accounted with for knowing 
one’s way around has been decreasing, and at the same time towards epistemic 
abstractness, or rather ontological ideality, as ‘nature’ denotes ever less perceiv-
able and ever more idealised things (see also Pelseneer 1949 and Collingwood 
1965): Whereas in ancient world cognition, nature and world as material 
situations were individual and to be approached individually to provide 
cognition; in polytheism, as a step away from particularity, there are several 
“abstract” or occult principles or characters to be taken into account; then 
monotheism is to guarantee unity and rationality of nature – there is just one 
God, thereby an unreachable one, whose plans with the world must be revealed 
(Stratan 2008: 2). And in the mechanist world view where nature is seen as 
having no own end nor even ground, God is also to guarantee causality (Henry 
2004: 99). 
This brings us to the technical-mathematical thesis about the origin of laws 
of nature, which, I think, has two lines of ideas coming together into the 
contemporary mathematical laws of nature: one is mathematical-theoretical(-
metaphysical), and the other is technical-practical(-economic) (however, they 
                                                 
151  ‘No-speculation’ attitude is manifested also by the tendency to turn supernatural beings 
of their myths like gods into sage-kings and heroes (Bodde 1963: 380). 
152  One can, of course, argue that linking human and natural spheres indissolubly like the 
Chinese did is a speculation about causal relations in the world; but this can also be a kind of 
“precautionary principle“. 
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are not clearly separable from each other, as mathematics belonged to magical 
practices (Henry 2008: 20) that has both lines of ideas in it). The second 
guarantees the applicability of mathematics to concrete material situations that 
all who have to do with technical problems (craftsmen, sailors, surveyors, 
merchants, etc.) find themselves in. Mathematics itself stems from such 
practical activities and its form is dependent on concrete practices of the society 
where it springs from (Ritter 1997b). Mathematics and its elements and 
operations were abstracted from tools, like the ruler and circle (Goldstein 1997: 
205) or the sun-dial (Serres 1997); from techniques of counting and calculation 
(like multiplication with number the same number abstracted; Ritter 1997b: 82). 
Abstracting geometry as pure mathematics from mechanics as instrumental and 
sensuous with Archimedes and Plutarch, as merely an application of the first 
(Authier 1997), parallels the distinction of the four debts and abstracting them 
from each other, particularly separating form from matter. As mathematicians 
used experimental methods, they were exemplary for craftsmen and other 
scientists – including the certitude of mathematics – who introduced mathe-
matical methods and instruments into crafts (Henry 2004: 82–83, Rothbart 
2007). Craftsmen’s instructions in the form of tables inspired early scientists 
about expressing nature’s order as mathematical proportions or laws (Zilsel 
1942a,b, Henry 2001). Galilei himself as a craftsman hoped to demonstrate 
everything geometrically, saw nature as written in geometrical language (Stratan 
2008: 17–20). The theoretical-mathematical line of ideas may stem from Pytha-
goras’ idea of numbers as the basic elements of matter, which was carried on by 
Plato and Aristotle, whereby form was abstracted from matter and number 
became an ideal form (Collingwood 1965: 77–93). Kepler’s view that mathe-
matics gives divine archetypes belongs to this line of idea (Henry 2004: 98–99), 
but Kepler, at the same time, dealt with “occult” arts and held “occult” theories, 
as did Newton, Boyle and the Bacons (Stratan 2008, Henry 2004, 2008).153 
Crafts and occult arts both aim at bringing forth material effects, or enacting 
causal chains to bring forth the desired result, and the pressure by church forced 
the latter to reveal causality as natural (in contrast to demonic). As man learned 
to bring forth various effects through creative mechanisms, experimental 
practice effectuated secularisation of the ‘laws of nature’ (Dorato 2005: 2 and 
Ch. 1), the ground of change is man and not God anymore – which accords with 
the manipulational understanding of causality. 
Francis Bacon believed that his proposed scientific method, which might be 
called experimental-descriptive (but not mathematical), would discover the true 
secrets of nature, her true essence, or forms or laws (Bacon equated essence and 
laws of nature), and her ways (Agassi 1956, Merchant 2003, Dorato 2005). 
Thus Bacon appealed to unprejudicedness and truth-revealing capacity of 
                                                 
153  Also to the Chinese view on natural order numericalness is not totally alien: the concept 
of law tu, which applies both to human (social) and to natural things, associates with 
numerical regularity, as law of any kind was seen to be something with measure (Needham 
1951b: 204–205). 
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natural science. His authority served to disrepute “feigning hypothesis” (Agassi 
1956 Part I: 274) and making errors in science (ibid: 239). So when for example 
Newton claimed not to have invented the mathematical formulae of his laws of 
motion, as if nature herself “spoke in the language of mathematics” – similarly 
to Kepler’s understanding of laws as the divine mathematical order, and to 
Galilei’s (and Roger Bacon’s) contention that the universe is written in 
mathematical or geometrical language (Dorato 2005: 19 and 21) – he created 
the illusion that the mathematical science of physics indeed discovered how the 
world really is in itself. The normative nature of natural and physical sciences 
and of mathematicalness – particularly of laboratory practices – seems to be 
already historically hidden behind the requirement for ‘truth’ of scientific 
theories. But if the technicality of contemporary science is taken seriously, then 
the original meanings of nomoi, lex and regula, along with Heidegger’s under-
standing on truth – aletheia or unconcealment – and technology, propose a 
different effect to scientific truth: it is not the relation between theory and the 
world (episteme), but rather how the world or nature comes to the fore, or is 
seen as showing herself, through scientific-technical activity, in the const-
ructions which order nature in one way or another. 
The conception of four debts clarifies the broader practical normativity (3b) 
by making explicit the Universe of Actions in play. In Heidegger’s example of 
silver chalice, the Universe of Actions is nested in the sacrificing rite, namely as 
material-practical configurations of the rite. Such a rite includes a silver chalice 
as an indispensable part, so the rite is the telos of manufacturing the chalice. 
The role of the chalice in the material-practical configuration of sacrificing rite 
is an element of Universe of Actions for the art of silver smithing, determining 
an end state of smithing. Similarly for legal norms and judicial practices, policy 
making and engineering practices, their end is reaching a particular wished 
social, technical, or social-technical(-natural or -quasi-natural) state of affairs; 
examples might be: the owner of an illegally appropriated thing retrieves his 
possession; the global average temperature rise does not exceed 2 degrees 
within n years; extracting hard accessible natural resources. As the given 
examples as pertaining to society and technology, and the notion of Universe of 
Actions suggest, the end as an element of the latter is something determined by 
man imposed upon the subjects of those ends (“elements” of a Universe of 
Discourse).154 Is the analogy legitimate, particularly – can parallels be drawn 
between the other three debts and engineering and legal practices? Universe of 
Discourse as the target (or subject in legal discourse) of laws, the particular 
beings and happenings in concrete times and places, should be viewed as the 
matter for those laws and policies, the laws and policies are or prescribe the 
(ideal) form for this matter (and thereby perhaps erase the own form of that 
                                                 
154  Slade (1997) argues for discerning ends and purposes: purposes are set by individual 
human beings intentionally, ends are independent of individual will; this accords with Hei-
degger’s understanding (also concerning Gestell) and is also partly meant here – I do not 
want to exclude the influence of certain individuals and their idiosyncratic purposes 
altogether. 
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matter – as these beings do not come as formless mass of matter). Ground, or 
perhaps more appropriately causa efficiens, would be all those who participate 
in the accomplishment of a law or policy. 
How does the fourfold debt clarify, or first of all – unconceal, the Universe 
of Actions or the end pertaining to laws of nature? It depends on the notions of 
nature and of laws of nature that we look at and how the aitia are connected to 
this notion. In the example of tree, corresponding to the Aristotelian notion of 
aitia, that which makes up something that might be called ‘laws of nature’ 
seems to be the form, where form is primary to matter, but matter is as 
indispensable as form. An example that has an analogy in contemporary 
understanding of laws of nature would be that of falling bodies: a stone falls 
downwards or towards the centre of the Universe because its end lies in being 
situated there, and this end is the ground of its falling. Nowadays end is not 
granted to nature anymore and just the ground is kept as (efficient) cause 
(Glazebrook 2000: 112) which in this case is the action of the gravitational force 
and expressed in the formula F=GMm/r2. But if there is no end or final cause in 
this law, is there then no promised Universe of Actions? Some straightforwardly 
normative accounts of mathematical laws of nature suggest otherwise: like that 
of Lowe’s described above, and that of Hage and Verheij (1999: 1051) 
according to which, in this case (their example is Newton’s law of gravitation) it 
is a rule that binds the state of affairs that the stone has a mass m1 and is at 
distance r1 from the Earth with the state of affairs that the gravitational force 
between the stone and Earth is F1. If both these accounts can be interpreted as I 
interpreted Lowe’s account as prescriptions to the subjects of cognition 
(scientists, for example), then Ronald Giere’s (2010) agent-based account of 
modelling pointedly brings forth the end-orientation of this law: a scientific 
model is composed with a certain aim which is determined by the modelling 
agents (scientists), the aim determining which features of the world and how are 
to be represented in the model; so a science as a set of models in his account, 
hence a set of aim-oriented representations to which also the law of free fall 
belongs, has certain aims and ends, or Universes of Actions.155 But the scientists 
in their research are a part of the social-technical situation which determines the 
possible ends of the research and hence of the models created for representing 
the real world phenomena. So when modelling falling of a body as subsumed 
under such a set of factors in such connection to each other, the end may be 
making nature “understandable”156, predictable and calculable, bringing nature 
into picture, reaching epistemic certainty and controllability; the mathematical 
law of gravitational force is a law for man to project nature, or for nature 
projected in this way. What about matter and form? I think matter, that was 
indispensable in Aristotelian account of nature, has been exempted from 
                                                 
155  Although Hage and Verheij seem not to mean their account of the law of gravitation 
(and, consequently, of scientific laws in general) as prescriptions for scientists as I interpret 
Lowe, I think that in light of Giere’s account it can be reinterpreted this way. 
156  Galilei: only mathematics gives explanation on nature (Stengers 1997: 349). 
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contemporary “laws of nature” and what is left is form (F-ness→G-ness) or, 
considerably simplifying, (‘the property of having mass m1 and being at 
distance r1 from the Earth’ yields ‘the property of having gravitational force F1 
with respect to the Earth’).157 
The often assumed imperativeness of the cognition of the world and of 
nature determined by contemporary science is again manifested by Needham 
(1951b: 226) who contends that the Chinese failed to develop a science 
analogous to that in Europe because they did not build a coherent theory nor 
applied mathematics in technology (this is just partly true, as mentioned above 
referring to Sivin 1985). This view presupposes the striving towards this 
“advanced”, “progressive” way of life as is peculiar to the contemporary 
(Western) technical and technologised life-world as Heidegger describes it, to 
the technogenic society (Stepin 1999a, 2005) (Sivin (1985: 44) makes a similar 
point of criticism). The aims to strive towards are objectivity of knowledge, 
control and dominion over nature – particularly over the material wilderness, to 
minimize uncertainties and hazards and to make nature into natural resources 
for man. The objectivity of knowledge is to avoid the morally pregnant 
subjectivity, or anthropomorphised view of the world and of nature. Such a view 
is said to have held by “primitive” peoples (Stepin 1999a: 361; 1999b, 
Pelseneer 1949: Chapter I). Organismic views of the world are expressly 
anthropomorphic. Science is said to have liberated humankind from such 
illusions by providing objective knowledge. But – is it at all possible to have a 
non-anthropomorphic understanding of the world? For one thing, the world as 
explicated above – as times and spaces filled with humans, as something 
through and for humans, cannot be but determined by human, his mutual 
quarrel with wilderness; so the world as the result of taming the wilderness by 
man and for man inescapably has a human face. For another thing, when 
reflecting on Heidegger’s words “man comes to see himself as standing-
reserve”, just like he sees the world and nature as a standing-reserve, one might 
be occasioned to look deeper and further. When man does not discern himself 
from nature, he sees all in one as a whole, with no distinctions, and thus as 
much anthropomorphic as nature-morphic; both are spirited and have their own 
being.158 When man objectifies nature, he sets himself counter to her, so they 
are like adversaries to each other; he sees himself as much limited from nature 
as nature from him; Heidegger specially accentuates objectifying: the more 
objective the object becomes, the more protrusive is the subject (that is man), 
this means that observing world turns ever more into a doctrine about man 
(Heidegger 1977a: 93). When man deprives nature of her own being, of her end, 
he bestows on her his own end and thus shapes nature according to his will and 
                                                 
157  Also Serres (1997: 121) says that in contemporary science there is only form and number 
but no matter. 
158  Heidegger (1977b) denies the anthropomorphism of this ancient cognition on the basis of 
Anaximander’s indiscriminate application of juridical and moral notions on nature, hence 
without acknowledging limits between natural and human-social spheres – and hence 
without transgressing any limits with his phrasings. 
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aims and his picture of the world; hence nature comes to have a human-defined 
shape. When he reduces nature into a series of joined causes, he does this in his 
laboratory where causation will be understood manipulatively – if man can 
manipulate the forces enacted on test site, he can state causal relations; so 
causation as “inherent in nature” is human-defined. When he reduces nature to 
bunches of clear-cut measurable properties and their functions that can be 
controlled by him and that are exploitable for practical aims, that is the Gestell-
shaped world cognition that makes a standing-reserve out of nature, he himself 
is one of the reserves, reduced to practically functional measurable properties. 
(Re)Drawing a line between man and nature parallels (re)drawing line 
between the world and wilderness, that brings me to again question the sphere 
that Finnis assigns to natural science as its subject. On the one hand, natural 
science tames “nature” by fixing her in (mathematical) “laws of nature”. Thus 
man makes nature known and controllable to him, brings her into his world. 
This he does actively by rebuilding nature: sciences create their success (Cart-
wright 2008: 6, reference to Mitchell); that is, with the help of experimental and 
observation techniques, engineering and technology, politics and policies, 
science makes its laws hold; depending on the science, its engineering branch is 
more or less successful.159 When there is no fixed ideal, law, theory, to 
normalise cognition and action, to guide separating “erroneous” from “normal”, 
then nature is as she is, she makes no errors. Agassi (1956 Part II: 95) concedes 
analogously: A fact seems ‘magical’ or miraculous only in the light of a theory; 
and Giora Hon (2003: 190): Error is an epistemic phenomenon that is relative to 
a chosen standard. Similarly magic and religious belief, the concept of ‘magical 
world view by the prehistoric peoples’ is normative and not at all restricted to 
the “prehistoric” people: the limit was drawn only later and largely due to the 
political pretentions of the church that induced probing of nature and, as a by-
product, strengthening of natural science (Henry 2001, 2004). The entities of 
physics were often not less occult or unobservable than spirits, gods or God: 
forces and action at distance (Newton), perfectly circular motion (Descartes), 
mathematics as the cause of motion (Copernicus).160 By ascribing to nature 
various “hidden features and orderliness”, man opines to render her knowable, 
less magical and wild, and to know his way around. Were it possible otherwise? 
If we allow nature to remain wild – would ‘law of wilderness’ be a contra-
dictory expression like ‘spontaneous fa’ is for the Chinese? If law is an 
epistemic phenomenon like error, then wilderness, by definition, remains un-
knowable. Even its limits may remain unknowable, when man rebuilds nature 
                                                 
159  Giere’s (2008: 126) admission (on Cartwright’s account of models) that at least in some 
cases “we construct the devices to fit our models as much as we construct models to fit the 
devices” means the same. 
160  About the import of various “occult” theories and arts in the history of science: 
Thorndike 1955 about astrology; Stratan (2008: 10–16) about Kepler’s analogies of Solar 
system to music, polyhedrons etc.; Henry 2001 (there 106–107, about Copernicus); Henry 
2008 about practices of magic and their relation to contemporary science; Jalobeanu 2001; 
Pelseneer 1949: 136. 
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and the world according to his theories and may thus blind himself as to the 
limits of the theories: what comes forth is not merely a human power nor handi-
work (Heidegger 1959a: 26; 2003: 257); or as Oliver Wendell Holmes (1915: 
43–44) says: 
[T]he part can not swallow the whole – […] our categories are not, or may not 
be, adequate to formulate what we cannot know. If we believe that we come out 
of the universe, not it out of us, we must admit that we do not know what we are 
talking about when we speak of brute matter. 
If we think of our existence not as that of a little god outside, but as that of a 
ganglion within, we have the infinite behind us. It gives us our only but our 
adequate significance. A grain of sand has the same, but what competent person 





Let us consider said aspects of normativity on the ecology-related example of 
science-based policy making introduced above, namely the complex model of 
Yucca mountain as a planned heavy nuclear waste repository (Lemons et al 
1997). The broader conceptual normativity (1a) consists in the demand to 
handle the natural thing – a mountain – as, or reducing it to, a limited bunch of 
well defined, clear-cut measurable properties which can be combined into a 
calculable mathematical model when represented by variables and parameters. 
The narrow conceptual normativity (1b) consists in the prescription of the 
concrete attributes considered in the model, and their (in this case flagrantly 
inadequately) restricted range of values, coming from the disciplines of geology, 
nuclear physics and climatology, which are all “hard” sciences, mathematised 
and to a considerable extent based on experimental knowledge. Due to the 
narrow focus on possible geological processes, no concepts from biological or 
cultural-religious concerns were taken into account. The mathematical and 
practical epistemic normativites (2a,b) are manifested by the lastly mentioned 
facts that said “hard” sciences apply mathematised models and if not all, then at 
least a considerable portion of their mathematical laws (sub-models) are tested 
in laboratory experiments for their fit with aimed material situations. In 
addition, the 95 percent rule applied in this case as the basis for deciding on the 
reliability of the mathematical models and simulations, of the conjectured 
(causal) links, is applied for avoiding “false positives” – a norm from science, 
even though inadequate in this highly complex and risky plan. The narrower 
practical normativity (3a) lies in designing and building the repository with the 
                                                 
161  Let us notice how Holmes’ expressions imply the organismic view of the world or nature 
(or Universe): if we are ganglions, then the whole of which we are parts is a minded or at 
least sensuous organism (with a nervous system). 
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help of corresponding theoretical and engineering sciences; and the broader 
practical normativity is manifested in the changing of the mountain from a 
natural-cultural thing – something living and spirited to be taken joy of – into a 
useful material resource – one of hiding waste, the unwanted and in this case 
dangerous exploited matter, hence into something to be itself exploited, thereby 
in a way blocking the previous view on it. 
Science ignores the individuality of things and places. E.g. if a place is 
subject to (industrial or other) plans, like in the case of Yucca mountain, it is 
ignored that the place is home to someone, possibly including humans (or 
belonging to their life-world), and that it has or may have a meaning for the 
humans who have the place as their home (by ‘home’ I mean also spiritual 
situatedness). How does this relate to the place’s own being and essence and 
end? The meaning it has for the people – is it the end superimposed by those 
people? Yes. But often those people take this place to have its own being and 
essence. Or is it the gods and spirits that bestow a meaning on the place? This is 
again something abstracted of the place itself. Even if the place is valued for its 
ecological richness, then it is not the place itself but the species and their 
numerical (statistical) features at that place, that is, clearly discernible properties 
(species) and their measure (multitude of species and representativeness at that 
place or how many individuals of this species per unit area). If a place is home 
to someone, then the “ecological richness” or “geological richness” or 
“aesthetic value” as comparable and/or scalable properties need not have that 
much importance. 
An example that unifies both Dretske’s and Oppenheim’s observed kinds of 
law, that is, law designing the (natural and/or social) world and law applying to 
human beings acting in this designed world: traffic. In the course of his social 
existence man has created routes – parts of the land on which he lives that 
connect him with other people in other places (sometimes with parts of nature, 
for example in quarries and mines). The routes can be mathematically 
represented, like on more or less precise geographical maps or graphically 
(topologically) like the schemes of public transport (metro, train, etc.) where 
nodes denote stations and edges denote connections between stations. In 
addition man has created various ways and methods to move ahead on the 
routes, and correspondingly rules that must be kept in order to safely use the 
routes and connect between places. From the point of view of the law or set of 
rules of traffic, people on the road are just subject to that law, namely they are 
so as long as they are located on the roads and hence can impact others who are 
then also subjects of that law. For the participants of the traffic, they just 
embody the attributes, defined in the law, that exactly determine their role, 
rights and duties when participating in the traffic, and other subjects are those 
with respect to whom they have those duties and rights, and who make up, for 
them, hindrances on the way connecting between places. However, as a traveller 
on the road, a human being has innumerable other properties or being that is not 
captured in his being a carrier of traffic. He is in a state of mind that is 
influenced by his recent and earlier past, his bodily peculiarities, the end of his 
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journey, the perceptions he receives during the journey, his acquaintance with 
the road and with situations of being on the road and participating in the traffic, 
etc. Thus taking the human being just as a participant in the traffic and hence as 
a subject of the law of traffic is setting him into an impoverishing enframing 
and in a sense blocking his own being. But not only the human being, but also 
the road taken as merely a space regulated by certain laws (and thereby 
determining humans to be subject to certain laws) or as mere connection 
between two points (a cognition empowered by fast transport techniques and 
highways) is not just a route but a place on the Earth, a place with its history 
that may have been home for plants and animals, later lending itself to humans 
for communicating, helping bring them from one place to another and bringing 
people together. But also – and ever more so – not only connecting but 
separating beings from each other by cutting their earlier connections and being 
insurmountable hindrances (e.g. for animals and their populations, but also for 
people). Roads also determine human dispositions by predetermining (and thus 
prescribing) possible directions and ways of moving around. They are for and 
through man – a part of the world, a tamed portion of the Earth, bringing him 
safely to the other side of wilderness. A road may suggest alienation from nature 
and the fastest possible leaving her, like a highway which at the same time is an 
alienation of the Earth from its own being; or it may be a home for wanderers 
and gather in itself not just the mortals but also the divine, like pilgrimage ways 




                                                 
162  “Wandern ist Einklang von Natur und Seele” („Wandering is unison of nature and soul”, 




The arguments set forth in the Introduction were defended or refuted as follows: 
1. “Scientific laws, or laws of nature as often called, are normative in a similar 
sense as legal laws are normative: they prescribe ways of acting and 
sanctions in case of non-conformity”: It has been found that scientific laws 
are implicitly normative in various senses as enumerated and expounded in 
paragraph 1.3.2, Chapter 2 and Appendix 3. Thereby their normativity is 
logically similar to that of legal laws: they prescribe ways of acting, but 
they do not do it directly and explicitly – not to concrete persons or in a 
logically prescriptive form, and not through sanctions in case of non-con-
formity, but rather indirectly. The indirect or implicit ways of prescription 
are through world view (or cognition) making up the basic perception of the 
(Western) life world that is taught in science classes, followed in production 
and policy making etc.; in scientific practice, for example in laboratory, it is 
on the basis of (experimentally) established relations between mathematical 
formulations and the controllable laboratory environment that theory 
implies prescription for setting matter to conform it. The guideline for 
action is both the concrete (mathematical) laws of nature (the formulations 
that have already reached this status) that are to hold on the material world, 
as well as the mind-set incited by them and their guided ordering activity; 
that is: both ‘how’ and ‘that’ the world is ordered. Laws of nature, in their 
various historical and possible meanings, are normative in even more senses 
than the contemporary conception of them as scientific laws. Often their 
prescriptiveness includes sanctions in case of non-conformity (for example, 
the theological concept of laws of nature). Even if the laws and sanctions 
are not given in a written or codified form, they are perceived or thought of 
as something imperative to human behaviour, hence in this sense explicitly 
normative. 
2. “The aim of laws (scientific and legal) is achieving epistemic and practical 
certainty – simplicity and foreseeability (predictability) in actions upon the 
world”: Laws bring certainty: whether they are understood as something in 
nature herself – then it is the perceived regularities of nature that enable 
man at least to some extent foresee future situations and adjust his under-
takings accordingly; or they are prescribed to the world – then the world is 
designed into accordance with the laws that are already known. This 
designing can be either of social realm, where the subjects of the laws 
consciously follow them (Appendices 2 and 3, paragraphs 1.1 and 1.3) or it 
may be natural realm that is formed into settings whose ways of acting the 
laws predict (Appendices 2 and 4, Chapters 1 and 2). 
3. “Mathematicalness and mathematical laws are pragmatic in the sense that 
they provide the repose of mind due to (illusory) simplicity in the complex, 
often irregular world”: This is yielded by Appendices 4, 2 and 3, and 
paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4. Mathematicalness, although abstracted from 
material world, material settings, is remote to materiality precisely because 
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it is abstract. Hence mathematical laws, as is well known, do not describe 
material reality, but rather models of reality. However, manipulating with 
mathematical entities in a sense seems to be so innocent and uncomplicated: 
they are immaterial, thus cannot do any harm, and undisturbed by material 
idiosyncrasies, hence reliable. Their ideality has been seen as divine, and as 
such steering the world. So man can achieve knowledge of this steering 
when the supposed underlying mathematical relations of material entities 
are discovered. Even when divinity is abolished, mathematics remains as 
the point of support and certainty: if the chaotic material world can be made 
as similar to mathematical system of relations as possible, then the 
calculations are expected to say something essential about their acting. This 
is believed to spare the effort of thinking, but also the trouble of attentive-
ness to the surroundings. 
4. “Mathematical laws of nature gain validity through active human agency in 
restructuring the world according to those laws, or forcing the world to 
display regularities expressed with the laws. The aim of doing so is as said 
with argument 2. This is how scientific laws are normative as said with 
argument 1”: This has been discussed in Appendices 4 and 2, paragraph 
1.3.2 and Chapter 2. Firstly, in laboratory matter is designed keeping in 
mind its correlations with mathematical formulations of its properties. The 
situations found in nature hardly ever display clear numerical or mathe-
matical properties and relations. It is through human designing activity, 
including designing objects that are taken as references in measurement 
(etalons), that matter is rendered into numerical form that can count as a 
domain for mathematical treatment. Further, the world outside laboratory is 
constantly changed, rebuilt, complemented and impoverished by human 
activity through various technologies that become ever more mathematical 
or scientific – not only technical devices and apparatus, but also social 
technologies. By forming the world according to those mathematical laws 
holding for those technologies, they are made to hold on the world. 
5. “The concept of nature depends on the concept of laws of nature; hence the 
more technical or abstract the concept of laws of nature, the more technical 
or abstract the concept of nature”: Chapter 2 attempts to show some corre-
lations between the notions of lawfulness or regularity and that of nature. 
However, which is dependent on the other is rather ambiguous and the 
conditioning is probably mutual, and there are difficulties tracing this 
particularly for the lack of knowledge about possible earlier perceptions of 
the world, of man and nature. When the dependence of man on nature is 
perceived more immediately, man must also respect nature’s own being and 
her often irregular ways, adapt himself to be able to manage his life. Taking 
ever more control over nature necessarily goes some way of technology or 
techne, thus being is brought into some work, for example a device or a law 
that displays regularity, works regularly. Appendix 4 presents some aspects 
of how measurement acts to this effect, thus measurement is a techne – 
bringing being into work. Appendices 1 and 2 illustrate the way how the 
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abstract mathematical notion of law of nature occasions seeing being itself 
as regular and assuming its subsumability to mathematical laws. 
6. “World view is dependent on the concepts of nature and of laws of nature, 
and it is normative to human agency”: Nature belongs to the world and what 
is regarded as natural is normative to thinking and action. This depends on 
the relation of wilderness and regularity in the concept of nature (Chapter 
2). The less nature is allowed to be wild and the more it is seen as regular, 
displaying (cognoscible) laws and regularities, the more natural or normal it 
is considered for man to order the world accordingly. 
 
Several problems remained or arose in course of the discussions that could not 
be addressed to a satisfactory extent, including: What is cognition? How is self-
cognition related with world-cognition? What is world? What is wilderness? 
Can there be world or laws without violence toward wilderness, toward nature, 
toward Earth? That is, without reorganising nature according to human needs 
(for repose of mind) and thus neglecting its (natural?) wilderness? Do some 
notions of laws of nature refer closer to nature herself, or are they all human 
imputations or reductions of nature? Can man get a closer cognition of nature 
without an enframing of some conception of laws of nature? What is greater 
violence – assuming nature merely as material, or assuming a soul in addition to 
matter thus potentially taking matter as “dead”? If the distinction between 
descriptive and normative vanishes, is there anything at all that is merely 
descriptive and not normative at all? Is any description – whatever it is a 
description of (e.g. of some imagined world like fiction or of “the world as it 
[allegedly] is” supposing a God’s-eye-point-of-view or of the world as expe-
rienced relatively to a subject or to a practice, the relativity kept in mind) – in 
some way and to some extent normative (at least conceptually normative)? (Is 
normativity perhaps a more-or-less feature? Or is the here supposed normativity 
of scientific laws not merely normativity but (also) a forecast?) Even if it is 
possible to escape the epistemic normativities, is it possible to escape con-
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Teadusseaduste normatiivsusest 
 
Väitekiri tegeleb maailma korrastamise, maailmas korra leidmise implitsiitse ja 
eksplitsiitse normatiivsusega. Kord, seaduspära ja regulaarsus seostuvad epis-
teemilise (tõsi)kindlusega ehk võimalusega ette näha ja planeerida. Seega on see 
töö kindla teadmise normatiivsusest ehk vajadusest kindlustunde järele ning 
sellest ajendatud reguleerimisest ja korrastamisest (ehk kindlustunde saavu-
tamise normatiivsusest). ‘Loodusseaduste’ all kitsas tähenduses pean ennekõike 
silmas kaasaegsetes empiirilistes täppisteadustes matemaatiliselt väljendatud 
seadusi. Ometigi on see vaid tipp sellest, mida võib vaadelda ja on vaadeldud 
korda ja regulaarsust väljendavana meid ümbritsevas maailmas või looduses. 
Nende kitsas mõttes loodusseaduste matemaatiline kuju põhineb vastavate 
nähtuste või entiteetide omadustel, mis on kvantifitseeritud, viidud arvulisele 
kujule ehk muudetud mõõdetavaks. Kuid täpne, range ja arvuline võrreldavus – 
mõõdetavus – ei ole omaduste välistav, vaid pigem astmeline iseloomustus. 
Matemaatiliste loodusseaduste normatiivsuse ehk ettekirjutuslikkuse üle 
mõtisklemise puhul on asjakohane loodusseaduste sisuline mõistmine ja selle 
mõistmise areng, seega ka nende seaduste niisugused tähendused, mida ei 
väljendata matemaatiliselt. Asi pole pelgalt selles, kas “loodus” on armutult 
sundiv või mitte või kas inimene vajab episteemilist tõsikindlust või mitte; asi 
on pigem selles, mida mõistetakse loodusena ja kust seda tõsikindlust otsitakse. 
Minu hoiak teaduse ning tema teooriate ja seadusi sätestavate praktikate kui 
normatiivsete suhtes võlgneb paljugi Joseph Rouse’i (2002) arusaamale teadu-
sest kui mitmes mõttes normatiivsest ning praktikate esiletõstmisest vastu-
kaaluks keelele, mida ta peab praktika alamstruktuuriks. Ma näen tema käsitust 
Edgar Scheini kolmekihilise kultuuri mõiste (nähtavad tehisesemed, teadlikud 
omandatud uskumused ja väärtused, teadvustamata põhjapanevad eeldused) 
alumise kihina. Selle kihi teadvustamatus ilmneb asjaolust, et vastavate põhja-
panevate eelduste normatiivsust tavaliselt ei märgata, see on praktikates implit-
siitne. Seejuures praktikaid endid ja teaduskeelt ei tajuta tavaliselt ettekirjutus-
likena (teadust ja tehnikat peetakse tavaliselt mittenormatiivseks). See alumine 
põhjapanev kultuuri- ja maailmataju kiht on minu nägemuse kohaselt tugevasti 
kujundatud sellisel viisil nagu Martin Heidegger kirjeldab kaasaegse teaduse ja 
tehnika olemust ning minu põhiline eesmärk on selle taju üksikasjalikum 
väljatoomine. Mu ülejäänud peamised inspiratsiooniallikad – eriti mis puudutab 
seda, mida teadus täpsemalt ette kirjutab, kuidas ta kujundab inimese ja maa-
ilma koosolu – on Heideggeri tehnikafilosoofias ja Carolyn Merchanti ökofilo-
soofias. Lisaks olen veel saanud ideid autoreilt (nii teadlastelt kui teadus-
filosoofidelt), kes rohkem või vähem eksplitsiitselt järgivad teaduse norme, nt. 
püüdes neid rakendada väljaspool vastava eriala rakendusi, või kirjutavad tema 
normatiivsusest. 
Väitekiri koosneb sissejuhatavast osast, mis ise koosneb kahest peatükist ja 
rakendustest, ning neljast lisast, mis illustreerivad ja toovad välja mõningad 
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üksikasjad sel teemal. 1. peatükis “Mida nimetatakse ‘seadusteks’? Seaduste 
keel ja loogika” võtan vaatluse alla seaduste keelelise ja loogilise vormi. § 1.1 
“Normatiivsete süsteemide loogilised elemendid ja omadused” esitab Alchour-
róni ja Bulygini eksplitsiitselt normatiivsete süsteemide loogilise rekonstrukt-
siooni. See koosneb järgmistest elementidest: diskursuse universum, omaduste 
universum, juhtumite universum, tegevuste universum ja lahendite universum 
(mis omistab tegevuste universumi elementidele deontilised operaatorid), kus 
viimased kaks on normatiivsete süsteemide eristavad elemendid. Seda loogilist 
süsteemi rakendan katseliselt teadusteooriale, kusjuures tegevuste universumit 
võrdlen vanaaegsete praktikatega, kus tegevusi kirjutati eksplitsiitselt ette, 
saavutamaks teatud tulemust ehk eesmärki, näiteks konkreetsete ülesannete 
lahendamisel (mis on analoogne kaasaegses õppetöös). § 1.2 “Arutluse tasan-
did – loogiliste elementide viited” on seaduste empiirilisusest või ideaalsusest 
teaduses ja õiguses ehk diskursuse universumi rollist ja olemusest. Nii teaduses 
kui õiguses on normiks, et mõisted tuleb hästi defineerida. Ometigi kui mate-
riaalset reaalsust tõsiselt võetakse, siis peab tal olema mõju teoreetilistele 
definitsioonidele ning seega muutustega tegelikkuses ja tajus muutuvad ja 
hägustuvad ka mõistete tähendused. 
§-is 1.3 “Seaduste modaalsus” on keskpunktis suhe ‘→’ vormelites 
(x)(Fx→Gx) või (F-sus→G-sus). Õigusnormide puhul öeldakse, et ‘→’ tähistab 
kohustust, loodusseaduste puhul – paratamatust või põhjuslikkust. Seepärast on 
§-s1.3.1 “Põhjuslikkus” käsitletud põhjuslikkuse mõistet ja selle rolli õiguses ja 
teaduses. Leitakse, et kui põhjuslikkust mõistetakse Hume’i poolt antud tähen-
duses üksteisele diakrooniliselt järgnevate sündmustena või ajendamiste/ 
tekitamistena, siis arutluse konkreetsel materiaalsel tasandil on põhjuslikkus 
sama nii õiguses kui teaduses, kuid tal on erinevad rollid tulenevalt nende 
praktikate eesmärkidest: õiguses (aga ka strateegiate loomisel) mingi juhtumi 
kohta tõe leidmine, selleni viinud (viiva) põhjusliku jada leidmine; teaduses 
kindlate (nt. eksperimentaalsete) tingimuste loomine. Teaduspõhisel strateegiate 
loomisel on need kaks eesmärki olulised. §-is 1.3.2 “Implitsiitne normatiivsus” 
esitan mitmete autorite käsitusi normatiivsusest teaduses ning pakun välja 
(mittevälistava ja mitte-kõikehõlmava) normatiivsuse liikide klassifikatsiooni: 
(1) Kontseptuaalne normatiivsus: 1a) laiem kontseptuaalne normatiivsus ehk 
analüütiline maailmavaade, 1b) kitsam kontseptuaalne normatiivsus ehk termi-
noloogia, mis pärineb erinevatest teaduslikest distsipliinidest ning mida 
propageeritakse teadusliku maailmapildi raames; (2) episteemiline norma-
tiivsus: 2a) matemaatilis-teoreetiline arvestatavus ehk püüdlemine maailma 
matemaatilise arusaamise poole, 2b) praktilised laboritegevused selle ees-
märgiga; (3) praktiline normatiivsus: 3a) kitsam praktiline normatiivsus, eriti 
tehnikas rakendatud teadus ehk tehniliste lahenduste ettekirjutamine, 3b) laiem 
praktiline normatiivsus – kuidas kujundatakse ümbritsevat temast teadusliku 
(kontseptuaalse) arusaamise põhjal, nt. poliitikas, strateegiate loomine. 
2. peatükk “Korrastatud maailm ja normatiivsuse allikad” uurib loodus-
seaduste ja mingil määral õigusnormide küsimusi, mis on seotud maailma-
käsitusega. §-id 2.1 “Tehnilise käsituse suhe mäendusega: ökofilosoofiline 
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analüüs” ja 2.2 “Kaasaegne teadus ja tehnika kui viisid looduse uurimiseks: 
ökofeministlik lähenemine” tõlgendavad Martin Heideggeri kaasaegse teaduse 
ja tehnika alusmõisteid ökoloogiast ajendatud tunnetusest lähtuvalt, nagu see oli 
veel levinud renessansiajal, kus Maad ja loodust nähakse elava, hingestatud 
tervikutena analoogselt inimese (eriti naise) organismile, keda inimene üritab 
allutada oma vaimsele ja tehnilisele võimule. § 2.3 “Heideggeri mõiste ‘sea-
destu’ tõlgendus kaasaegse teaduse ja tehnika olemusena” tõlgendab Heideggeri 
mõistet Gestell, mida ta käsitab kaasaegse teaduse ja tehnika ning neil põhineva 
maailmatunnetuse olemusena, (Rein Vihalemma) praktika-põhise teadusemõist-
mise raames. Gestell on tunnetuse struktuur, mille kaudu maailm ilmneb koos-
seisuna, millele ma omistan kolm olulist omadust: püsivus, mõõdetavus ja 
kättesaadavus/käsutatavus. Need tugevdavad ja tingivad üksteist ning tagavad 
selle, et maailma matemaatiline kohtlemine teoorias ja praktikas õnnestub.  
§ 2.3.1 “Gewirk ja Gestell, abstraktsioon ja mateeria” otsib tähendusi, millistes 
maailma on tunnetatud koe ehk võrguna (Gewirk – Heideggeri tegelikkuse-
mõiste nähtuna läbi teadusliku teooria): seda võib näha tegelike, materiaalsete 
asjade ja nende suhete, kaasa arvatud inimolendite võrguna; või kui põhjuslike 
toimimiste jada, mida inimene suudab esile kutsuda näiteks uurimislaboris; või 
kui abstraktsete, idealiseeritud muutujate võrgustikku, mida eeldatakse esin-
davat tegelikke suurusi (tegelikkuse mõõdetavaid omadusi). § 2.3.2 “(Mate-
maatiliste) loodusseaduste normatiivsuse juured” jälgib mõiste ‘loodusseadused’ 
ajalugu, tuues esile selle arengu aspektid, mis panustavad nende seaduste 
normatiivsusse ning nende kaasaegsesse mõistmisse matemaatilistena: ‘seadus’ 
kui iseenesest kellegi poolt seatud mingit laadi norm, mida tuleb järgida; 
loodusseadused kui materiaalse loodusliku maailma enda regulaarsused, mida 
inimene peab oma käitumises silmas pidama; loodusseadused kui jumala 
ettekirjutused, mida loodus (ka inimene) peab järgima, ning matemaatika kui 
nende jumalike seaduste keel; kutsealased reeglid (sageli matemaatilised) 
kohtlemaks vastavaid osi maailmast vastavates distsipliinides ja praktikates, nt. 
käsitööd ja kaubandus (seega vastavad tegevuste universumile kui loogiliselt 
ehk eksplitsiitselt normatiivsete süsteemide defineerivale osale). 
Lisa 1, “Teaduse konstruktiiv-realistlik käsitlus ning selle rakendus Ilya 
Prigogine’i loodusseaduste mõistele” (Mets, Kuusk 2009) illustreerib arusaama, 
et matemaatika on see tõene keel, milles maailma kirjeldada ja temast aru saada. 
Kritiseerime Prigogine’i katset laiendada oma matemaatilist lähenemist sellele, 
mida ta nimetab ‘tegelikkuse fundamentaalseks tasandiks’ ning ‘inimtunnetuse 
fundamentaalsele tasandile’ (eriti ajale). Meie kriitika tugineb peamiselt täppis-
teaduste teooriate olemusele: nad on konkreetsete eesmärkidega idealiseeritud, 
abstraktsed teooriad, kus nimetatud eesmärgid määravad nõutava või lubatud 
abstraheerituse tasandi ja läheduse empiiriale.  
Lisa 2 “Sotsiaalteaduste teaduslikkusest. Rein Taagepera Making Social 
Sciences More Scientific. The Need For Predictive Models” (Mets 2009) seos-
tub teadusliku, matemaatilise lähenemise normatiivsusega ühiskonna nähtuste 
valdkonnas. Taagepera vaidlustab matemaatika, või pigem statistika, numbri-
liste meetodite väärkasutust ühiskonnateadustes ning põhjendab täppisteadus-
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like, kvantifitseerivate, eesmärgile suunatud meetodite rakendamist, mida ta 
peab teeks mõistmiseni (mis on tema jaoks teaduse eesmärk). Normatiivsus 
tema hoiakus teooriast ja matemaatikast juhitud uurimise esmatähtsuse suhtes 
avaldub selgelt tema selgituses teaduse alustest, nimelt teises neist kahest 
uurimist innustavast küsimusest: “Mis on?” ja “Kuidas peaks olema loogilistel 
alustel?” (Taagepera 2008, 5). Implitsiitselt ilmutab Taagepera lähenemine 
täppisteadusliku ratsionaalsuse normatiivsust – et täppiskvantifitseerimine 
annab mõistmise ning seda tuleb püüelda, kui inimlikud pürgimused tahavad 
kasulikud olla. Minu analüüs asetab Taagepera lähenemise praktika-põhise 
teadusfilosoofia raamesse ning toob esile mõned ühiskonnanähtuste eripärad, 
mis peaksid matemaatilise lähenemise korral ettevaatlikkusele kutsuma.  
Lisa 3 “Rahvusvahelise õiguse mõned piirangud filosoofilisest lähtepunktist” 
(Mets 2012a) tõmbab paralleele teaduslike ja õiguslike režiimide vahele 
teoreetilisel ja praktilisel tasandil. Ta rõhutab praktika, materiaalse tegelikkuse 
esmatähtsust võrreldes teooria ehk kontseptuaalse mõistmisega. Viimast pee-
takse aga sageli selgeks ja hästi defineerituks ja sellisena tõest mõistmist 
tegelikkusest pakkuvaks ning eeldatavalt rakenduvaks ülemaailmselt sõltumata 
“kohalikest materiaalsetest idiosünkraasiatest”, mida peetakse kõrvalekaldeks 
korrektsusest ja seetõttu korrigeerimist vajavaks. Ma vaidlen nii teaduslike kui 
õiguslike seaduste ja vastavalt korra (korrapärasuste) universaalsuse vastu ning 
maailma kohalikult mugandatud teoreetilise ja praktilise kohtlemise poolt. 
Ühtlasi sean kahtluse alla regulaarsuse mõiste, mis tundub mõnel autoril (nt. 
Tunkin) olevat fundamentaalne juriidiliste seaduste praktikale viitava käsituse 
jaoks, nimelt kui toimingute või tegevuste regulaarsuse.  
Lisa 4 “Mõõtmisteooria, nomoloogiline masin ja mõõtemääramatused 
(klassikalises füüsikas)” (Mets 2012b) puudutab suhteid füüsika matemaatiliste 
seaduste ja “mürarikka” materiaalse laboritegelikkuse vahel, millele nad peak-
sid rakenduma. Mu eesmärgiks on näidata, et ei fundamentaalsed ega fenome-
noloogilised (arvulised) seadused ei kirjelda materiaalset tegelikkust, kuna nii 
lihtne matemaatika kui arvude omistamine on liiga idealiseeritud materiaalse 
maailma ähmasuse ja keerukuse suhtes. Ma väidan, et matemaatika kasutamine 
mateeria käsitlemiseks on pragmaatiline ehk juhitud eesmärkidest ja tegevus-
test, ning et seda on ka müra ja (mõõtmis)vigade mõisted, nende modellee-
rimine ja matematiseerimine, olles maailmaga lihtsa arvutatava kontseptuaalse 
ja praktilise ümberkäimise teenistuses.  
Lisad 1, 2 ja 4 illustreerivad peamiselt teaduse teadmisteoreetilisi norma-
tiivsusi, lisa 3 laiemat praktilist normatiivsust, ning kõik neli lisa illustreerivad 
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Physics has for a long time been regarded as the most mature of all sciences due 
to strict mathematically formulated laws of physics and success of theories in 
applications, for which it has been taken as the example of scientificity which 
other sciences should strive towards. Just what aspect of physics it is that is 
regarded as the cause of its success and hence the yardstick of scientificity – 
this question has given rise to differing opinions. In his book Making Social 
Sciences More Scientific. The Need For Predictive Models Rein Taagepera 
criticises the opinion that physics is a rigorous science ‘merely’ due to the use 
of mathematical operations and numerical accuracy of results. He shows that the 
strictness of physics consists instead in its method that allows to set numbers 
and mathematical formalism into correspondence with real phenomena in a way 
that enables application (first of all prediction), and to unite physical theories 
into uniform, integral systems. At the same time he teaches how it would be 
possible to reach the same in social sciences. 
In the first part of my review I will give an overview of the book’s chapters, 
describing in more detail Taagepera’s general understanding of science and 
scientific method. In the second part of the review I analyse the positions 
presented in the book from the point of view of philosophy of science 
(particularly that of constructive realism), providing examples from social 
sciences. With my critique I show that the society cannot be handled with strict 
theories similar to those of physics, and that in order to raise the applicational 
strength of social sciences, other means often suit better than rendering them 
similar to physics by developing mathematical formalism. 
 
                                                 
1  This is a translation from the Estonian original: 
Mets, A. (2009). Sotsiaalteaduste teaduslikkusest. Rein Taagepera, Making Social Sciences 
More Scientific. The Need for Predictive Models. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, 
254 pp., ISBN 978-0-19-953466-1. – Studia Philosophica Estonica 2.1, 112–134 (On-line 
version ISSN: 1736-5899; available on-line: 
http://www.spe.ut.ee/ojs-2.2.2/index.php/spe/article/view/79/43) 
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2. Overview of the book 
 
In the book Making Social Sciences More Scientific. The Need for Predictive 
Models, Rein Taagepera, professor emeritus of the University of Tartu, takes a 
critical look at the method of contemporary social sciences from a physicist’s 
point of view, and hints to ways of improving it. The method that is in the focus 
of Taagepera’s criticism is misuse of statistics, that is using statistics in all 
possible instances – even if it adds nothing essential to the content of the 
scientific work and may in some cases even hinder substantial research. The 
solution that Taagepera offers to improve the situation is to adopt mathematical 
models analogous to those of exact sciences, that would be constructed on the 
basis of the logic of the phenomenon under study and would enable prediction. 
Foreword is an excerpt of the article “Duncan Luce” by Duncan Luce, 
originally from the collection Psychology in Autobiography (1989), where Luce 
criticises psychology as one of the fields that most employs statistics, at that for 
very modest results that often provide no understanding of the phenomenon 
itself. In the preface Taagepera describes the collision of two approaches: his 
approach, originating from exact sciences, and that of social scientists having 
social scientific background: different are both methodologies (explanation and 
prediction versus description) and what is regarded as a result (logical 
quantitative models versus statistical “models” that can be abundant and 
different for the same set of empirical data). Taagepera considers mainly 
political science, but he emphasizes that the same holds for all social sciences. 
He regards computers to be one of the means for misusing statistics – ready-
made statistics programs the use of which only requires pushing the right 
button, but not logical thinking. With this book the author tries to open the eyes 
of the reader about how limited statistical methods are, while showing the way 
to constructing logical models; at the same time, the book can be used as a 
textbook in high schools. 
The book is divided into three major parts: (1) “The limitations of 
descriptive methodology”, (2) “Quantitatively predictive logical models” and 
(3) “Synthesis of predictive and descriptive approaches”. I will give an 
overview of each of them separately, thereafter add my comments. 
In the first chapter of the first part “Why social sciences are not scientific 
enough” the author describes the relation between social sciences and 
mathematics and highlights the deficiencies of that relationship. In social 
sciences, mainly statistical analysis is employed, most of all general and linear 
regression, to test hypothesis about impacts of some variables on other 
variables, and this is used when tackling any problem regardless of the essence 
of the problem at hand. Explanatory approaches are not regarded. Many 
statistical indicators are presented, that is just a bunch of numbers that do not 
contribute to the understanding of the problem. 
Taagepera presents his understanding of science (Taagepera 2008, 5): 
 
Science stands on two legs. One leg consists of systematic inquiry of “What is?” 
This question is answered by data collection and statistical analysis that leads to 
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empirical data fits that could be called descriptive models. The second leg con-
sists of an equally systematic inquiry of “How should it be on logical grounds?” 
This question requires building logically consistent and quantitatively specific 
models that reflect the subject matter. These are explanatory models. 
 
The ’should’ here is logical, not moral, and it can be corroborated and 
disproved. The legs also have to be joined somehow, that requires systematic 
qualitative thinking. Taagepera contends that contemporary social science has 
disregarded the other leg – thinking on logical grounds. Quantitativeness in 
models does not only mean direction, as it tends to be in social sciences, but 
exact numerical relation that can be corroborated through testing. But the results 
of social sciences consist of a bunch of regression coefficients that explain 
nothing and cannot be used in practice in any way whatsoever. 
Taagepera contrasts descriptive and predictive methods: in case of prediction 
we have an explanation in the form “This should be so, because, logically.…”, 
whereas in description “This is so, and that’s it” there is no explanation. The 
latter only says how things are interrelated, and it says this postdictively – only 
in the best cases can such a description be applied to new similar cases, and they 
offer no new ideas nor raise questions. The basis of explanatory models is 
inquiry for causes – why do things affect each other exactly as they do. If the 
model turns out to be successful in testing, then it holds for the particular 
phenomenon more broadly. This is how it goes in physics and should also go in 
social sciences, according to Taagepera. But standard statistical programs make 
it possible for social scientists to create bunches of numbers that are never used 
after having been published. 
In chapters 2, 3 and 4 Taagepera exemplifies the limits of the descriptive 
method and offers a cursory insight into predictive modelling. In chapter 2 “Can 
social science approaches find the law of gravitation?” it is described how, by 
applying linear regression, without using any other mathematical methods or 
other methods of analysis, the regularities underlying data remain undiscovered. 
This happens even in cases where the coefficients received through statistical 
analysis are very good, for example, correlation is high. James McGregor has 
carried through linear regression for three laws of nature (Galileo’s law of 
falling objects, Boyle’s ideal gas law, Newton’s law of gravitation). Results 
were very good, but nothing in them hinted to the underlying laws of nature. 
Taagepera himself carried through an experiment on social scientists, in which 
he asked them to analyse data that nearly perfectly matched the universal law of 
gravitation. No one of the respondents discovered the underlying law. This is a 
warning example that shows that even if there is a regularity in data, social 
scientists probably do not find it, particularly if the statistical analysis gives 
good results – then social scientists do not even consider using other methods. 
In the 3rd chapter “How to construct predictive models: simplicity and non-
absurdity” Taagepera looks more closely at creating predictive models. Social 
scientists’ understanding of exactness is generally limited to finding statistical 
coefficients with as many decimals as possible for every variable. These are, 
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though, only for linear relations, also if data are clearly related non-linearly. 
Linear approximation can indicate the direction (if one variable increases, the 
other increases/decreases), but not the quantitative relation between the 
variables. For this, Taagepera suggests to begin with setting the relation 
logically: one has to exclude logically impossible cases (taking into account the 
real properties of the quantities, for example if they cannot be negative), and the 
model should be as simple as possible, containing only those variables and 
coefficients that are essential in the problem at hand (these are namely those 
which in statistical models are exaggerated with). Interdependence of variables 
should also be considered, not only dependence of one variable on other, 
independent variables. 
The 4th chapter “Example of model building: electoral volatility” demonst-
rates the more concrete steps in the process of building a model. The most 
important recommendations before looking at empirical data are: dare to 
simplify – one has to retain as few variables as possible; delimit the con-
ceptually possible domain of variance; determine the behaviour of variables in 
extreme cases, or anchor points (which may even not appear in reality, but are 
important for understanding the phenomenon as a whole); find means that give 
an idea of the possible form of the model (equation) that is probably non-linear 
(because linear equations usually violate some boundary conditions), pre-
supposing the model to be a continuous curve between two anchor points. Then 
the preliminary model can be tested on empirical data and amended if 
necessary. As an example, electoral volatility in successive suffrages dependent 
on the number of political parties is given. The regression coefficient R2, so 
much loved by social scientists, may say nothing about fitness of the model, as 
it depends also on consistent set of data. 
In chapters 5, 6 and 7 Taagepera criticises more thoroughly the dispro-
portionate dependence on descriptive methods. The 5th chapter “Physicists 
multiply, social scientists add – even when it does not add up” compares 
general features of the equations of physics and those of social sciences. The 
most essential differences between them are as follows: 
 in physics’ equations there are few variables, as problems are divided into 
smaller parts that are solved separately, and common operations are 
multiplication and division; in social sciences there are many variables – all 
impacts are being tried to insert into one equation – and usually they are 
added and subtracted, multiplication is sometimes used, but division is 
always replaced with subtraction; 
 physics’ equations contain up to one freely adjustable constant and that has 
substantive meaning (there may be more constants in applied physics); in 
regression equations such constants are more numerous than variables and 
they have no substantive interpretation, they can have whatever value; 
 physics usually has one equation per phenomenon – if there is none, it is 
achieved; regression equations are several alternative and advantages of one 
over the others are as often as not practically substantiated; 
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 in physics, inconsistencies are avoided even in extreme cases: when an 
outcome appears absurd, the equation is modified; in social sciences 
inconsistencies are tolerated, they do not force to modify the regression 
equation; 
 the aim of physics’ equations is to predict both in the narrower sense (inside 
one equation) and broader sense (as to the mutual dependence of variables, 
on different levels of the phenomenon), and the failure of prediction requires 
explanation; the aim of social sciences’ equations is at best postdiction, 
usually they do not present causal relations, being too freely modifiable; 
 physicists indicate the possible error ranges of measurements and give only 
meaningful decimals; social scientists present correlation coefficients even if 
equation itself is not given completely, and often excessively many 
decimals; 
 physics’ equations are reversible and transitive that enables them to form 
networks interrelating variables; standard regression equations are unidi-
rectional and non-transitive, variables are not interrelated. 
The 6th chapter “All hypothesis are not created equal” takes a closer look at the 
hypothesis raised in social sciences. Research procedure much used in social 
sciences is as follows: a hypothesis is formulated, data are gathered, the 
hypothesis is tested and then either accepted or rejected. Taagepera criticises 
that such method is too robust, not allowing modifications of hypothesis, hence 
important details can remain unnoticed. Also the character of the hypothesis of 
social sciences is weak: the compulsory null hypothesis (dy/dx0) says nothing 
about possible or expected results, and also the merely directional hypothesis 
(dy/dx>0 or dy/dx<0) can easily be fulfilled due to accidental coincidence, but 
they are equally useless for prediction. For prediction and drawing practical 
instructions one needs quantitative hypothesis, that is, a model in a functional 
form (y=f(x)) that can easily be falsified, but in case of confirmation it is equally 
more useful, as it informs about exactly in which proportion and why quantities 
co-vary. Large set of positive cases is often regarded as confirming weak 
hypothesis, but this can be deceptive. According to Taagepera, building a model 
should follow a cyclic path in which hypothesis and empirical data cooperate. 
The 7th chapter “Why most numbers published in social sciences are dead on 
arrival” presents details of methods for solving problems. Whereas in physics 
(and also in common sense) solving a problem starts with figuring out a causal 
model (that is, one contemplates, how things might be connected), in social 
sciences data are collected without prior expectation about them. Then some 
data analysis method is applied, but there are different methods and they 
provide different results, that is, they give different accounts of the reality. In 
physics few numerical results are published and these are meant for employing 
in further inquiry. In social sciences plenty of numerical results are published 
and usually none of them is employed by other scientists. Their aim is to mimic 
quantitative science. 
In the second part of the book “Quantitatively predictive logical models” we 
find chapters 8–13 that present model building in more detail. The 8th chapter 
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“Forbidden areas and anchor points” gives general instructions for building 
certain types of models. First of all one has to determine the conceptually 
possible values of variables (domains of variance) and the values of output 
variables corresponding to extreme values of input variables (anchor points). 
According to this the appropriate scale for presenting graph is to be chosen, that 
is, the possible form of the function (usually nonlinear). Parameters are 
determined empirically. If there are several input variables, the operation 
between them (multiplication, division, …) has to be decided according to the 
way they logically relate to each other (whether they annihilate or enhance one 
another). 
Why may we employ simple functions in social sciences as we do in 
physics? Taagepera proposes that their suitability is to be tested at the least, as 
in physics they are suitable. The models received are deterministic in respect to 
average results, but probabilistic in respect to particular cases – analogously to 
computing the location in quantum mechanics. 
The 9th chapter “Geometric means and lognormal distributions” explicates 
the advances of geometric mean in relation to arithmetic mean with the help of 
examples: geometric mean reflects real tendencies better. In certain cases it is 
also not possible to use arithmetic mean, and in some cases lognormal 
distribution has to be used instead of normal distribution (if the values of the 
variable cannot be negative). 
In the 10th chapter “Example of interlocking models: party sizes and cabinet 
duration” an example from social sciences is presented about how it is possible 
to create logical quantitative models analogously to physics. Variables are the 
size of cabinet, the effective number of parties (Taagepera’s own created 
notion), the duration of cabinet, the number of parties that have won seats in the 
cabinet, the proportion of votes for the winning party – that are interrelated – 
and there is one empirically determined constant. Through logical argu-
mentation a quantitative multiplicative model is achieved (the inverse square 
law of cabinet duration) that approximates well many real cases. The difference 
of the argumentation from physics is that variables are derived from each other 
in line, not as a network, where each relation would bring with it an additional 
factor. Taagepera says that one reason for this is the absence of physical 
dimensions. 
Taagepera does not regard it important to call his models “substantive” as 
some other authors have, as generally he does not need to take into account 
factors specific to social sciences when creating these models, although in some 
cases such factors may pose conceptual constraints. Nevertheless, these models 
are theoretical. He takes the requirement for narrowly social substantive expli-
cation to be sterile when anchor points are all that is needed for constructing a 
model. 
The 11th chapter “Beyond constraint-based models: communication channels 
and growth rates” presents new techniques of building models with examples. 
One of the most important variables in political science and in social sciences in 
general is taken to be communication channels, that is also the number of 
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possible conflicts and is related to cabinet duration as well as to the repre-
sentative assembly size. Taagepera names some other elements that can be 
taken over from physical sciences: minimization and maximization, differential 
equations, notions of entropy and information adapted as appropriate, conserved 
quantities. As an example of minimization, Taagepera gives the changing of the 
representative assembly size that often follows the tendency towards the cube 
root law of assembly sizes without this law being consciously taken as template. 
According to this law the work load of one representative is minimized – 
analogously to the light that minimizes efforts, “choosing” shorter path when 
travelling through a denser medium. 
In the 12th chapter “Why we should switch to symmetric regression” the 
author explicates the advances of symmetric regression in relation to ordinary 
least square regression. The main shortcomings of the latter are that equations 
are non-unitary, irreversible and non-transitive. Regression curves y against x 
and x against y are different and are not deducible from each other, hence they 
do not show the real trend. This jeopardises scientific results as when com-
paring logical model and real data incidental scattering can considerably distort 
their conformity when using standard ordinary least square method only in one 
direction. Such equations cannot make up interlocking systems. In contrast, 
symmetric regression gives only one regression line that is both reversible and 
transitive, making it possible to create interlocking systems of variables. 
However, it does not replace conceptual modelling, being descriptive and still 
apt to mislead. Physics equations form interlocking systems, and due to mutual 
dependence of variables it is possible to reverse equations, even if in reality the 
phenomenon is causally directed (an example is given of law of gravitation, 
force being dependent on masses and their distance). 
The short 13th chapter “All indices are not created equal” explicates testing a 
model with data. Taagepera warns that empirical data should not be taken as the 
ultimate truth, because measurements are usually imperfect: there are different 
measuring methods, measurement errors etc. If for the same index describing a 
phenomenon different values are received, one should prefer the one which 
better coincides with the logically expected relation, because it encompasses 
causal link, it enables generalisation and is more useful for prediction – the 
likelihood that the coincidence is random is very low. 
The third part of the book “Synthesis of predictive and descriptive ap-
proaches” contains chapters 14–18. In the 14th chapter “From descriptive to 
predictive approaches” Taagepera gives the most detailed explication about his 
understanding of scientific theory. Statistical methods employed in social 
sciences cannot lead to laws: they do not distinguish causes, causal chains, 
being too coarse and enabling only to describe, but not to analyse phenomena. 
In physics, theory is a conceptually grounded and empirically tested inter-
locking set of models. But social sciences presently resemble rather the pre-
Newtonian physics or alchemy where one “philosophers’ stone” was to do 
everything: theories of everything, according to Taagepera, appear namely 
during the dawn or noon of theories, at forenoon scientists are too busy 
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researching something. In social sciences different things are called theory: one 
merely directional model can be a theory, but theory can also be “weaker than 
“hypothesis”: “A theory is a set of interconnected assumptions…. From the 
theory, we derive one or more hypothesis”” (quoting Souva 2007). In Taage-
pera’s opinion an important feature of theories is cumulativeness: successive 
paradigms do not replace each other, they build on each other (as on those that 
are presumed). In social sciences cumulativeness means heaping up empirical 
data, accounts of them diverge and paradigms shift often. 
Also the ways how sciences use statistics differ. In physics, linear regression 
lines are mainly used in applications for approximating complex nonlinear laws, 
adapting underlying laws to particular conditions. But those fundamental laws 
themselves cannot be discovered with the help of only statistical methods. One 
starts with qualitative observation, on the basis of which the important 
measurable quantities present in the phenomenon are conjectured. Those are 
tested on a small preliminary set of raw data, using linear regression inter alia 
to hypothetically filter out most important factors (but it is not trusted without 
reserve, however). Further, the nature of the phenomenon is conjectured and 
more data collected. In this way, applying logical discourse and empirical 
testing in conjunction, a quantitative predictive model is finally created. For 
testing this, statistical methods are again employed (preferring symmetric 
regression), but now not anymore on raw data, but on data transformed 
according to the model – that is, it is the model that is tested now, not the 
hypothesis like in social sciences. If the test does not confirm the model, then 
not only the model but also test data are revised. The result of such a cyclic 
model building can be a scientific law. 
In the 15th chapter “Recommendations for better regression” advice is given 
on how to get the best out of concrete empirical data when creating a model. 
The most important is to draw a graph of the data – this enables to visually 
assess whether linear regression makes sense at all and which function would 
best approximate the data. The graph should present the whole domain of the 
function and means to get a more complete view of the phenomenon and 
arrangement of existing data on it. 
In the 16th chapter “Converting from descriptive analysis to predictive 
models” Taagepera gives to the descriptive statistics some hope to be useful: in 
some cases and conditions (if the quantity has a natural scale and zero-point, 
and the logical model contains all variables simultaneously), it is possible, with 
the help of somewhat more complex mathematics, to use its numerical results to 
evaluate the parameter of predictive models. 
In the 17th chapter “Are electoral studies a Rosetta stone for parts of social 
sciences?”2 Taagepera explicates his understanding of the relation between 
mathematics and particular fields of science. In a sense, sciences constitute a 
hierarchy: more mature sciences are mathematically more formalised, and are 
                                                 
2  Rosetta stone was a historical multilingual document that aided to decipher Egyptian 
hieroglyphs. 
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partly a basis for other sciences, helping them in explaining phenomena, and in 
this sense they can be taken as fundamental. Natural sciences (physics, 
chemistry, biology) are mature, formalised, cognitive and social sciences that 
follow them in the hierarchy are not yet mature. Mathematics influences 
sciences and sciences influence each other as to the use of mathematics for 
modelling fundamental phenomena, but they also influence mathematics as to 
developing formalisms. Taagepera presents historical data about the relative 
importance of the elements of quantitative formalisms (data tables, formulas, 
graphs) in publications of different fields as one of the possible indicators of the 
maturity of sciences. 
Comparing natural sciences with social sciences from the aspect of laws, it 
turns out that the boundary between them is fuzzy. Although laws of nature 
(laws of physics) are regarded as eternally true and those of social sciences as 
dependent on contingent context, however, laws of physics should be regarded 
as predicting certain results in certain conditions (Colomer 2007), and in this 
sense social laws can also be regarded similarly. Simply the more generally 
holding laws of physics are formalised using less factors – one has to recognize 
what is essential in the phenomenon, what is additional in certain conditions. 
Observer’s influence on what is observed is taken to be stronger in social 
sciences, weaker in natural sciences. At the same time, it appears to be strongest 
in quantum mechanics. Is it comparable to social sciences? In both nature and 
society one encounters subject’s resistance to influences (for example 
microorganism’s reaction to antibiotics, society’s reaction to acknowledged 
regularity). Taagepera proposes that social sciences should not pretend to 
be(come) totally similar to natural sciences, rather, it should be found out if 
some parts of them can be made more exact than they presently are. That is 
what he is trying to do with the help of electoral studies. 
The most important point about electoral studies is that many of their 
quantities have natural unit and also natural zero-point. The former is missing in 
case of many quantities in physics, the latter in case of many quantities in social 
sciences (for example in opinion measurements). At the same time they have 
the shortcoming that units are not divisible, that is, differently from physics they 
have no natural interval (in other words, they are discrete, whereas quantities of 
physics are continuous). Hence in political science it is possible to apply a more 
stringent scale than in other social sciences. Nevertheless, also in other social 
sciences there exist quantities the soft scale of which can be turned into a firmer 
one, analogously to temperature, that is one example in natural sciences where 
determining the scale has not been unique. That electoral studies can be the 
Rosetta stone for some parts of social sciences, is demonstrated by the fact that 
creating quantitative models based on soft scales has succeeded in some cases 
(De Sio 2006a,b, 2008), but caution is still required, because handling those 
scales in this way is not without problems. 
Therefore, political science can partly be taken as similar to natural sciences 
due to scales of quantities, but as a social science it remains a non-laboratory 
science the subject of which is in constant changing. 
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The 18th chapter “Beyond regression: the need for predictive models” briefly 
rehearses statements formulated in several places in the previous text: social 
sciences might be more quantitative and more successful in prediction than they 
are. They do not correspond to society’s needs, providing merely postdictive 
descriptions that have no practical use. With the help of techniques given in the 
book it is possible to render them more scientific and hence raise their 
usefulness, enhancing the possibilities to use them in social engineering. 
Following the current stream, social sciences end up in a dead end that 





In the following I give my comments on Taagepera’s account. 
The reproach that social scientists are too fond of statistics seems to be 
justified – others, too, have complained about this. For example a PhD student 
whose topic is essentially qualitative is reproached for the lack of statistical data 
and analysis in the research work, regardless of the fact that statistics would 
have no essential role in the particular work. Likewise justified is the critique 
that the role of statistics in social sciences is often mainly ritual, aiming at 
giving a scientific impression. But when a work already contains the numbers 
and looks scientific enough, one needs no other mathematics and the research is 
finished. Prediction – that is supposed to be the main aim of science – is not 
reached. I regard both aspects separately. But firstly I present some 
philosophical conceptions of science and situate the social science criticised by 
Taagepera into this context. 
Rein Vihalemm (1989, 1995) discerns between exact sciences, or physics-
like sciences (phi-sciences) and non-exact sciences. The former are 
constructive-hypothetico-deductive by their method: they construct their 
research area mathematically, on the basis of these mathematical constructions 
hypotheses are formulated, those are tested experimentally, whereas any 
experiment must be reproducible. If an experiment is not possible, like in 
celestial mechanics, hypotheses are tested by observation (quasi-experiment), 
which also must be reproducible. Mathematico-experimentally abstracted 
idealised laws are mathematically deducible from each other. Those sciences 
so-to-say adapt the world to their cognition – the mathematical conceptua-
lisation (mathematical in the general sense) – and the aim of the laws 
formulated in these sciences is to say what is possible and what can be done, 
and not to describe what the world in itself is like, as is the popular under-
standing; that is, the exact scientific laws say which experiment enables 
producing a particular phenomenon, which observation should be conducted for 
detecting a certain phenomenon or event. Non-exact sciences (more precisely – 
non-phi-sciences) are by their method classifying-descriptive-historical: they 
divide the world to be examined into classes according to its detailed 
description, where also its historical development (forming) has to be taken into 
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account. These sciences adapt their cognition to the world – they must notice all 
details and the phenomenon as a whole for adequately describing it. Non-exact-
scientific method stems from natural history, from which Vihalemm yet 
discerns social and humanitarian studies (Vihalemm 2008, 418), that he regards 
rather as philosophies that stem (or should stem) from rational-critical approach, 
from a method that receives feedback regarding values and goals, and that 
enables corrections. But they are not inferior because of this, only their goals 
and possible methods of action are different than those of phi- and non-phi-
sciences. 
Let us notice how Vihalemm’s understanding of the character of physical 
laws differs from that of Taagepera. Whereas Taagepera regards the two 
fundamental questions of science to be “What is?” and “How should it be on 
logical grounds?”, then Vihalemm rejects the first question requiring descriptive 
answer: “The aim of science is not drawing a true image of some phenomenon, 
some sphere in all its diversity, but discovering laws, finding out what, how and 
to what extent obeys laws, what is possible and what is impossible according to 
the laws” (Vihalemm 2008, 414). To its stead Vihalemm takes the question 
“What can be done?” This is inseparable from the experimental character of the 
laws of physics – experiment shows what can be done, and if our logical 
presumptions hold – if it is possible to operate with the world according to such 
a logic, that is, if a phenomenon with such a logic can be selected from the 
world. This kind of selectivity enters Taagepera’s account only in the stage of 
testing when the test data are processed according to the logical model. Of 
course, he does not miss the concrete aspect of doing something with the world 
either, but this appears explicitly only in engineering. This can be an important 
aspect because developing exact scientific laws in some field should presuppose 
the possibility of conducting (in principle) reproducible experiments in that 
field, but in social fields this is highly questionable, if not absolutely 
impossible. 
According to Ronald Giere’s (1988, 2009) account any scientific theory (of 
both exact and non-exact sciences) consists of sets of models. He regards a 
model to be a non-linguistic entity that is defined by some language (for 
example, in exacts sciences mathematically) and that has a similarity in some 
aspect and to some degree with the world, that is, with the part of the world 
modelled. Whether the similarity of a particular model with what is modelled is 
good enough (with respect to the goal and context of the model) is decided by 
the community of scientists. There are models of different levels and they are 
hierarchical: the most abstract are general principles (principled models) that 
correspond to fundamental theories, from which those representational models 
are derivable when concrete conditions are added. From the other side, the least 
abstracted are empirical data, gathered with the help of experimental and 
mathematical means, from those models of data and models of experiment are 
derived. From representational models and models of experiment scientific 
hypothesis are derived that are tested on models of data. For some parts of the 
world, however, principled models may be lacking in principle, in which case 
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representational models are constructed based on models of data with the help 
of additional empirical and mathematical considerations. 
According to Vihalemm’s account social sciences are non-exact sciences and 
they must differ from physics: the statistics employed in social sciences is just a 
particular kind of description – a numerical description. Also collecting and 
using empirical data without the prejudice that some data might be superfluous 
or do not fit into the account should go well according to this account – as all 
details of a phenomenon must be noticed. But if we think about the criticism by 
Taagepera, the question arises: what is the aim of such a description? What is 
the aim of social sciences in general? Taagepera himself seems to endorse the 
point of view (that he explicates to some extent) that the aims of sciences 
consist in their application: the aim of physics, at least for the general public 
and practitioners, is technical engineering, or applying physics to design the 
external physical world; the same holds for natural sciences more generally; 
likewise the aim of social sciences should be social engineering, designing the 
society. Offering knowledge for deriving practical instructions of action, it 
would be useful for the society. Can a social science, descriptive in the way 
presented, enable to design the society? If statistics is a goal in itself for social 
scientists as a research result and there are no more general conclusions about 
the processes in society accompanying it, then probably it happens as Taagepera 
says – its results are dead on arrival. In physical engineering numerical models 
can be used for creating devices because one can select materials with (nearly) 
identical physical properties, process them into (nearly) identical elements, 
taking into account the allowed tolerance, to assemble them in the same way – 
then such model describes every such artefact. However, the existence of 
theoretical understanding of the underlying phenomenon is presupposed. But in 
social sphere one cannot find two identical “materials”, each object of study 
must be approached individually, and if statistics is done on raw data without 
prior understanding of the phenomenon (as is often done for example in 
econometrics, and probably in many other fields), then indeed this statistics 
cannot say anything more general, if anything at all. 
What kind of models, according to Giere’s classification, could be the so-
called statistical models created in social sciences? And are their hypotheses the 
same in this classification as those that Giere calls hypotheses? Giere says that 
for testing hypotheses, models of data are used, not directly data, and let us 
notice that in Taagepera’s account data come into play in both creating and 
testing a model, and he discerns the data used in social sciences from those used 
in natural sciences, as the former piles up data without principled selection both 
for creating and testing a model, the latter stems from a preliminary under-
standing of the phenomenon when collecting data for creating a model, and 
from the created model itself when testing it, on the basis of which is created 
what Giere calls model of data. What is lacking in social sciences? Obviously 
they feature no generally accepted principled models, then, according to Giere, 
representational models should be constructed on the basis of models of data 
and additional empirical and mathematical considerations. According to 
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Taagepera, in social sciences usually no such kinds of models are constructed 
that Giere would call representational models, although there exist data and also 
something like mathematical considerations – statistical methods. But if those 
methods are applied without contemplating their meaning (that is what 
Taagepera reproaches social sciences for), can they be called considerations? 
Also empirical considerations seem often to be lacking – those would be these 
numerous advices that Taagepera gives (taking into account the conceptual 
character of variables, the meaning of anchor points etc.). Is the way data are 
used in social sciences really such that also according to Giere there is no 
selection criterion? Probably there is some, but much more weakly defined than 
in natural sciences. Perhaps the statistical descriptions (or “models”) received 
can be taken for models of data – also the possibility, proposed by Taagepera, to 
employ them in creating a conceptual (or representational) model seems to hint 
at this. As according to Giere’s schema hypotheses are derived from repre-
sentational models, this yields that those called “hypotheses” in social sciences, 
at least the null- and directional hypotheses criticised by Taagepera are not 
hypotheses in Giere’s sense. Perhaps it is those that can be taken for the 
(implicit) criteria for creating models of data? If so, then it seems that in case of 
social sciences we are not dealing with sciences. 
Nevertheless, one could not say, as Taagepera claims, that social sciences 
approach data or observation from an absolutely theory-free position. Theory-
ladenness is a matter of fact emphasized by philosophers of science already long 
ago, that among other arguments helps to refute naïve forms of inductivism and 
falsificationism (the first of which could be regarded close to the methodology 
of social sciences on the basis of Taagepera’s presentation) and that has been 
shown as empirical fact by several studies in cognitive sciences. Also social 
scientists have some understanding of the area they study, of which phenomena 
appear and interact there, what their essential features the correlation of which 
is to be looked for are. At the same time, striving to defy one’s prejudices is 
sometimes necessary, especially when studying a society the cultural and 
historical background of which differs significantly from that of the researcher, 
because radically different factors may appear to be essential there. 
Would it be possible to render social sciences similar to physical sciences as 
Taagepera wishes – at least to some extent? To some extent he has already done 
this of course, as he exemplifies in his book, particularly with political science: 
he has constructed idealised mathematical laws that approximate real systems 
and processes, that is, which have good enough similarity with real systems 
(verified through observation) for being used in prediction. Predictability stems 
from there being identified fundamental phenomena and causal relations in the 
modelled systems, for example communication channels in the case of the 
chamber of representatives and others. Often those phenomena are such 
quantities that can be uniquely measured – that makes it possible to formalise 
their relations mathematically. Nevertheless one must notice that mathematical 
formalism, or rather its interpretation for a real case, is significantly softer than 
in natural sciences: there is always the possibility of big digression that depends 
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on particular society in which those systems are regarded. This means, on the 
one hand, that there are a lot of ceteris paribus conditions that complement the 
formulation of a law and that diminish their generality; on the other hand, it 
may be that the subject of social sciences is not deterministically predictable 
enough like those of natural sciences. They have a great and very essential 
difference: the subject of social sciences has consciousness that the subjects of 
natural sciences, especially those of physics, presumably do not have. 
We presume that the light does not choose how it behaves out of its own free 
will, when passes from a sparser medium into a denser one: we presume that it 
necessarily changes direction and that it has no other choice but to shorten its 
way through the denser substance. But we cannot presume that people always 
know or want to behave in the way that is easier for them or that they have the 
possibility. Human consciousness and free will, even understanding of free will, 
depend heavily on the culture where the human being has formed as an 
individual, and probably on many other factors. Laws and political rules are 
conscious artefacts of human beings that possibly can be mathematically 
described (and many of them have been), but at the same time they can be 
consciously changed, and broken either consciously or unconsciously. 
Taagepera himself gives an example of how one society digressed from the 
cube root law of assembly size. If we have a predictive model for describing 
some (political, institutional) phenomenon of the society, can we predict when it 
will not hold? If even such an essentially formalised field can digress from 
prediction, then we can expect even more in fields of social sciences that have 
less of softer rules. 
Taagepera writes that when creating his models, there was no need to take 
into account any specifically social scientific matters, although these may in 
some cases pose limitations. For the regulated phenomena that he regards one 
can indeed rely, for example, on the law of large numbers or principles of mass 
behaviour that make it possible to average over peculiarities of individuals and 
therefore to abstract from several factors appearing in society. But there are 
factors in society for which such an averaging is not possible: those are dealt 
with in such disciplines as psychology, pedagogy, management theory and 
others. Here such phenomena become fundamental for which mathematical 
formalism analogous to political science may not be realisable, hence it would 
not be possible to construct quantitative models, either. Taagepera does briefly 
mention standardising quantities with a softer scale, but here one must take into 
account factors specific to the society. Many conceptions may have such 
dimensions that render their formalising futile. For example comparing different 
societies as to how they conceive some qualitative conceptions (e.g. democracy, 
capitalism etc.) may be impossible, because different societies perceive these 
things differently due to their different historical relation to them, to language 
(conceptual networks), general mindset dominating in the society and other 
factors that all influence one another and change constantly. 
But also in the cases observed and formalised by Taagepera a particular 
society seems to be a prerequisite: the Western democratic society. For 
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example, one of his presuppositions is that there is communication between 
members of representative assembly and the voters – that not necessarily 
functions in every society. Social institutions that are regulated with some law 
or the will of sovereign are arbitrary in the sense that they can also be changed 
in the same way. They are not necessary. Likewise there are cases in politics 
where the reality departs significantly from the public propaganda, where 
according to the law one state of things is the case (e.g. democratic polity), but 
in reality things function differently (e.g. authoritatively). Thus it is justified to 
doubt if models based on phenomena and tendencies that seem necessary (like 
minimising and maximising) would indeed hold in all possible states and 
polities, including, for example, the Soviet Union, North Korea and others. In 
different states, polities, societies, radically different factors may emerge as 
decisive. For example, the role of religion in society may be inconsiderable or 
fundamental (e.g. Estonia vs India), that on its part is not necessarily reflected in 
politics or economics (compare the low religiosity of Estonian population in 
Christian confessions vs the shares of state budget allotted to the Church, 
particularly in contrast to other religions, including native religion). 
I would give an example from organisation theory as presented by Mary Jo 
Hatch. She considers the following core concepts (we could perhaps also say 
“dimensions”), that are relied upon when constructing organisation theories: the 
environment of organisation, strategy and goals, technology, organisational 
social structure, organisational culture, and physical structure of organisation. 
For each of these aspects, there are several theories stemming from different 
fundamental assumptions (generally divided into modern, symbolic-inter-
pretive, and postmodern views by Hatch) and emphasising different aspects in 
organisations. As it turns out, no theory is futile, but has its own span of 
applicability – as there are organisations of differing sizes, core activities and 
goals, cultural backgrounds etc, and different theories are useful for different 
aims, for example the modernist view is often helpful for managers in concrete 
decision-making process, the symbolic-interpretive view is useful for a more 
coherent understanding of organisations as a social phenomenon. So is each of 
these dimensions on its part divided into sets of core concepts, or dimensions, 
that can take different values that usually are non-exact, non-numerical (or for 
which numerical formalism might not make much sense), but that nonetheless 
can be used to define categories for classifying organizations. These concepts 
are, of course, interdependent, influence each other, and even include each other 
as elements: for example, organisational environment can be divided into basic 
concepts as cultural, political, social, technological, economical, physical and 
legal environment (that, on their part, are not independent of each other, and, 
depending on the context, cannot always be regarded as separate aspects, but 
some of them should often be regarded as one, e.g. cultural and social, or 
economic and political). 
Besides the multiplicity of factors as presented, Hatch points out some more 
features of the subject that I take to be essential from the point of view of exact 
sciences. One of those, strategic management – “an important link between the 
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organization and its environment through which information and influence 
pass” – was regarded as one-directional by modernists, environment influencing 
the organisation; but the link also includes the other direction: “just as strategy 
emerges from organizational processes, so the environment emerges from the 
actions and interactions of organizations.” This means that, unlike exact 
scientific objects that can be (nearly) isolated from the surrounding environ-
ment, its possible intermittent influences, and be studied as an abstracted, 
simple phenomenon (mathematically speaking: boundary effects are reduced to 
minimum), the objects of social sciences usually cannot be isolated from their 
environment – environment with all its aspects constitutes an integral part of the 
object, the boundary between the object and its environment cannot be drawn 
uniquely and unambiguously, which also Hatch explicitly states. 
The other important aspect, which pertains to most social sciences, is their 
fundamental “quantities” (I put the word into quotation marks, because of the 
analogy to the relevant notion in physical sciences, but in the case at hand, as 
we will see, they may not be taken as quantities, that is, as having numerical 
values, at all). In physical sciences, the fundamental quantities like length, mass, 
time and others can be either directly measured, or a unique and unambiguous 
relation between the phenomenon (e.g. temperature or pressure) and a mea-
surable quantity can be established (usually experimentally) so that it is possible 
to formulate strict mathematical laws having those quantities as components. In 
social phenomena those underlying, most fundamental “variables” are different. 
Hatch presents the theory of organisational culture by Edgar Schein, according 
to which culture exists of three levels: the deepest, most fundamental level is 
basic beliefs and assumptions, on which values and behavioural norms lie, and 
on the surface lie artefacts. Schein takes the interrelated core assumptions and 
beliefs about the reality to be the most fundamental level of explanation in 
social affairs. They are invisible, often inaccessible to consciousness and taken 
for granted. Values are social principles and standards held within a culture and 
norms are unwritten rules, usually pertaining to values, both being supported by 
underlying assumptions. Usually they are become aware of when they are 
challenged in a fundamental way. Artefacts are the most observable and 
accessible manifestation of culture, or “remains of behaviour”, but, as Hatch 
writes that “artifacts lie furthest from the cultural core. Their remoteness from 
the core indicates that they are easily misinterpreted by those who are culturally 
naïve, including cultural researchers when they begin a new study.” These 
levels may not be consistent and relations between them are not straightforward 
and unique, hence quantifying the fundamental level with the help of the more 
accessible levels may be problematic and doubtful. Even their conceptualisation 
is problematic: approaching from the researcher’s conceptual framework 
(modernist approach), the studied culture’s constituent concepts may be 
distorted and the result may not adequately reflect it, even though be better 
understandable to the researcher. 
If the fundamental factors of some fields of social sciences cannot be 
mathematically formalised, or to be more exact – to set into a numerical scale 
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(for example they are not measurable straightforwardly but only through a 
complex of other factors), this does not yet imply that they cannot be used for 
creating models. This has been done, but the models are not quantitative but 
qualitative. Those exist, for example, in entrepreneurship studies, in manage-
ment science, but also elsewhere. As these models are often in the form of a 
graph or matrix (e.g. in a lot of cases presented by Hatch, where two dimensions 
of organisation are regarded together, each having grossly two values, making 
up four categories) they might be regarded as mathematical in the general sense 
(whether they also classify as exact in the sense specified by Vihalemm requires 
perhaps special study). Although these models are qualitative, they are never-
theless strict and theoretical: they are idealised from empirical observation, 
taking into account specificities of concrete sphere, and they present causal and 
functional relations between elements of phenomena and conditions in which 
the relations hold. They can also have a form of equation, that is, to resemble a 
law of physics, if they contain measurable quantities (for example the effect of 
multiplication in entrepreneurial cluster of which there exists a theoretical 
logical model corresponding to Taagepera’s criteria and an equation for 
idealised case (the author is Tõnis Mets)), but this is not always necessarily so. 
However, this does hint to one more context, besides that proposed by Taage-
pera, where the statistical “models” of social sciences, or statistical research, are 
useful: namely testing the hypothesis about the modelled phenomenon. But this 
presupposes that the phenomenon itself is very clearly described, its essential 
elements explicated, and there is a theoretical schema about their interaction: 
that is, there exists a representational model in Giere’s meaning. Such a method 
is applied for example in studies about organisational culture, where also 
questionnaires and factors derived from their responses (models of data) are 
used for testing models and measuring concrete quantities of organisations (for 
example to what extent the organisation is a learning organisation3). Often 
phenomena on this level are so complex that creating an algebraic model for 
them would be too complicated, and that is why the least square method is 
chosen that provides a regression equation to be applied to other cases. 
Hatch also provides examples from which we see that the method of social 
sciences starting from zero-hypothesis is not totally useless. Joan Woodward 
studied the performance of organisation in relation to the dimensions of 
structure proposed as underlying by different management theorists: span of 
control, number of management levels, degree of centralization in decision-
making practices, management style. Her hypothesis was that one of the 
established views is more effective than the others (essentially a zero-
hypothesis), and her method was statistical (data analysis based on empirical 
research). Having found no such relations, she continued her research and 
finally came up with technology as another important dimension of orga-
nisation. Besides, her study served as a starting point for other following studies 
                                                 
3  I’m thankful to Prof. Tõnis Mets for the explications and examples from the field of 
management science. 
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that resulted in more thorough understanding and detailed models of the 
particular subject matter. This is a good example of how the criticised social 
sciences’ methods, if applied with consideration, can lead to meaningful results. 
Keeping in mind the assumed goal of social sciences – designing society (or 
social engineering) – such qualitative models and accounts are no less useful 
than strictly quantitative. But they have to be taken with as much precaution: we 
are dealing with a sphere of the world that subsumes to prediction significantly 
less than those of physical and natural engineering. Whereas in the latter it is 
possible to experimentally determine the limits and conditions of validity of 
laws, reproducing experiments in different settings if needed to get all 
conditions under control (if some conditions remain uncontrollable and the law 
candidate unpredictable due to this, then it is abandoned), then in society one 
cannot conduct the same test several times: it is not possible to create exactly 
the same experimental conditions, to use exactly the same test sample, because 
all samples are different (at that, probably not all their differences are 
describable qualitatively, more the less quantitatively), they change in the 
course of experiment, and the experimental conditions change both because of, 
and without the help of, experiment. If in the shaping of society some models 
about it are applied, then the one shaped is always different and reacts to 
shaping differently. Also in natural scientific design there exist such compli-
cated, complex systems, for example, organisms and ecosystems that contain a 
multitude of factors that influence one another and constantly change in time. 
Taagepera himself provides one such comparison as to the reaction of the 
subject to designing, but he regards natural sciences to be similar – physics and 
biology are both mature natural sciences in his account of science, although the 
latter is mathematically less formalised, hence to some extent less mature. 
Nevertheless, one should discern from the point of view of the studied subject 
what and why can be moulded in a strict quantitative shape and to what extent 
also be designed according to those shapes. Vihalemm even thinks that there are 
no laws on the basis of which it would be possible to forecast and control 
evolution, either biological or cultural, social – this process is constant adapting 
to contingent accidental occurrences the results of which cannot be foreseen. 
Forecasting and control can be employed in technique and physics that can be 
accounted for from the point of view of constructive rationalism (Vihalemm 
refers to August von Hayek), but not in conceptions of society. 
To conclude, I firstly must emphasize that the problems regarded in the book 
by Taagepera are real problems that needed to be highlighted and brought to 
attention, and Taagepera’s advice for overcoming them are well to the point and 
hopefully will receive the attention they deserve by social scientists, and will be 
taken into account, and that henceforth the parts of social sciences that are in the 
focus of this critique indeed will be amended and become more scientific. 
Nevertheless one has to be attentive, to follow the advice that Taagepera also 
gives: each problem must be approached individually. But even more: each 
particular case must be approached individually. Not everything is mouldable 
into a quantitative functional form, and if this does succeed to some extent, then 
19 
due to the subject of social sciences we are dealing with a very uncertain 
prediction, for due to variability of context it is not possible to check the same 
statement repeatedly. In this sense social sciences cannot be exact sciences: 
their subject is too self-determined and autonomous and not subjected to 
infallible rules, to necessary laws. Contrary to the subject of physics that of 
social sciences is a conscious being with free will, who can willingly or 
unwillingly ignore the rules and laws created by, or formed among, alike 
beings. In this sense here also the meaning of laws of nature or laws of science 
becomes fuzzy: even if a logical model about a phenomenon is found, be it 
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